


MAY 1952



# JOURNAL



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






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
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
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
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
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# CONTENTS

MAY, 1952

	Page
Secretary's Notes ... ..	vii
Frontispiece: H.M.S. <i>Indomitable</i> .	
The War in Korea with special reference to the difficulties of using our Air Power ( <i>Lecture</i> ). By Wing Commander P. G. Wykeham-Barnes, D.S.O., O.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C., R.A.F. ... ..	149
The Responsibility of Junior Officers to the Laws of War ( <i>Lecture</i> ). By Mr. N. C. H. Dunbar ... ..	164
The Merchant Navy ( <i>Lecture</i> ). By Mr. R. G. Grout... ..	177
A General Survey of the Middle East ( <i>Lecture</i> ). By Mr. Malcolm Muggerridge ... ..	190
The Escape of the <i>Scharnhorst</i> , <i>Gneisenau</i> and <i>Prinz Eugen</i> . Did we let them slip through our fingers? By Wing Commander J. D. Warne, D.S.O., D.F.C., R.A.F. ... ..	201
Standards and Colours in the British Army. By Colonel H. C. B. Rogers, O.B.E. ... ..	206
United States Submarines in the Blockade of Japan in the 1939-45 War—Part II. By Major C. S. Goldingham, R.M., F.R.Hist.S. ... ..	212
The Story of The Royal West African Frontier Force. By Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke, D.S.O. ... ..	223
The Army as a Career for Graduates. By Lieut.-Colonel Frederic Evans, M.B.E., T.D., M.A.(Cantab.) ... ..	230
British Commonwealth Naval Operations during the Korean War—Part III ... ..	241
A New Definition of War and its Application to Air Power. By Captain S. Vines, R.A. ... ..	249
Diary of the War in Korea ... ..	255
The International Situation. By A. K. Chesterton, M.C.	
(i) European Defence Community ... ..	260
(ii) Trieste ... ..	260
(iii) Anti-Colonial Policies ... ..	261
(iv) The Middle East ... ..	261
(v) The Far Eastern Wars ... ..	262
Correspondence ... ..	264
General Service Notes ... ..	269
Navy Notes ... ..	275
Army Notes ... ..	283
Air Notes ... ..	290
Reviews of Books ... ..	298
Additions to the Library ... ..	303
Anniversary Meeting ... ..	306

## NOTE

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May, 1952

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#### Vice-Chairman of the Council

Air Chief Marshal Sir James M. Robb, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C., has been elected Vice-Chairman of the Council for 1952.

#### Vice-President of the Council

Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., has been re-elected a Vice-President of the Council.

#### Elected Members

Major-General R. A. Hull, C.B., D.S.O., has been elected a Member of the Council in the vacancy caused by the resignation of General The Lord Ismay, P.C., G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O., M.C.

The names of Members elected to the Council at the Anniversary Meeting will be found in the Report of the Proceedings at the end of this JOURNAL.

#### Ex-Officio Members

Vice-Admiral C. A. L. Mansergh, C.B., D.S.C., and Major-General B. C. H. Kimmins, C.B., C.B.E., have accepted the invitation of the Council to become ex-officio Members of the Council on taking up the appointments of President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, and Director, Territorial Army and Cadets, respectively.

### STAFF

Wing Commander E. Bentley Beauman, R.A.F., was appointed Librarian on 1st March, 1952.

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Commander I. G. H. Garnett, D.S.C., R.N.  
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Vice-Admiral C. A. L. Mansergh, C.B., D.S.C.  
Commander A. L. Wylde, R.N.  
Commander (E) P. L. Cloete, R.N.  
Sub-Lieutenant C. B. Filmer, R.N.

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Captain E. B. Taylor, The King's Royal Rifle Corps.  
Captain S. A. G. Jaffery, Pakistan Army.  
Lieut.-Colonel N. de P. MacRoberts, D.S.O., M.C., late The Royal Fusiliers.

Captain N. C. H. Dunbar, late General List.  
 Major D. H. Davies, M.C., 7th Queen's Own Hussars.  
 Captain G. H. Cusworth, late The Royal Warwickshire Regiment.  
 Captain J. M. Gow, Scots Guards.  
 Brigadier M. Haq Nawaz, Pakistan Army.  
 2nd Lieutenant J. F. H. Pease-Watkins, Royal Artillery.  
 Major M. G. Stevens, Royal Signals.  
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The Council hope that many more Members will support the Scheme for Covenanted Subscriptions, details of which have been circulated to all Members.

This materially assists the Institution because it enables Income Tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription. It is emphasized that a Deed of Covenant entails no additional expense to the Member, but it goes a long way towards meeting the increased essential costs of administration. Second and subsequent covenants may be executed at the old rate of £1 5s. od. per annum. The Council wish to thank the many Members who have re-covenanted since the beginning of the year.

To date, there are 1,521 Annual and 782 Life Covenanted Members.

Any Member who has not received his copy of the Scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

### LIAISON OFFICERS

The following alterations or additions to the list of Liaison Officers, as published in February, have taken place :—

<i>Establishment or Command</i>	<i>Name</i>
<b>ROYAL NAVY</b>	
Flag Officer, Scotland ...	... Commander J. S. H. Lawrence, R.N.
R.N. Barracks, Chatham...	... Lieutenant-Commander F. E. Meynell, R.N.
R.N. Barracks, Devonport	... Captain (S) H. C. Lockyer, R.N.
Portsmouth Group, R.M.	... Major J. L. Carter, R.M.
Plymouth Group, R.M. ...	... Lieut.-Colonel T. P. Honnor, R.M.
<b>ARMY</b>	
Eastern Command ...	... Lieut.-Colonel C. L. C. Roberts, M.B.E.
Scottish Command ...	... Lieut.-Colonel G. L. W. Andrews, D.S.O.
East Africa Command ...	... Lieut.-Colonel P. H. Man, O.B.E., M.C.
Far East Land Forces ...	... Major O. C. S. Dobbie, M.B.E.
British Element Trieste Force ...	... Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Clarke, O.B.E.
<b>ROYAL AIR FORCE</b>	
Bomber Command ...	... Group Captain J. N. Tones.
Coastal Command...	... Squadron Leader M. Mays.

### TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1951

The Council have awarded the Prize of Thirty Guineas to Major (local Colonel) P. A. Tobin, R.E.

The following Essays were received :—

The best hearts, Trim, are ever the bravest replied my uncle Toby.

The best laid plans of mice and men.

Eagles for Doves.

To prepare for war is not to countenance it. To be not prepared is to invite it. I dare you.

### WESTLAND PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1952

Particulars of this competition will be found in the leaflet in this JOURNAL.

### EARDLEY-WILMOT MEDAL COMPETITION

The competition for the medal instituted by the late Rear-Admiral Sir Sydney M. Eardley-Wilmot will take place this year.

The medal will be awarded for the best essay contributed by a Member of the Institution on :—

"Changes in Naval Warfare owing to new and modified weapons."

Essays must be typed in triplicate, and each copy must be clearly marked "Eardley-Wilmot Competition" on the outside. Care should be taken to avoid confidential matter. When a reference is made to any work, the title of such work must be quoted.



## SECRETARY'S NOTES

Essays must be strictly anonymous, and each must have a Motto, which must be written on the outside of each copy. They must be accompanied by a sealed envelope with the Motto written on the outside, and the competitor's name inside.

All essays must be sent by registered post, addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W.1, and must reach the Institution not later than 15th November, 1952.

## PRIZE

A silver-gilt medal and eighteen guineas will be awarded for the best essay. If this, or any other, merits publication in the JOURNAL, payment will be made at the usual rate. In the case of any essay written by a serving officer, the Editor will seek permission from the appropriate Service Department before publication.

## CORONATION OF H.M. QUEEN ELIZABETH II

Details of the arrangements to be made for viewing the Coronation Procession from the Institution and Banqueting House will be published in the November issue of the JOURNAL. Applications for seats which have already been received from Members have been recorded, but they will carry no priority as a ballot is considered inevitable. No further applications should be made until 1st December, 1952.

Members are requested to await the published arrangements and to refrain from asking for advanced information.

## MUSEUM

On 23rd January, 1952, Lieut.-General Sir George Cory, accompanied by Colonel Perreau and other officers and warrant officers of The Royal Dublin Fusiliers, viewed the silver and other regimental relics of the Regiment which had been deposited in the care of the Institution in 1922. Owing to lack of space it had not been possible to display all these pieces, although many have found a permanent place in the Museum.

With the agreement of the Council of the Institution, the Regiment decided to allot the surplus to approved Army Messes and Establishments, whose representatives also attended. Items were formally handed over and a record has been made in the Museum Registry.

## ADDITIONS

A coloured print entitled "The Review of The Queen's Own Regiment of Yeomanry Cavalry, on Kempsey-Ham." Engraved by H. Pappill from a painting by W. I. Pringle. The Regiment is The Worcestershire Yeomanry Cavalry, 1842 (9552). Given by J. L. Gerson, Esq., T.D.

Four cartridges similar to those reputed to have been one cause of the Indian Mutiny in 1857 (9553). Given by the Rev. H. G. South.

A dress sword of an infantry officer, 1834 (9554). Given by Captain J. D. Daintree, C.B.E., R.N.

The fighting sword of a commissioned officer, Royal Navy, 1884 (9555). Given by Captain J. D. Daintree, C.B.E., R.N.

A sergeant's tunic, 1st King's Dragoon Guards, 1914 (9556). Given by Mrs. E. F. G. Wollaston.

Three bronze medals commemorating the victories in the Crimea, 1854 (9557). (1) Alma, 20th September, 1854. (2) Balaclava, 25th October, 1854. (3) Inkerman, 5th November, 1854. Given by H.M. Queen Mary.

An engraving entitled "The Retreat at Naseby." Engraved by W. Giller from a painting by A. Cooper (9558). Given by Miss C. Oldfield.

### JOURNAL

Offers of suitable contributions to the JOURNAL are invited. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of the recent war; also contributions of a general Service character, such as Strategic Principles, Command and Leadership, Morale, Staff Work, Naval, Military, and Air Force History, Customs and Traditions.

The Editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers and, if found suitable, to seek permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's Commanding Officer.

### CHANGES OF ADDRESS

Members are particularly requested to notify any change of address which will affect the dispatch of the JOURNAL.

Naval officers are strongly advised to keep the Institution informed of their address, as JOURNALS sent to them via C.W. Branch of the Admiralty are invariably greatly delayed.



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# THE JOURNAL

of the

## Royal United Service Institution

Vol. XCVII.

MAY, 1952.

No. 586.

### THE WAR IN KOREA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF USING OUR AIR POWER<sup>1</sup>

By WING COMMANDER P. G. WYKEHAM-BARNES,  
D.S.O., O.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C., R.A.F.

On Wednesday, 5th December, 1951, at 3 p.m.

AIR VICE-MARSHAL SIR FRANCIS J. W. MELLERSH, K.B.E., A.F.C.,  
in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN : As you will know, this is the third lecture that has been given before this Institution on the War in Korea. There have already been lectures covering the naval and land aspects of the campaign, and this afternoon we are to hear something of the air side of the picture. It is my privilege to introduce our lecturer, Wing Commander Wykeham-Barnes, who is to talk to us on "The War in Korea with special reference to the difficulties of using our Air Power."

Early in the campaign, the Americans realized that they had neglected the art of night ground attack, and the Commanding General of the Far Eastern Air Force asked the Chief of the Air Staff for the loan of a Royal Air Force officer who was experienced in that art to go out there and teach them something about it. Wing Commander Wykeham-Barnes had had much experience during the last war in this particular role and had commanded units over North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Germany in this kind of work. He was accordingly selected to go out there, and was attached as an adviser to the Staff of the Commanding General of the Fifth Tactical Air Force.

While he was there, he planned their operations and advised on their tactics. At the same time, he himself carried out a large number of sorties by night against the enemy. He gained a good deal of experience in that country, and I think that he is very well qualified to talk about it this afternoon. I will therefore ask Wing Commander Wykeham-Barnes to give us his lecture.

#### LECTURE

WE are going to speak this afternoon about difficulties in air warfare, just as previously we have spoken about difficulties on the land and on the sea. I want to make it absolutely clear that a lecture packed with difficulties is of necessity also packed with criticism.

We are not interested here in what went well, we shall analyse as best we can this afternoon all the things that went wrong. So we must, in the first place, put the perspective right by showing the enormous value of air power to the land campaign in Korea and the titanic efforts of the United Nations air forces in the early months of the struggle. In particular, we must in all fairness show that their effort from the beginning of the campaign was prompt, vigorous, well thought out, and ruthlessly carried through.

<sup>1</sup>A sketch-map of Korea faces page 258.

There has never been a military Service yet whose theory has matched exactly its practice in wartime. We expect to be a certain percentage wrong. Our struggle is to be as great a percentage as possible right; and so let us go into all those things that went wrong in the air campaign and never forget, throughout them, the great thing that went right. This, in a phrase, was the saving of the Allied armies from utter defeat in the opening stages of the campaign.

#### INITIAL HANDICAPS

First of all is the initiative in this Communist attack. I need hardly say, speaking to professionals, that the initiative is never on our side. It was not in this case. Perhaps the attack was as great a surprise as has been any campaign. Perhaps we may be inclined to turn to our Intelligence Officers and stare them rather hard in the eye. I would not care to criticize. Let us just say that there was surprise; and if we had not the initiative on this occasion that is nothing extraordinary, because we are not war-makers and so we never have the initiative.

Secondly, the theatre. Korea is one of the most difficult countries in the world for tactical aviation. There are two types of country which are most unpleasant for the tactical airman: one is jungle and the other is mountain. Korea is nearly 10/10ths mountain.

Thirdly, for the last of the unavoidable difficulties, I can think of no better name than the hideously jaw-breaking phrase, "the politico-geographical straitjacket." I have to give it some such name as that because it is very difficult to deal with this problem in straight, plain speaking, but the implications are obvious. The airman is taught almost from his cradle that if he wishes to attack the enemy, he must attack him at his source. We have all spent years studying the art of going straight to the source of the enemy's air power in order to begin our struggle for air superiority. The source of the enemy's air power in this campaign is out of bounds.

The fourth factor about which I wish to speak is the one that we can correct. All the previous three are thrown at us as problems, and there is very little we can do about them. This fourth one we can deal with. It is the normal strategical and tactical problem of operations in any part of the world, and we can discuss it constructively, find out, if we can, what went wrong, and attempt to use those instances as arguments on which to build better conceptions. That fourth factor—the normal tactical and strategic method of operations—will be the subject of our discussions.

#### DEPLOYMENT FOR EMERGENCY

First, then, let us go back to the beginning of the campaign, nearly 18 months ago, and look at the first and most difficult problem. We have said that we would never have the initiative. We can only prepare for the call to counter the enemy's move, when in his own good time he strikes against us.

And so the initial deployment of our forces is entirely a child of circumstance. It is chance, and chance which depends very largely on what is nearest to hand, what is most suitable, and particularly upon geography and the availability of airfields. It is vital with air forces to get this initial deployment right. Perhaps it can be said, if the campaign is short and sharp, that the Air Commander's campaign is won or lost in the first few days. Once he has got his initial deployment wrong, only two things can save him from an inevitable defeat. Those two things are good communications and aircraft with a good radius of action.



With the turn-over from conventional propeller-driven aircraft to jets, many aeroplanes were short of range. Communications have always been inadequate in tactical air wars—I should like stronger brains than mine to explain why. But if the Air Commander cannot, for some reason, align his formations correctly in the first few days, these two things are his salvation. He can straighten out the tangle if he has first-class communications and if his aircraft have long range; but if he is short of those two things, and if, moreover, he has had the misfortune to get his units into the wrong place, he is badly placed indeed.

In this campaign we have a land mass to which the enemy has one access through the Manchurian passes. We have access by sea from many directions, doubtless, but initially, when we were being forced back from one position to another, we were not able to put ashore the quantity of air resistance necessary to give the armies adequate support. Since we were not able to do so, our alternatives were no less than three separate land masses: the Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu, the Korean mainland, and the Philippine Islands. Thus the American Air Commander was faced with the problem of lining up his air force against the enemy with only a fraction on the Korean mainland and by far the greater weight of his power distributed between three different islands.

The units which he produced and had to deploy in this air force were mainly the occupational, defensive squadrons of Japan. I do not wish to throw the first stone, but there can be few people who would deny that there is something peculiar about occupation, something which, if it does not actually undermine efficiency, requires added vigilance if it is not to do so.

The fighter squadrons defending Japan had not performed an exercise with the American Army between 1945 and 1950. They were suddenly thrown into this battle. It is not surprising if they were a little out of their depth—they were not surprised themselves.

A war plan doubtless existed for the air defence of Korea in co-operation with the Army. I say "doubtless," because we spend the golden years of our lives in writing war plans for wars which never materialize. We write war plans for North, South, East, and West, and doubtless a war plan was prepared here also. I am not in a position to say, but if it was it had a rough time in its implementation.

It may have relied upon the holding by the South Korean Army of a limited number of air bases for a certain number of days, whereas it is now a matter of history that initially the South Korean Army was broken in a very short time. Its retreat to the South left the great complex of airfields round Seoul in the hands of the enemy. I am speculating, but doubtless the war plan for the air defence of Korea was disorganized with the seizure by the enemy of those bases.

When the air force was built up—and it was built up initially in the most desperate series of counter-strokes—a tactical headquarters had eventually to be formed. The classical conception of this tactical headquarters is that the tactical Air Commander shall stand side by side with the General commanding the ground forces. They are there to stand or fall together. They must consult at least twice daily, and it is a physical impossibility, without telepathy, for them to be apart.

Here we had the great mass of the American air effort outside Korea. The unfortunate General commanding that effort is inside Korea, because, and quite rightly, he must be alongside the General commanding the land forces. Consequently, he has to send his orders over different communications to formations across the water, and his control must lack that personal touch so vital to an air commander.

During my period there, there was a spell of about 24 hours in which communications broke down completely, and we were left to fight the war on our own. Though rather enjoyable in fact, this is certainly wrong in principle.

Communications do not seem to travel. They work well on your home training grounds or in your static organization, but if they are transported 500 miles they take vital time to work up. For many critical weeks the tactical air force worked not as one machine, but as a set of independent fighting units. This is a very grave disadvantage.

#### COMMAND

To complicate the command of the air forces, there was, first, the fact that the Commanding General and his staff of the tactical air force lived inside Korea and his units lived outside. Secondly, the Strategic Bomber Commander and the Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Air Forces had perforce to live in Tokyo, with the heavy striking force close to them. Though the C-in-C. was close to his strategic heavy squadrons, his tactical air force was almost out of his reach.

Another point, which I have no doubt has been covered extensively in an earlier lecture, was the co-ordination of the effort of the air striking forces of the Allied Fleets. Perhaps the only natural feature in our favour in this theatre was the fact that Korea is a peninsula, and we were able to ring it with sea power almost immediately. This was a great advantage in many ways, giving us fluidity of land operation, enabling us to go ashore when we wished and to re-embark where we wished. It enabled us also to keep carrier-borne task forces at sea. To co-ordinate the efforts of the carrier aircraft with the rest of the air campaign was a hideously complicated undertaking.

#### FINDING THE ENEMY

Korea is not an easy country in which to find one's way about at the best of times. It is rather featureless—all the hills look alike and the rivers flow in every possible direction. It has no system. It is perhaps somewhat ludicrous now to think that the ancient name of this country was "The land of morning calm," when the only certain landmark in Korea is the battle line which can be pinpointed by the burning, the explosions, and the tracer. In no other parts of the interior would I care to bet very heavily upon my position from a pinpoint.

Thus it becomes exceedingly important to have up-to-date radar and radio navigation. This relies on ground stations which must be deployed, and they do not work well immediately. At the time when I knew this theatre, it was as likely as not that the navigational aids for which one was briefed would fail to materialize. A beacon which was supposed to acknowledge on such and such a frequency very often did not do so. The fixer service was equally unreliable. It is the same problem of the transplanting of a static organization suddenly into the field.

The navigational facilities that were there were much overcrowded, because the build-up of squadrons out-stripped the capacity of the ground organization to handle and to serve them. It is much easier to build up in actual aeroplanes, which can eat up the miles to the battle area, than to build up the vital facilities necessary to operate them economically. To build up a radar warning system, a radar interception system, a radio/radar navigational system, and a series of homing beacons takes time, and during the time that it was being built up it was very difficult indeed to operate efficiently.

Perhaps this might be taken as a confession of weakness, but we must, in fact, prepare for the type of war we expect. If we prepare for, and expect, a highly scientific war, we must prepare and train very scientifically. In this particular case, in the air, as in many other things, the clock suddenly went back many years, and navigators who had been taught to rely on radar and astro-navigation suddenly had to work with nothing but a crumpled map and a stop watch, and the map none too accurate either. Can we, however, decide deliberately to put back the clock in our training mechanism because of this possibility that we may suddenly have to fight a very unscientific war?

By now both the warning system and the navigation system are well up-to-date and working very well. Many of those early problems have gone, but they must be emphasized because the early part of the campaign is so much the most vital part, when everything hangs in the balance.

#### STRIKING THE ENEMY

Now, the aircraft are there and the organization to handle them works smoothly. In the early part of the campaign it was a matter of flinging bombs and rockets at the advancing Communists to try to save our own troops from annihilation. Later came a scientific and a systematic scheme of air co-operation. It is obvious that the Communists launched this campaign without the slightest belief that they would ever need more than a token air support. Their own air force was extremely small, and even weaker than its numbers suggested. It was disposed of in under three weeks. I cannot, therefore, believe that the Communists ever planned a war in which air action would play a decisive part.

Within three months of the outbreak they were facing a very heavy weight of aviation. I think that any soldier would agree that the air attacks which the Communists had to endure within three months of the opening of the war was equal to that thrown against any army to date.

They have had to endure that day in, day out, ever since, and very rapidly they acquired the art of camouflage, and acquired it the hard way. The man who does not camouflage well in the middle of the day may be dead by sundown; and I would say that in a considerable experience of trying to see armies from the air, I have never seen a camouflage like the camouflage of the Communist Army. They are, to all intents and purposes, invisible. They carry their policy to such lengths that they have been known to cover the tracks of an armoured fighting vehicle as it makes them. In some cases there are photographs which show tracks that have been rather inadequately rubbed out, and on one occasion somebody caught them at it.

They have concentrated, in a country which is a mass of small villages with few towns, always in the villages, where they could put their troops under cover, their trucks in houses, and their tanks in barns, and where, in a quite small village, two or three battalions could practically disappear from sight. To get them out of these hide-outs has required very extensive damage to the civilian population of Korea. It is one of the most unhappy and lamentable features of the campaign that in the effort to extract the Communists from these village strongholds, the civilian population has suffered abnormally, even worse than in the wars in the West.

Wherever their bridges are destroyed they have built underwater bridges, very hard to detect, except on photographs, and, when detected, extremely hard to destroy. In a word, they have become the masters of camouflage and deception, and I do not think any of us would be ashamed to turn to them for instruction in this art. They have, after all, learned in a harder proving ground than any of us, for anyone who

has had the better part of 400 fighter-bomber sorties a day thrown against him on a narrow front is bound to learn. They have learned.

How have they survived this incessant pounding? We know something about Korean morale because we have Koreans fighting on our side. We know rather less about Chinese morale, but it must be a formidable factor if it can withstand the weight of these attacks. The effect of rockets, napalm, bombs, and cannons all going one way on this front must be devastating to any soldier, particularly when his own aviation shows no signs of fighting on his side.

I must remind you that since the first two weeks of the Korean campaign until, in fact, yesterday, the Communist armies have never seen an aeroplane of their own over their heads, to our knowledge. I think it was 10 days after the beginning of the campaign that the last Communist aeroplane flew over their own troops in the front line, and it was yesterday that the first MIG-15 flew over Communist troops in the front line. They have had more than a year with the skies empty of their own aeroplanes and full of the enemy's.

To overcome the remarkable camouflage, certain steps have had to be taken which are unnatural to normal tactical warfare, and they should be considered with the greatest reserve because they are not possible under what we regard as normal circumstances. To start with, they are all based upon complete air supremacy. The changing condition of the air war may cause a modification of these tactics soon.

Air strikes in support of the army have been directed very carefully and minutely against targets in detail, both by advanced armoured posts (O.P. posts controlled by the Army), by A.O.P. aircraft flown by the United States Army, and by an air observer keeping a constant watch on the front, which the Americans call the "Mosquito" tactic, "Mosquito" being a code name which they use for the spotter-director of the fighter-bombers.

The system is as follows. The aircraft take off from their base on a pre-arranged strike. When they come into the proximity of the battle line, they call on a pre-arranged frequency for a director. The director will either confirm or cancel the leader's orders. If the director cancels the order, he will put the aircraft under a "Mosquito" aircraft, which will direct the leader against the enemy in very great detail. The "Mosquito" will not merely be content to show our aircraft the area in which the enemy is to be found; he will practically show it the enemy in person. If the pilot is unable to follow his directions, the "Mosquito" is prepared to show, with tracer gunfire or something similar, the exact spot at which to direct the attack.

In addition to the pre-briefed strike, the "cab rank" system may be used under the direction of the "Mosquito" aircraft. Fighter-bombers are flown into the air and are held against possible disposal on the "cab rank" until a call from the Army gives them a strike under the direction of the "Mosquito" aircraft.

#### INTERDICTION

The system of attacking the rearward elements of this invisible army had to be greatly modified. They were just as invisible in the rear of their army as they were in the battle line and, after the first few weeks, attacks on their communications by day began to show dwindling results. As they must be getting their supplies from somewhere, attacks on their communications by night were added.

But we all know that the mortal thrust in attacks on communications comes when the battle breaks open, when the movement begins, when the break-through is established, when whole divisions must be moved from one focal point to another.



That is when the transport goes on the road, when the ammunition trucks, the petrol tankers, and all the vast supporting fleet that goes behind the fighting army begins to move. So long as the battle creeps around yard by yard, attack on communications is not a decisive factor and can only weaken the enemy, and not mortally wound him.

However, by attacking by night it was possible to cut down the fighting efficiency of the Communist front line, and to ensure that every man, every weapon, every shell, every sack of rice, every tin of petrol had to be smuggled into the enemy front line. I have already said that the Communists are first-class camouflage artists. I am bound to admit that they are also first-class smugglers. The stuff still gets there, and until the war can be stirred into a war of movement I do not believe that the interdiction can ever be decisive.

#### SUITABILITY OF WEAPONS

I do not think that the evaluation of the weapons used in this war should occupy us very long. There has been nothing revolutionary and, perhaps with the exception of the napalm incendiary bomb, there is nothing of which the capabilities were not a known factor. The napalm bomb proved itself to be extremely valuable in many aspects of hill fighting and in many uses, both against armour and against strong-points of every kind. We must not be too precipitate in our claim for this weapon, but we should at least give it a fair trial, and that, I think, we are now doing. At the beginning of the campaign, it was distrusted by many people.

A false lesson that came out of Korea was a denigration of the jet aircraft as a support weapon for the Army. The argument went as follows: "The jet flies fast, the jet has short endurance. We want to see what is going on on the ground and to attack it. The jet cannot do these things. It goes by too quickly, and it goes home too soon." That argument was built on a number of somewhat ill-digested lessons. But with a few adjustments in the design of the jet which may be used for ground attack, it will be found to be more suitable and have a higher hitting capacity and a higher sustained offensive capacity than its equal weight, pound for pound, of propeller-driven fighter-bomber. We may raise this matter in discussion. Personally, I regard the lesson as proved.

#### STRATEGIC BOMBING

The initial strategic target was the industrial area situated between Hamhung and Wonsan. With a certain amount of initial inaccuracy, the heavy bombers corrected their aim and eliminated it very quickly. In fact, it is fair to say that the strategic bombing ceased after about two months of war; but perhaps we must get a new idea of strategic bombing. Certainly, the war potential in Korea, or that part of the war area which was not out of bounds, was successfully eliminated in a very short time.

Then began the isolation of the enemy army by bridge-busting, and that is still going on. The type of bridge which is built in Korea, which is a land of bridges, is extraordinarily hard to hit from the air, but I think it is safe to say that every bridge of tactical importance to the enemy has by now been destroyed.

Unhappily, the Communists have mobilized a huge army of labourers. With this almost inexhaustible supply of coolie labour, they are prepared to rebuild bridges in wood, or under the water in the form of stone ramps and embankments almost as fast as they can be destroyed. A very elaborate bridge recently destroyed for, I think, the second or third time was rebuilt completely in wood within 48 hours and had to be destroyed again. The work of the strategic bombers for many months past



has been destroying semi-tactical targets which are built up again almost as fast as they are hit.

At first, the bombers went unescorted, but to continue their policy they are needing every day a heavier weight of fighter defence.

#### SUPPORT OF THE AIR FORCES

The supply and maintenance problems of this campaign were headaches from the outset. Only Pusan was a port of any use whatsoever as a supply base. It had an extremely limited handling capacity and never really gave the air force the backing it required. There are now, of course, additional port facilities, but I think they will never be completely adequate.

The battle, therefore, particularly at its most critical phases, has been most intensely affected by the United Nations capacity to bring air transport aircraft into the theatre. Again and again air transport has been called upon to supply for an emergency in very large tonnages. Nobody who observes this campaign can fail to be impressed by the extent to which air transport has been called in at crucial moments and the magnificent service which the American air transport organization has given.

The essential lessons for us with air transport are, first—and we do not need to be told this—that it is vitally important; and second, that when forming it we need two sorts: long range and high speed, in small quantities; short range and slow speed, in large quantities. Those with short range and slow speed must have certain qualities. First, this type of aircraft must take off and land in the smallest possible space. Secondly, the speed is quite unimportant—anything over 100 miles an hour will do. Thirdly, it must be utterly reliable, with the reliability not of a Ford car but of a horse and cart. If it is not reliable, the situations into which it is thrown will merely deliver it into the hands of the enemy. The United States Air Force were operating transports continually from airstrips that were practically within artillery fire of the Communist lines. If they are operating when we are retreating, an aeroplane need only be unserviceable for two hours and it is delivered into the enemy's hands. Short landing and reliability for our air transport are necessary before all else.

To complement that most important characteristic, we must be experts in the art of building airstrips. Naturally, the smaller the distance required by our transport aircraft for landing and take-off the smaller we need to build our airstrips. The problem of air supply in Korea became almost entirely a problem of building strips. Korea has very little flat land and most of that is marshy. Every airstrip was a major engineering effort. We must invent an airstrip that needs less man hours to build it. It is, perhaps, as important a problem for our engineers to face as is the problem of building the highest performance fighter.

#### THE GROWING BATTLE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY

Lastly comes the problem of fighting the MIG-15. This, which has developed in the last few months into the major factor in the air war in Korea, is perhaps the most interesting problem to the professional airman. Why did the MIG. come into the war at all? The MIG-15 is a most up-to-date fighter. It is right in the very forefront of the world's technical designs. It is still at the stage where it would be excusable to nurse it on the smooth cement runways of its homeland. Starting with a small and an ineffective air force, the Communists are now deploying ever-increasing quantities of a delicate and expensive machine, towards an end which is still a mystery.

I cannot see any reason for the first nine months of its operation but that of tactical trials. It first appeared on 17th December, 1950, and it has been slowly extending its influence, very cautiously, mile by mile, and, increasing the size of its patrols aircraft by aircraft, it has been spreading South.

At first, it was flown cautiously and inexpertly. It has since been flown very much better. At first it avoided combat; now it is tending to seek combat. Everything that we see about the behaviour of this aeroplane shows us that Korea has been used as a testing ground for it. By a combination of light airframe, high engine thrust and good aerodynamic design—I was tempted to say "fortunate" aerodynamic design, but it is a wrong principle to attribute good luck to one's opponents—a first class aeroplane has been produced. Let us make no mistake about it.

We thought that it had two or three weak spots. We are beginning to doubt whether it has these. It is flown by pilots who speak Chinese on the radio. I cannot say that that proves anything particular, because one needs no more than about 200 words to operate aircraft on the radio, and even when these words are Chinese they can be learned.

Most important of all, its bases are North of the Yalu River. Consider the predicament of the Air Commander of the United Nations air fighters in Korea. He sends his aircraft from about the 38th Parallel and flies them 150 miles North towards the border to maintain the air superiority necessary for our armies to operate unmolested from the air, and also, of course, for our bomber offensive to continue unchecked. They arrive with a great deal of their fuel used up. When they arrive, they provide protection for the friendly bombers or protect the area in which the bombers may be expected. They attempt to supply "area superiority"

At the time which suits them, when the sun is in the right position, when their morale is at its highest, and when their formation is perfect, from across the Yalu River in the North come 50, 60, or 100 MIG-15s. We cannot even photograph them on their bases. We cannot molest them on their airfields, nor attack them while they take off nor surprise them while they are forming up. We wait, as we must, until they have reached the height of 40,000 or so feet, until their formation satisfies their leaders and they have the sun behind them, and until we are ourselves rather short of fuel. They then come; then the fight begins.

That is the problem in front of the Fighter Commander in Korea. How long he can continue to give an assurance to his Commanding General of a reasonable degree of air superiority under those conditions, it is not for me to say, but with so many factors against him it must be exceedingly difficult for him to cope, even now.

The accounts of fighting this MIG-15 show that under any circumstances it would be an opponent to be respected. It has an excellent performance. It has a very powerful and hard-hitting armament, although in some respects we think that this is not entirely suitable for jet-to-jet fighter engagement. This may partly account for the fact that the engagements between jet fighters have not produced very heavy casualties as yet on either side, coupled with the fact that up to now the MIGs have not pursued a particular air policy. They just interfere. We think that now they are bidding for air superiority over the heads of their own armies, and we may expect to see more decisive results when the fighters engage and stay until a decision is reached.

#### CONCLUSION

Let me summarize. Some of the worst problems were at the outset. First, some unsuitability of equipment and training. That, we feel, is inevitable. No military

force has ever gone into the field with completely suitable equipment and training. Had it done so, it would have been too good for this world. Next, shortage of airfields, shortage of means to make airfields, shortage of communications and inadequacy in their working when they are transplanted; navigational facilities which are not sufficiently portable; and being thrown back upon elementary navigational principles which have fallen out of use, perhaps because we have advanced too far along purely scientific lines; deployment of forces in the field due to necessity, and the awkwardness and the handicap of using those forces subsequently after they have once been deployed. Remember how difficult it is for an air commander, once all his units are deployed and the supporting lines built up to keep those units working, to change everything round.

Of the problems which still persist now, the greatest difficulty of all is fighting an enemy whose base is just off-stage. Secondly, attacking an army that has brought camouflage to the highest pitch of perfection we have seen yet. Thirdly, the natural disadvantages of that unhappy country. Fourthly—something which is completely fundamental and, perhaps, valueless to this lecture, but who can resist mentioning it?—the lack of the initiative. The enemy still has a positive aim; we are merely trying to frustrate it.

We all of us spend our working lives planning to face first this threat, then that, and then another, none of our own making. We have always to plan for someone else's war, and we always will have to plan for someone else's war—a multiplicity of plans, a piling up of one imponderable upon another. How happy for a while is the aggressor, who designs his own war and then duly begins it in his own time. He may face an International Court of Justice in the end, but I cannot help a twinge of envy for him as he puts down on paper all the things he has learned throughout his professional life and, for at least the first few months, sees them all go smoothly into action.

For us, instead, an infinite combination of possibilities; consideration of every part of the world as a possible scene for our next containing action, an endless diversity of uses for our machines of war. The unhappy designer says to us "this equipment will never be meant to do so and so." It may not be meant to do it, but doubtless it will have to do it; and, always, in the course of our training and in the course of our planning, we must prepare it for anything that may come, so that we may turn to face whatever may be sent against us.

#### DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN: The meeting is now open for discussion and questions.

BRIGADIER RACKHAM: Can the lecturer tell us if the enemy took any offensive action from the ground against our aircraft in the way of anti-aircraft guns and matters of that kind?

THE LECTURER: It has been one of the most striking aspects of this campaign from the air that the anti-aircraft opposition has been very weak. After all, if the enemy is producing a fighter in the very forefront of the world's fighters in performance, we might at least expect him to balance his forces with an equally convincing demonstration of anti-aircraft fire, which is, of course, a great deal easier to deploy than is a large fighter force. But nobody has ever reported anti-aircraft fire remotely approaching the scale, intensity, or accuracy to which we were accustomed from the German Army. Some radar flak has been reported, but that, too, has been too low in intensity to be really effective against our aircraft.

BRIGADIER RACKHAM: There is another question I should like to ask. I am very interested to hear about the use of air transport. I am not in the Army now, and so I am not up-to-date. How is it envisaged, in the British Army at any rate, that this air

transport, which I am quite sure will be most extensively used, will be controlled? Will our Divisional Commanders, or at least our Corps Commanders, have a squadron or something of that sort to take the place of our R.A.S.C. in the future?

**THE LECTURER:** The normal principle is that some of the air transport will be under the control of the Tactical Air Commander, who links arms with the Army Commander, and that the Army Commander should convey to the Tactical Air Commander his requests for air transport, much in the same way as he conveys his requests for all other air support.

When asked for normal air support, the Tactical Air Commander may have to reply, "I am sorry. I am fighting for air superiority to-day." Likewise, when he is asked for air transport, it may be that the Air Commander may have to say, "To-day I am building up fuel for my fighters." If it is vital for the Army Commander to have air transport, the matter will have to be referred higher. Needless to say, advance planning normally eliminates such a situation.

If the air transport is placed under the command of anybody at a lower level, there is very great danger of its being wasted. The essential in the operation of all aeroplanes—civil, military, flying-boats, helicopters, and everything—is that they should touch the ground at the rarest intervals, and stay there as little as possible. In the civil air lines, that is the measure of efficiency, and the same measure of efficiency applies in an air force, because if aircraft sit around on the ground they do no good. The object of keeping their control vested in the Air Commander is to ensure their full employment.

**GROUP CAPTAIN DUNDAS:** The lecturer said it was thought at first that the MIG-15 had two or three weak spots, but that it is now believed that those thoughts were unfounded. Is the lecturer prepared to enlarge on that? He referred also to its armament as being unsuitable for fighter v. fighter work. Is it possible for us to have some enlargement on this also?

**THE LECTURER:** One of the weak spots, we thought, was the armament. You will know that its three guns, of heavy calibre, produce a combined rate of fire of about 1,000 rounds a minute. This does not seem sufficient for fighter to fighter combat. In fact, the combat reports by United Nations pilots are full of accounts of how "I was flying along when I was unexpectedly attacked by a MIG-15," but with no mention of hits. You will agree that it is very disgraceful for a fighter to attack a machine which is not prepared, to attack it from behind and out of the sun, and to miss it completely. That has been done a great deal. Perhaps it is not entirely a matter of the rate of fire. It is suspected that the trouble may be due to bad gunsights or bad shooting. It may be as simple as that.

A great many hopes were expressed that the MIG would be difficult to control at low speeds. That is something which might be expected with a high speed, high performance aeroplane, and there seemed to be good reasons why it could be so. But later experience has shown the MIG to be very easy to control at low speeds—in fact, exceptionally easy to control. A most disappointing discovery!

**COLONEL FOOKS:** I should like to ask the lecturer a question. In Korea, do the United States, for instance, have a separate Air Force and a separate Army?

**THE LECTURER:** Yes.

**COLONEL FOOKS:** But earlier, in about 1944, the Air Force was under the control of their Army, was it not?

**THE LECTURER:** Yes, but now it is separate.

**SQUADRON LEADER J. L. NUNN:** Early in the lecture navigational difficulties were discussed, and among other things it was said that the clock had been put back as far as astro-navigation was concerned. Surely, astro-navigation is the one aid which could immediately be put into effect in Korea, provided there were two people in the aircraft. There is no necessity for a lot of equipment, or for radio or radar beacons to be used. It is the simplest form of navigation, and it is quite fundamental. I was rather surprised by the statement.



Secondly, I wonder whether the lecturer could say a little about the performance of the Australian squadron in Korea, which has been operating so well from the outset?

THE LECTURER: Regarding astro-navigation for tactical use, of course there are two essentials. One is to be able to look down, and the other is to look up. The reason that astro-navigation has been of only very limited value in this theatre has been because the air forces have been looking down so hard. Even what the Americans now call medium bombers have been flying extremely low, and this too often puts clouds between you and the stars. The questioner may now ask how heavy aircraft that should rely on astro-navigation, come to be flying in such intimate contact with the ground.

What is happening is that we are attacking too small a target with too big a weapon. I think we are doing that consciously and purposely, and very rightly, no doubt, in order to save our soldiers from having to fight continual hand-to-hand battles with the Chinese, who can go on doing that for a thousand years without even noticing their losses.

As regards the Australian squadron, No. 77, the General Commanding the United States Fifth Tactical Air Force himself said that it was "the best squadron I had; the one that set the pace." Although that statement was made some time ago I would be willing to bet that it still applies. They have the highest possible morale, and their standard of maintenance is tremendous.

Of course, in their tactics and their fighting system they have to integrate 100 per cent. with the United States Air Force, as they are working with them all the time. If the United States Air Force doctrine in any way deviates from their own, they have to accept it.

WING COMMANDER GIBSON: Can the lecturer say how the North Korean forces have tackled the airfield problem?

THE LECTURER: They have kept the forward airfields in being by exactly the same method as in the repair of bridges and everything else we have knocked down—by unremitting labour, by astronomical numbers of coolies, who either completely disregard death or else the people who control them completely disregard it for them.

For example, in every bomb load dropped on airfields, nearly half the bombs are delayed action; and so the bangs go on for days. This, we know from various sources, has caused extensive casualties in the repair forces. None the less, the forward airfields get repaired somehow or other, and they manage to keep sufficient of them in being to operate a very small number of aircraft from North Korea—none of them MIGs.

The airstrips that they keep in being must be smaller, bumpier, and less attractive in every way. The airfields from which the MIGs are operating are out of camera range, and, as I say, out of bounds and, presumably, have been less disturbed than my own aerodrome. They are out of bounds, and so they are probably excellent air bases. If they were not out of bounds, they would cease to be excellent air bases in a matter of hours.

MR. GRATWICK: Have there been any particular difficulties in maintaining aircraft in use in Korea, and has this, combined with any battle damage, seriously affected the rate of effort aimed at in the use of the aircraft?

THE LECTURER: It depends entirely upon the class of aeroplane. As the jet aircraft has taken the place of the propeller-driven aircraft, both the maintenance has been easier and the battle damage less severe. The speed of the jet saves it from much of the ground fire, and a hit from a heavy machine-gun is often less serious. Thus a propeller-driven aircraft which is struck in the engine or in the cooling system, if it gets back to our lines at all, will usually crashland with a seized engine, and will be either a rebuild or a write-off, whereas a jet aircraft under similar circumstances will very likely land back at base wheels down, and it will be merely a question of repairing the initial damage.

However, the problems of maintenance are hideously difficult. Under the circumstances which I have outlined, it may well be imagined that spares are very hard to come by. Secondly, the country has been beaten to pieces. Those of us who knew the Western



Desert at its worst period—say at the end of 1942—if we pick the worst spot there, where the greatest number of tanks had fought, and multiply that by three or four, we have the environment of a typical Korean airstrip—up to the knees in dust in dry weather, and similarly in mud in wet weather. In those circumstances maintenance is horrible, and particularly the maintenance of delicate equipment such as air cameras, instruments, radio, and radar.

MAJOR-GENERAL B. T. WILSON : Were the Commanders of the United Nations forces able to get their attacks supported from the air by a considerable number of aircraft ; and if so, was that support effective ? I should be very interested to know from the lecturer whether there was any approach to the success of the close fighter support that was given in the North African campaign ?

THE LECTURER : It would be hard to make a general answer which would be completely satisfactory, because the war is a year and a half old now and during that time support has occasionally been either more or less than required.

Perhaps the best way to answer would be to say upon what the success of the support depended. When the communications worked well, and in particular when the forward troops were able to identify themselves reasonably easily or when the enemy could be flushed a little, support was usually first-class. It was very rare for there to be not enough aeroplanes to go round.

The next thing is to direct the strike against that part of the enemy which is holding up the ground forces. That was the crux of the air support manoeuvre. When the enemy had not been disturbed in any way, or when we were unable to put down on them some indicator, such as coloured smoke, it sometimes was exceedingly difficult for fighter-bombers to make an effective strike. But if they were disturbed a little or indicated, or in some way shown to the fighters, they could be struck. When they were struck, I do not think that any military commander in that theatre would have any quarrel with the effectiveness of the strike, because the fighting power, air to ground, of a fighter-bomber has increased tremendously in the past few years.

In particular, the use of rockets and napalm has reached a stage where a very small number of aeroplanes can deliver a fearful punch if they can once locate the spot and put their sights on it. It is the location which is the great difficulty.

AIR COMMODORE COHU : Can the lecturer say a little more on the operational merits of the jet as against the piston-engined fighter ? It seems to me that, apart from the battle for air superiority, the piston fighter has many advantages over the jet. I am thinking of longer endurance, easier logistics, smaller airfields, and so forth.

THE LECTURER : There have been very powerful arguments on either side, supported by officers of much greater seniority and experience than mine, but I think that the swing of the argument is turning in favour of the jet aeroplane.

The chief conventional argument is the range of the piston engine. That is undeniable. Whether the jet engine can match it in the foreseeable future is a little beyond me, although I should not be surprised if there were someone in this room qualified to reply.

If we put aside that question of range, we have many other very excellent arguments on our side. First, the jet aircraft definitely wins on maintenance, at least according to my information. In ability to absorb enemy fire and come home, it wins, even over an air-cooled radial engine.

Thirdly, the visibility from the average jet as compared with the average piston-engine fighter is infinitely better, because in a propeller-driven aeroplane there is usually a monstrous engine and four, five or six blades in front of the pilot. The jet pilot has an excellent view of the battle.

The speed of the jet aircraft has been quoted against it in this type of warfare, and I admit that the slower the aircraft goes, the more the pilot can see. Nobody denies that by coming to a dead stop one can see most of all ; but a properly directed jet can pick up small targets on the ground very much more quickly than was ever supposed possible.

The ability to turn and attack, once the object has been seen, lies almost entirely in the rate of the roll of the aeroplane. If it has powerful ailerons and rolls fast, the pilot can get on to the target in a very short time. He can pick up a target and put his sights on it almost as quickly as a comparably slower aeroplane that does not have the same rate of roll. Therefore, if the rate of roll can be increased proportionately with the speed of the aeroplane, there seems to be no reason why the jet should not be just as good a ground attacker, and moreover, one that can defend itself in the air in the face of enemy opposition.

People came back initially from this theatre of war with quite different ideas. They said some very harsh things about the jet fighter-bomber. Some of the things they said were justified at the time and place they said them, which was in the opening of the campaign. It was, of course, intimately bound up with the fact that the first jet pilots to come into this theatre had never in their wildest dreams imagined themselves supporting the army on the ground. They were, therefore, even more inexperienced in this type of warfare than their comrades in the propeller-driven aeroplanes.

Whenever I see an air unit in the Royal Air Force and read "This unit is to do so and so," I always feel inclined to add at the end of it, "and anything else which anybody can think of."

If we have any spare time in training, it is not a bad idea to think of one or two training exercises totally unconnected with one's own primary role, just to give pilots a little experience of what is liable to happen when a war begins. With fighter-bombers, everybody wants them, and wants them to do everything.

CAPTAIN ROBERTSON, R.N.: Would the lecturer consider it useful experience for a Royal Air Force fighter squadron to do a spell of duty in Korea?

THE LECTURER: Yes, except that if you say "a unit," it means that such a unit would have to stay there for a sufficiently long time for the move to be economic. And such a period might be too long. I have tried throughout to stress how unrealistic this air war has been to date. It is now getting, I am afraid, very much more realistic. Within a matter of weeks, all the fighter units in Korea may be fighting for the control of the air. Then, indeed, it would be a most valuable experience for a fighter unit to go there.

As long as they are fighting in support of the Army on the ground, I consider that it would be of the most vital importance to send pilots there, and not a unit, because the pilots want experience of shorter duration and more widely spread among a number of pilots than would be obtained by the sending of a unit. If the Korean war is an unrealistic one for the airman it is better that a lot of individuals should get a little experience of it, than that a few people should have a great deal.

LIEUT.-COLONEL BLACKER: Is the lecturer able to say anything about the capacity of rotating wing aircraft to withstand punishment from the ground?

THE LECTURER: There is not very much information, I am afraid. The special qualities of a rotating wing aircraft, of course, have been exploited very thoroughly in this campaign, and the uses of the rotating wing aircraft are increasing daily. I think that the reason why so few of them have been shot down is the cunning way in which they can be used. That is to say, instead of blundering into trouble, if necessary they can stop and consider, which few conventional aircraft can.

Perhaps, therefore, the truer evaluation is not the capacity of a helicopter to absorb punishment, but its capacity to avoid punishment—and that has been considerable. It has gone into the most unpromising situations and has come out without a scratch because of its own peculiar qualities.

THE CHAIRMAN: As there are no more questions, there are a few words I should like to say. We have listened to a most interesting and admirable lecture, and before I express on your behalf our thanks to the lecturer, there are one or two points I should like to touch upon.

I think it is impossible at this stage to attempt to assess the value of air power in the Korean campaign. We have heard, and we all know, that the powerful American strategic bombing force has been completely hamstrung. In the very early days of the campaign—as the lecturer said, in the first two months—they probably had a certain number of targets that might legitimately be called strategic targets. They dealt with those in the first few weeks, and since that time it has not been possible to employ them in their proper role.

Then again, as far as the tactical air forces are concerned, we have heard of their difficulties—equipment, airfields, communications, and so on—but once again I think it has been somewhat unrealistic in that until very recently, at any rate, they have enjoyed almost complete air superiority. But despite this, there is no doubt that they have put up a magnificent show. In the very early days in particular, during the efforts to hold the Pusan beach-head, and operating as they were from the Japanese mainland, it was a most remarkable effort on their part.

There are one or two things that the lecturer said to which I should like to refer. He has mentioned the question of the importance of the design of our equipment, both ground and air, for this very tactical type of work. I have no doubt that the Air Staff are fully alive to this problem of designing and producing aircraft for this tactical ground attack role. I feel, however, that training for this role—in particular, for the night attack role—is most vitally important. It is a thing to which we must give very close attention.

We know that the problem of building temporary airfields is being given great attention, but it is an extremely difficult problem; and its complement—the aircraft with a short take-off run and landing run—is something to which we must give more thought. It conflicts, of course, with the ever-increasing urge for greater performance, and we *must* have the performance. But the limit, as far as runways are concerned, has very nearly been reached, if it has not already been reached, and something must be done to obtain an aircraft which, while having the performance, must at the same time be able to take off and land in a very short space.

One of the questions which was brought up in discussion was that of helicopters. It is very interesting to see the way in which the helicopter has come into its own in Korea. It seems to me that, as a result of the success of the helicopter out there, there will now be a tremendous development in this type of aircraft. I have been reading recently that the Americans are taking this up in a very big way, and they are even contemplating the use of helicopters for amphibious warfare, to take the place of landing craft, and so on. The questioner raised the matter of the helicopter's vulnerability. It is all very well when we have complete air superiority, but it must be remembered that we may not always enjoy that.

I should like to thank Wing Commander Wykeham-Barnes very much indeed for coming here this afternoon and talking to us. It has been most interesting, and on your behalf I say "Thank you very much indeed." (*Applause.*)

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR RICHARD GALE: Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure you would like me, on behalf of the Council, to thank the Chairman for coming here this afternoon and to say how very interested we have been in what he has had to say, in addition to what the lecturer has said.

This lecture completes a series of three which, I think, have given us all a great deal of food for thought on warfare with which we might be faced. Although Korean conditions are peculiar, bullets still hurt, flying is just as difficult, and men still have the same amount of courage. All those things are evident in time of war. Thank you very much indeed. (*Applause.*)

## THE RESPONSIBILITY OF JUNIOR OFFICERS TO THE LAWS OF WAR

By MR. N. C. H. DUNBAR

On Wednesday, 28th November, 1951, at 3 p.m.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,  
in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN : We are fortunate this afternoon in having Mr. Dunbar to lecture to us on a subject which has aroused a considerable amount of interest. He is going to put forward the legal aspect of the subject, not in a controversial spirit, but to let everybody know what that aspect of it is. I need not say much about Mr. Dunbar. I will only say that he is an international lawyer who, for several years past, has been engaged in the study of and research into the laws of war in this Country and the United States, and I will ask him now to address you.

### LECTURE

#### INTRODUCTION

THIS paper is concerned solely with the responsibility of junior officers according to the rules of International Law. It would not be true to say that in practice such an officer will necessarily be immune from trial and punishment at the hands of an authority so disposed by the mere fact of his having acted lawfully. Like W. S. Gilbert's policeman, the lot of an officer in this regard is not a particularly happy one. He must perforce rely on the good faith and charitable disposition of the authority in whose power he may happen to find himself from time to time.

Irrespective of such contingency, few would deny that it is the duty of our armed forces to observe the laws of war, and that offences amounting to war crimes are at the same time violations of our military law which should, if possible, be punished by our own courts. As to whether it can be claimed that a code of military honour common to all civilized States exists, and that there will be general condemnation of serious breaches of such a code, is another question.

Furthermore, there are numerous practices of modern warfare in respect of which no rule of law has been established or, at any rate, the law is disputed. It would be impossible on this occasion to attempt to examine adequately the nature and scope of the laws of war. I am, therefore, assuming that certain well-established rules appertaining to the conduct of warfare do exist.

#### INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR

It is now accepted that in time of war all members of the armed forces are, in general, bound to comply with the customary and conventional rules of International Law or, if none exist, that such members must at least conform to a certain minimum standard of conduct dictated by the laws of humanity and the public conscience. It cannot be asserted that the latter requirement would be contrary to the doctrine of *nullum crimen sine lege*. The main objection to retroactive legislation is that at the time of performing the act in question the person concerned was justified in believing that he was acting in accordance with the law.

No such belief can reasonably be said to exist in case of murder and other heinous crimes. No substantial injustice would be done to a person accused of war crimes in respect of acts universally known to be prohibited by the fundamental principles



of criminal jurisprudence. Although it is often difficult to attain a just reconciliation between the imposing demands of military discipline and the necessity for preserving the supremacy of the law, it must be emphasized that, by entering into the armed forces, a person cannot divest himself of all legal responsibility for his acts. Efforts to achieve success in military operations will not, save in rare instances, justify a departure from the accepted rules of warfare. The British *Manual of Military Law* states<sup>1</sup> that it is essential that officers should appreciate that they will always be liable to be called upon by the civil courts to justify their actions towards their fellow citizens; that in enemy country there should be courteous intercourse with the civilian population; and that all ranks should be instructed specifically as to their correct behaviour towards civilians and officials.

The principle of individual criminal responsibility for violations of the laws of war has become firmly established in International Law. In the words of the Nuremberg International Tribunal<sup>2</sup>: "That International Law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been recognized. . . . Crimes against International Law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of International Law be enforced." This is even more so when such violations constitute at the same time offences against the general criminal law. Certain acts committed by members of the armed forces do not become less criminal because they take place in time of war. What deprives such acts of their criminality is their conformity to International Law.

#### PENAL SANCTIONS

The question of penal sanctions appears to have become important after the 1914-18 War. The absence from the Hague Conventions of 1907 of express provisions relating to individual criminal liability for violations thereof led some writers to conclude that failure to observe the prohibitions contained in the Conventions gave rise only to a civil claim against the belligerent State concerned for damages or compensation. It was also contended that penal sanctions were merely proposed and hinted at in Articles 29 and 30 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field. It was generally realized, however, that civil remedies would not act as a sufficient deterrent in respect of violations of the rules of warfare and that it would be monstrous if the absence of express provisions in the Conventions implied a complete lack of penal sanctions, especially as most of the offences committed in the war constituted reprehensible crimes according to the municipal law of the belligerents. The municipal law of most civilized States provided penal sanctions for infractions of the laws of war, and the punishment by military tribunals of crimes attributed to members of the enemy armed forces was envisaged by the military law of the United States, France, and Germany, in particular.

In the international sphere the matter was brought into prominence by the report submitted in March, 1919, by the Commission on Responsibilities to the Preliminary Peace Conference, and by Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles whereby the German Government recognized the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.

<sup>1</sup> Chapter XIV, Appendix 22.

<sup>2</sup> Judgment: as published in 1946 by H.M.S.O., Cmd. 6964, p. 41.



## DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF WAR CRIMES

Prior to the 1914-18 War, however, no real attempt had been made by States to differentiate between those violations of the laws of war which were to be considered criminal and those infractions which, on account of their less serious nature, were more analogous to summary criminal offences, or to civil wrongs in municipal law giving rise merely to an action for damages. The first step towards distinguishing war crimes from non-criminal breaches of the laws of war seems to have been taken by the 1919 Commission on Responsibilities which in its report declared that the war had been "carried on by the Central Empires together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, by barbarous or illegitimate methods in violation of the established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity." The Commission then went on to compile a list of serious crimes which it considered should be made the subject of individual responsibility and punishment.

The Geneva Convention of 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field expressly stipulated that the contracting States should take all necessary steps to instruct their troops in the provisions of the Convention and to bring them to the notice of the civil population, and that the Governments should propose to their legislatures, should their penal laws be inadequate, the necessary measures for the repression in time of war of any act contrary to the provisions of the Convention. Even so, the Convention made no express provision for the punishment of individual offenders, nor was any distinction drawn between acts which were to constitute war crimes and those which were not.

The 1939-45 War saw the firm establishment of the concept of individual criminal responsibility for violations of the laws of war. In addition it was recognized that not every breach or non-observance of the Hague and Geneva Conventions could be regarded as a war crime. In 1944, an eminent authority suggested<sup>3</sup> that war crimes proper might be defined as "such offences against the law of war as are criminal in the ordinary and accepted sense of fundamental rules of warfare and of general principles of criminal law by reason of their heinousness, their brutality, their ruthless disregard of the sanctity of human life and personality, or their wanton interference with rights of property unrelated to reasonably conceived requirements of military necessity." This guiding principle formed the basis of the Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Tribunals and of Law No. 10 of the Allied Control Council for the occupied zones of Germany, in so far as those documents enumerated certain atrocities and offences against persons and property which were to be recognized as war crimes and in respect of which there was to be individual responsibility. The definition of war crimes in all three documents was substantially identical. The International Tribunals, and almost all other war crimes tribunals which had to consider the question, were satisfied that the definition of war crimes contained in Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg International Tribunal was declaratory of existing customary and conventional International Law.

The seal of approval was set upon this view of the matter by the resolution<sup>4</sup> of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 11th December, 1946, "reaffirming the principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal and directing the Committee on the Codification of International Law . . . to treat as a matter of primary importance

<sup>3</sup> Lauterpacht in *British Year Book of International Law*, 21(1944), p. 79.

<sup>4</sup> *General Assembly Journal*, No. 75, Supplement A-64, Add. 1, pp. 944-946.

the formulation of the principles of the Charter and of the Tribunal's Judgment in the context of a general codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind or in an International Criminal Code."

#### THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949

On 12th August, 1949, four Conventions relating to various aspects of warfare were signed at Geneva by some 60 States. The Conventions are concerned with the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field and at sea; the treatment of prisoners of war; and the protection of civilian persons in time of war.

For the most part the Conventions do not introduce striking innovations in the law of war but rather seek to amplify the principles and rules already laid down by some of the earlier Hague and Geneva Conventions. However, it is important to observe that the 1949 Conventions embody provisions which leave little doubt on four matters with which this paper is concerned. In the first place, the Conventions specifically enumerate those violations which constitute crimes—they are referred to as "grave breaches"; secondly, the contracting States expressly undertake in time of peace and war to disseminate the text of the Conventions as widely as possible in their respective countries, and to include the study thereof in the programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction so that the principles may become known to the entire population, in particular to the armed forces; thirdly, the contracting States undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing or ordering to be committed any of the "grave breaches" defined in the Conventions, and that the contracting States shall be under a duty to search for persons alleged to have committed or ordered the commission of such "grave breaches" and bring them (regardless of their nationality) before its own courts—or they may hand over such persons for trial by another contracting State provided the latter has made out a *prima facie* case; and, fourthly, each contracting State also undertakes to take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the Conventions other than the "grave breaches" defined in the Conventions. In all circumstances accused persons are to benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence. The "grave breaches" defined in the four Conventions comprise any of the following acts when committed against persons or property protected by the Conventions: wilful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian in occupied territory to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving such a person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the third Convention; the unlawful deportation or transfer or the unlawful confinement of civilian persons in occupied territory; the taking of hostages; and the extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. No contracting State shall be allowed to absolve itself from any liability incurred in respect of "grave breaches."

The definition of "grave breaches" contained in the four Conventions resembles, but is rather more extensive than, the definition of war crimes set out in the Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Tribunals. While the term "grave breaches" is restricted to certain violations of the provisions of the four Conventions, it is not suggested that the term is necessarily binding or exhaustive in regard to those aspects of warfare outside the purview of the Conventions. Nevertheless, the

definition of "grave breaches" will serve to indicate what acts or conduct are likely to be regarded by tribunals as constituting serious violations of the law of war.

#### THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

Thus, in practice, an officer should encounter little difficulty in understanding the general purport of the laws of war, and in realizing, in most cases, whether his actions amount to war crimes. The rule that ignorance of the law is usually no defence does not place on the civilian an undue burden of responsibility. It is not required of any person, especially in modern times, that he shall appreciate the nature and significance of all the offences which he is capable of committing. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to expect that a person of sound common-sense shall be aware of the principles of criminal law relating to crimes of violence against persons and property.

An examination of a large number of war crimes trials held after the last war reveals that almost invariably the offences charged against members of the armed forces were of the kind included in the definitions of war crimes and "grave breaches" specified above. In regard to some aspects of warfare, notably aerial bombardment and submarine warfare, in which the law is highly controversial, with few exceptions, no charges have been preferred.

#### MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND THE PROBLEM OF SUPERIOR ORDERS

The responsibility of a member of the armed forces is, however, rendered more onerous by his subjection to military discipline. The general duty of obedience to the orders of a superior officer has, in relation to the trial of war criminals, given rise to considerable discussion. It has been contended by some that no subordinate member of the armed forces should be required either to question the legality of a superior order or to refuse to carry out an order which he considers to be unlawful. However, it would appear that this opinion is not in accordance with municipal and international law. Time will permit only a few matters to be mentioned in this connection.

#### BRITISH AND UNITED STATES LAW

Early in the XIXth Century, it became evident in British and American law that the fact of a person being a soldier and of his acting strictly in obedience to orders did not of itself relieve him of criminal liability for acts which would be crimes if committed by a civilian. Numerous decisions have reiterated this principle. The same rule is observed in British and American military law. Under the British Army Act, a soldier must obey any lawful command given by his superior officer in the execution of his office. If, however, the "command is obviously illegal, the subordinate would be justified in questioning or even in refusing to execute it as, for instance, if he were ordered to fire upon a peaceable and unoffending bystander."<sup>6</sup> The qualification of lawfulness also appears to have existed in the United States Articles of War since the inception of an organized American Army. The American commentator Winthrop maintains that according to United States military law the subordinate would be entitled to disobey an order which was "so manifestly beyond the legal power and discretion of the commander as to admit of no rational doubt of its unlawfulness."

Such was the case in the trial of Henry Wirtz in 1865. Wirtz was a German who, during the American Civil War, had held a commission in the Confederate army. At

<sup>6</sup> *Manual of Military Law*, Chapter III, para. 12.

the conclusion of the war he was tried by a Military Commission in Washington and convicted of ill-treating 45,000 prisoners of war in his charge at Andersonville, Georgia, and of the murder of some of them himself. He was sentenced to death and executed. In answer to the plea put forward by Wirtz that he had merely carried out the orders of his superior commander the Judge Advocate said: "A superior officer cannot order a subordinate to do an illegal act and if the subordinate obey such an order and disastrous consequences result, both the superior and the subordinate must answer for it. General Winder could no more command the prisoner to violate the laws of war than could the prisoner do so without orders."

The controversy which arose in this Country during the 1939-45 War was in no small measure occasioned by a paragraph<sup>6</sup> inserted in 1914 in Chapter XIV of The British *Manual of Military Law*. That paragraph reiterated the rule formulated by Professor Oppenheim in his treatise on International Law, according to which the order of a superior authority constitutes an absolute defence. A similar provision was also embodied in the United States *Manual*. Although this rule did not accord with the generally accepted principle of law in the matter, it was not until 1940 that the text of Oppenheim's treatise was revised. In 1944, amendments to the same effect were inserted in both the British and United States *Manuals*. The date chosen for making the amendments may appear unduly significant. It must be remarked that the retention for over 30 years of Professor Oppenheim's doctrine of subordinate immunity is the more surprising seeing that the Birkenhead Committee of Enquiry set up by the British Government in 1918—only four years after the publication of Chapter XIV of the British *Manual*—unanimously reported that the statement in the *Manual* lacked authority and that the Committee could not accept the doctrine that it was the duty of a soldier never to question an order which he received. The Committee went on to recommend that the plea of superior orders should not be accepted by courts set up for the purpose of trying alleged German war criminals if it could be proved that the acts charged were flagrantly and obviously contrary to the laws and customs of war. The Inter-Allied Commission of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 adopted the same view.

#### THE RULE IN GERMANY

In Germany no writer, with the exception of Professor Oppenheim, appears to have regarded the duty of obedience to superior orders as unconditional. Even in 1940, one of the leading German commentators, Professor Schwinge, wrote: "Hence in military life, just as in other fields, the principle of absolute, *i.e.*, blind obedience, does not exist." As far back as 1845, the Prussian Military Code recognized the principle of moral choice by providing that a subordinate would be punished if, in the execution of an order, he went beyond its scope or if he executed an order knowing that it "related to an act which obviously aimed at a crime." This provision was embodied in the Military Penal Code of the Kingdom of Saxonia in 1867, of Bavaria in 1869, and of Baden in 1870. The rule operative in German military law during the 1939-45 War was that laid down in Article 47 of the Military Penal Code of 1872. This Article provided: "If through the execution of an order pertaining to the service a penal law is violated, then the superior giving the order is alone responsible. However, the obeying subordinate shall be punished as an accomplice; (1) if he went beyond the order given to him, or (2) if he knew that the order of the superior involved an act which aimed at a civil or military crime or offence." In the *Llandovery Castle*

<sup>6</sup> Chapter XIV, para. 443.



(1921)—a case which concerned the killing of the survivors of a torpedoed hospital ship who had taken refuge in life-boats—the German Imperial Supreme Court held that a military subordinate is not entitled to obey without question an order which is “universally known to everybody, including also the accused, to be without any doubt whatever against the law.”

#### THE CHARTER OF THE NUREMBERG INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

An account of the treatment of the problem in the international sphere between the two world wars cannot be attempted here. However, the culmination of the movement towards the formulation of some guiding principle of law to be observed by international and municipal tribunals alike in the treatment of the problem may be said to have taken place upon the signing of the Charter of the Nuremberg International Tribunal of 8th August, 1945. Article 8 of the Charter provided: “The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.” Similar provisions were incorporated in the Charter of the Tokyo International Tribunal of 19th January, 1946, and in Law No. 10 of the Allied Control Council for Germany promulgated on 20th December, 1945.

#### WAR CRIMES TRIALS

It is now possible, I believe, to deduce from the judgments delivered by numerous war crimes tribunals some broad principles applicable to the problem of superior orders. In the main these judgments have displayed a commendable uniformity in the matter. It can safely be asserted that the doctrine which implies the duty of absolute obedience to superior orders has been discredited. But it is also true that the contrary view, according to which superior orders can in no circumstances constitute a defence, is equally untenable. A more exacting degree of responsibility has generally been required of superior officers in the armed forces than that demanded of subordinate members. The former are expected to be familiar with the recognized conventional and customary laws of war and have therefore been held responsible for offences which could not, perhaps, be described as manifestly illegal. The order of a superior authority may in certain circumstances wholly or partly excuse the commission by a subordinate of an act in violation of the laws of war. While it is impossible to prescribe the exact limits within which the defence is legally justifiable, it is suggested that the following principles should be taken into consideration by a Court confronted with the task of determining subordinate responsibility.

1. The municipal law of most civilized States does not regard the plea of superior orders as constituting an absolute defence to a criminal act. Since this is a fundamental rule of criminal jurisprudence, it may properly be regarded as forming part of International Law.
2. While obedience to the orders of a superior officer is an indispensable element in every military system, such obedience can be required only in respect of orders which are lawful.
3. The requirements of military discipline cannot serve to extenuate guilt when violations of the laws of war have been carried out on an extensive scale or when those offences are in flagrant disregard of generally recognized moral standards or have been committed consciously, ruthlessly, and without military excuse or justification.



4. The evidence must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the subordinate knew, or as a person of ordinary understanding, ought to have known, that the order was unlawful. In the first place, an order to require obedience must relate to military duty; secondly, even if the order relates to a military subject, it must be one which the superior is, under the circumstances, authorized to give; and thirdly, if the order relates to an act which is manifestly outside the scope of the superior's authority, the subordinate may not plead ignorance of the illegality of the order.

5. The subordinate may be aware that the order was unlawful and yet successfully plead the defence if he was subjected by his superior to such a degree of coercion as to deprive him of the will or capacity to resist the execution of the order. Nevertheless, the gravity of the act perpetrated by the subordinate must bear some relation to the consequences likely to follow upon disobedience of the order.

6. The unlawful act of a subordinate may be excused if it was carried out in obedience to a superior order represented as a measure of reprisal against similar reprehensible conduct on the part of the adversary. However, the act must not, in regard to the violation of International Law committed by the enemy, be disproportionate or unreasonable.

7. Superior orders may in certain circumstances operate in extenuation of responsibility. Thus, courts have taken into consideration the fact that an accused took steps to impede, modify, or avoid the execution of the order.

The doctrine propounded by Professor Oppenheim in the matter of superior orders was considered by the United States Tribunal in the trial of *List and Others*. The Court held<sup>7</sup> that Professor Oppenheim espoused a minority view "which completely overlooks the fact that an illegal order is in no sense of the word a valid law which one is obliged to obey"; that "those who hold the view that superior orders is a complete defence to an international law crime base it largely on a conflict in the articles of war promulgated by several leading nations"; and that "international law has never approved the defensive plea of superior orders as a mandatory bar to the prosecution of war criminals." The Court recognized that the foregoing rule confronts a military subordinate with the alternative of choosing between the possibility of punishment by his superior authority for disobedience of an illegal order and that of punishment for the crime under the law of nations. The Tribunal said<sup>8</sup>: "To choose the former in the hope that victory will cleanse the act of its criminal characteristics manifests only weakness of character and adds nothing to the defence. We concede the serious consequences of the choice, especially by an officer in the army of a dictator. But the rule becomes one of necessity, for otherwise, the opposing army would in many cases have no protection at all against criminal excesses ordered by superiors."

#### CONCLUSION

It is certain, however, that the problem of superior orders will continue to prove controversial, especially outside the realm of legal theory. The International Law Commission of the United Nations which has been engaged, among other things, upon the task of formulating the principles of International Law recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg International Tribunal, has experienced no little difficulty in stating the rule of superior orders in an acceptable form. The Commission

<sup>7</sup> See the Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals prepared by the U.N.W.C.C., Volume VIII, p. 51.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, p. 51.

has, in its formulation of the principle, preferred not to follow the literal text of Article 8 of the Charter of the Nuremberg International Tribunal but to state the rule as interpreted by the Tribunal in its Judgment. The Tribunal had declared<sup>9</sup> that "the provisions of Article 8 of the Charter were in conformity with the law of all nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the International Law of war has never been recognized as a defence to such acts of brutality though, as the Charter here provided, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the existence of the order but whether moral choice was in fact possible." The idea of moral choice has formed the basis of the rule formulated in July, 1950, by the International Law Commission, namely: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him."

It is hoped that the principles suggested above may not be inapplicable to the question of determining what is meant by the term "moral choice." They have been framed with regard to the circumstance that it would be inexpedient at the present time to attempt to lay down precise and detailed rules which are unlikely to be respected in practice. The situations in which the problem of superior orders might arise are so diverse that no useful purpose would be served by trying to legislate for them individually. The criterion of "moral choice" will rightly confer on courts a wide discretion in the matter so that they are almost certain to view with leniency acts committed by members of the armed forces which are not obviously unlawful or morally reprehensible. Due weight must be attached to the circumstances surrounding the order. A clear distinction should be drawn between orders carried out in the stress and emotional excitement of battle, when instantaneous obedience is often vital to the success of the operation and to the safety of the unit and, for example, orders which may be performed at greater leisure during the belligerent occupation of enemy territory. The degree of latitude granted in respect of the manner in which the order is to be executed, and the rank of the subordinate as affecting his discretion, are merely a few of the factors which a court has to take into consideration.

It may appear from what has been said that the junior officer of to-day bears a substantial burden of legal liability for his actions. In practice, however, responsible members of the armed forces of this Country are unlikely to experience serious misgivings in carrying out the duties which they are called upon to perform.

A large number of the excesses to which the 1939-45 War gave rise—especially those which bore no conceivable relationship to the necessities of the war—were due to the legal and moral insensibility of the perpetrators. The cause of humanity and of the development of International Law demands that licence to commit atrocities shall not indirectly be conferred upon members of the armed forces by permitting the latter to take shelter under the canopy of ignorance of the laws of war and of superior orders.

#### DISCUSSION

**THE CHAIRMAN:** The lecturer will now answer any questions, or any members are invited to make any remarks on the subject that they think fit.

**LORD HANKEY:** The chairman evidently did not get my message that I did not intend to speak to-day. I have been very surprised by the lecture. I had expected to hear about the troubles of the younger officers in interpreting International Law provided

<sup>9</sup> Judgment, p. 42.

for. In that I received no help at all to-day, but I heard a great deal about the origins of the present position—obedience to orders, etc. As a student of these questions on almost every point I am diametrically opposed to the lecturer.

Viscount Maugham, a former Lord Chancellor of England, has just published a book (*U.N.O. and War Crimes*) with a political postscript by myself. It is mainly an appeal to U.N.O. not to stereotype important features of these war crimes trials. If the distinguished lecturer reads the book he will find there a great deal of critical matter.

We have heard much about the Nuremberg Tribunal and its Charter which governed many other trials. They were not in accordance with International Law, nor with the law of Great Britain, the U.S.A., or Germany where the trials took place.

They began badly. What could be more disreputable than their origin! Four men were got together to vet the American draft Charter and to put it into shape. Who were they? Two had already been selected as prosecutors for the U.S.A. and Great Britain respectively at the coming trial. The third was a Russian, who became a Judge at the trial, and whose conception of justice was that it was an affair for the Governments who had already declared the accused guilty. The fourth was a very distinguished French lawyer, who sometimes warned his colleagues that they were acting contrary to International Law. Those were the people who put together the Nuremberg Charter.

To begin with, it violated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is true that this particular Declaration was approved by the United Nations a little later, but Human Rights are fundamentals which every lawyer is supposed to know. For example, Article 10 declares that:—

“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”

A victor tribunal, consisting only of victor nations, with no neutral or unbiassed outsider, with a Charter drawn up by the prosecutors to suit the prosecution, cannot be accepted as a fair, independent, and impartial body.

Let us return now to Article 11 (1):—

“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.”

How can we reconcile these trials with that? The accused, as already mentioned, had been denounced as war criminals ever since the Crimea Conference (1943). Everything possible was done to suggest that they were guilty. In breach of the Geneva Conventions they were deprived of their uniforms, decorations, badges of rank, and at court-martials were not tried by their equals; e.g. in the case of Field-Marshal von Manstein.

It has been argued that, as declared war criminals, they were not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. That was to presume them guilty before the trial, contrary to Article 11 above. For that instrument allows no exception. Thus, under Article 1, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” and under Article 2, “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration. . . .”

I turn to Article 11 (2) of the Declaration:—

“No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.”

Could anything possibly be clearer than that? Yet, neglecting the warnings of their French colleague that some of the acts with which the prisoners were to be accused were definitely not crimes at the times when they were committed, “aggression” was included in the list of criminal charges. I was myself up to the neck in the Kellogg Pact, right at

the heart, and never on one single occasion in all the discussions about the Kellogg Pact did I hear one single word to suggest that it was a criminal act. And never, in all the 26 years in which I was Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, did I hear any suggestion that planning and preparing a war of aggression was a crime. Planners do not know whether their plans will be put in operation as aggression or as counter-measures.

Lord Maugham and Mr. Paget are not the only legal critics of these trials. The list includes three dissenting judges at the Tokyo Tribunal, a Dutchman, a Frenchman, and an Indian judge, and at least two Judges of the U.S.A. Supreme Court of Appeal at Washington (Mr. Justice Routledge and Mr. Justice Murphy) and many others. Then there is the political 'inwisdom of the whole thing, and the frightful precedent that has been set on which I could continue for hours if time permitted, but I have already exceeded my ration.

CAPTAIN G. DRUMMOND: My Lord Chairman, we have heard about these laws of war. Does it mean that our sons will have to learn them before they can pass out at Sandhurst? It was at Nuremberg, was it not, that these laws originated? That means that, after another war, there will be another lot of laws drawn up by the victors.

Am I right in saying that these laws were drawn up and made retrospective for the vanquished? If they had not been drawn up, we could not, I presume, have tried our vanquished enemy. Having made it retrospective, should we who started night bombing and so on, and finished up with the atomic bomb, not have been on a better wicket in the eyes of the world on the question of atrocities if our own criminals had also been tried?

MR. J. W. BECKETT: What seems to me to be alarming, if I understood the lecturer aright, was the assumption that there was a code of International Law in warfare which would guide us or our sons in another war. That assumption seemed, from the lecturer's own statements, to be inaccurate, because a code of warfare demands some impartial tribunal.

War is the breakdown of law; it means that the politicians and diplomats have completely failed in their job. Had they succeeded, there never would be a war and we should not need the warrior class.

When it is over, apparently, the politicians and civilians of the conquering nation then decide how many shall be executed or otherwise punished. That seemed particularly untenable when the lecturer gave what he seemed to think was a case that burked no argument.

Imagine a junior officer told by a superior officer to shoot a civilian, who appears to be quite harmless. His conscience says "Tell the general to go to blazes. I am not going to shoot him." In many armies he would not survive to enjoy his conscience very long. How can he know that the superior officer is wrong?

During the last war a very great military authority, called Mr. Tom Wintringham, was put in charge of the education of civilians. Some interesting things he taught them were how to garrotte a soldier, how to set fire to a sentry, and how to do a little quiet spying. How am I to know, when I tell my general to go to blazes because he has told me to shoot a civilian, what kind of person the civilian is? It is possible that the general knows what he is talking about. It is possible that he has an intelligence officer who is intelligent. That officer may quite correctly have told my general that that respectable looking civilian is waiting to set me or one of my men on fire the moment he can get out his handbook. Yet the lecturer assumes that a young subaltern of 20 or 22, is able to decide that the general must go to blazes because he wants that particular civilian to be shot. I may have carried this a little far, but it is not far from the truth.

Then the lecturer gave the one case he could find, apparently, outside the last war of a gentleman who was executed—or murdered, as I should prefer to call it—for obeying the orders of a superior officer during the American Civil War. It was significant that the executed gentleman was on the losing side. I did not hear of any of the victors in the American Civil War being executed.



During the whole of the last war, according to the International Law which the lecturer seems to accept, not one single atrocity, even of the mildest or least suspicious kind, was committed by any member of the British, American, Russian, or Allied armies. Not one charge was brought against them. In the absence of a charge, we must assume that there was no misbehaviour. To suggest that it is necessary for anyone but members of a defeated army to worry about International Law is taking the business too seriously.

All that it boils down to is : keep out of the Navy, Army, or Air Force unless you are satisfied completely that your side is going to win. If your side wins, you will have committed no crimes, but will be saviours of humanity. If your side loses and there is no law under which the victors can get you, they will invent one.

THE LECTURER : A number of questions have been raised to which I should like to have made a reply. However, I must answer the point made by the last speaker that the Allies did not try members of their own armed forces for the commission of crimes. With great respect, that is not true. Our courts-martial were frequently engaged in trying offences committed by members of our forces against the enemy and against civilian inhabitants of occupied territory.

I myself have prosecuted at numerous courts-martial when members of our armed forces have been charged with offences which, in effect, constituted war crimes committed against civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory. These trials, however, were not referred to as war crimes trials ; they were known as courts-martial. It is wrong for the general public to get hold of the idea that only the vanquished have been brought to trial. Our own soldiers have been tried whenever it was considered that the offences which they were alleged to have committed seriously contravened either International Law or British military law.

MR. MONTGOMERY BELGION : With regard to the lecturer's last statement, may I ask how many Allied industrialists, doctors, and lawyers, and how many generals, admirals, and so on on the Allied side, have been tried in the courts-martial which he has just mentioned ? I should also like to ask why the lecturer seems satisfied with the language of, say, the new Geneva Conventions ? According to his quotations, one forbids various things, such as the taking of hostages, with the proviso he quoted : " Unless they were justified by military necessity." Is not that extremely vague ? Would not any quarrel that might arise in the future be over just this vague language ?

Another thing I did not understand was his referring to the Birkenhead Committee and his references to some of the courts at Nuremberg trying cases 1 to 12, because I do not see what authority the Birkenhead Committee or those courts had to lay down international rules.

THE LECTURER : With regard to our own statesmen, politicians, industrialists, and the like, I must agree that none, so far as I am aware, was brought to trial. I have been concerned with what may be called war crimes proper, namely, offences committed by members of the armed forces. Most of the other crimes in respect of which German statesmen and industrialists were brought to trial, were referred to as crimes against peace or crimes against humanity. This lecture has been restricted to the subject of war crimes.

International Law is composed of both customary law and conventional law. The latter comprises such rules of law as are laid down by conventions and treaties to which a large number of States have subscribed. Within this category may be included the Hague and Geneva Conventions. I understand that the 1949 Geneva Conventions are now in force, seeing that they have already been ratified by nine States. I believe that the British Government has still to ratify the Conventions.

MR. H. NEWNHAM : I should like to make one very brief remark. The distinguished lecturer said that the English war criminals have been tried in courts-martial. I have the impression that he thought that there was an equivalent, a synonymity, between British courts-martial and the International Tribunal at Nuremberg.

If I had to be tried by any tribunal anywhere, I would rather be tried by a court-martial of naval, army, or air force officers. To my mind, to represent that there is any



similarity between a British court-martial—whether it is presided over by an admiral of the fleet, a general, a colonel, or anybody else—and the Nuremberg Tribunal is absolutely abhorrent to our idea of British justice.

THE LECTURER : I would ask you not to confuse the proceedings of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Tribunals with those of the two thousand or so war crimes trials which have been held by Allied authorities. The two International Tribunals have little connection with the subject under discussion today except in so far as they enunciated principles of International Law. On the other hand, war crimes tribunals of this Country were, in effect, courts-martial. They were composed of military officers who were usually advised as to the law by a Judge Advocate, or a legally qualified officer present at the trial.

In the *Peleus* trial, for example, the court was constituted of seven officers, two of whom held the rank of Brigadier. The latter were both distinguished serving officers of H.M. Forces. The court, having listened to the summing-up of the Judge Advocate following upon the evidence, proceeded to convict the five accused of the charges brought against them.

Although these courts were advised on matters of law by the Judge Advocate, it was not necessary for them to accept his interpretation of the law. Therefore, if a military court considered, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, that, despite the law, it would be morally wrong to find the accused guilty, it was always open to the court to acquit him. In fact, however, courts have almost always found the accused guilty whenever a serious violation of the rules of warfare has been established.

Thus, it is a mistake to assert that a war crimes tribunal bears little resemblance to a court-martial seeing that, in practice, apart from the more flexible rules of evidence applicable to the former tribunal, the procedure is virtually identical.

THE CHAIRMAN : The lecturer has given us a very clear exposition of the legal point of view on International Law. I do not intend to try to embark upon that subject. I would only like to take one aspect : that is, that I do not think we heard quite enough about the difficult position of the junior officer.

In a debate in the House of Lords, we described the International Law as it now stands as creating an extremely difficult problem for the young officer, and more so perhaps for the n.c.o. ; it becomes more and more difficult as one goes down the ranks. It is an impossible position if nobody can be sure how he stands when giving or receiving an order, and I cannot understand why rather more assistance is not given by the senior officers who are responsible for the officers and men in the Services today to get this matter placed upon a proper footing.

Most of us here have been brought up, I believe, on a very sound military doctrine : "An order is an order. If you do not like it, you carry it out and then you complain." If the responsibility rested only upon the young officer or the n.c.o. who had given the order, he would take the risk and be tried ; but it is an enormous responsibility if he has to think "what if my men are captured after having carried out my orders and are tried as war criminals." He might feel that he is sentencing all his men, if captured, to be shot or otherwise executed under the interpretation an enemy court may give to International Law.

Who is to determine these orders ? If it is an all-British or American court, well and good, but at present a North Korean court—the lecturer will correct me if I am wrong—of three Korean officers can try prisoners of war. Such a court may not agree with what has been done—we cannot always expect them to look at things from the same point of view as ourselves, e.g. the bombardment of their own towns. We cannot say anything, because we ourselves have introduced and legalized this procedure. Three officers can constitute a court, and the only restriction is that if there are only three officers forming the court they must be unanimous. Not a difficult matter to ensure.

I thank the lecturer very much, on your behalf, for a most extremely interesting talk. (Applause.)

## THE MERCHANT NAVY

By MR. R. G. GROUT

On Wednesday, 16th January, 1952, at 3 p.m.

COMMODORE R. HARRISON, D.S.O., R.D., R.N.R., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: This afternoon we are to hear about the Merchant Navy, and we are fortunate in having with us a gentleman who fills a very responsible position in one of our large shipping companies. Mr. Grout has very considerable experience and I am sure he will be able to tell us a very interesting story. Not only was he in the offices of the shipping company abroad for quite a long time—12 years or more—but during the last war he was taken into the Ministry of War Transport to deal with the detailed planning for the Normandy landing, and he was the Ministry of Transport representative at Bayeux and afterwards at Rouen and at Brussels. When that was successfully completed, he came back to London and carried out the arrangements for reinstating the short sea trade and for the ships taking supplies to liberated Europe.

I now ask Mr. Grout to tell us all about it.

### LECTURE

WHEN your secretary conveyed to me the invitation of your Council to address you this afternoon on the subject of the Merchant Navy, I realized that he was setting before me a very large canvas upon which to paint a picture for you. I decided to divide my canvas into two parts. First, I shall try to sketch out for you the composition of the Merchant Navy, its financial structure and the machinery of operation, touching upon some of the problems with which the merchant shipowner has to contend. Since I am given to understand that this Institution is primarily interested in the eventual relation of the subject discussed to the problems of war, I shall then use the remainder of my canvas in an attempt to outline some aspects of that part of the picture.

First of all, let us try to get our picture into proper perspective by a backward glance into history. The carriage of cargo and passengers in ships on a commercial basis is of very great antiquity. The Documents Room of the British Museum contains shipping documents dating back to the Third Century B.C. Around the coasts of Britain small vessels were established carriers of heavy goods well before the Romans built their military roads. Coming a little closer to our own times, it is recorded that the English Fleet which routed the Spanish Armada was composed of 133 merchant ships and only 34 men of war. History does not tell us how many of the crew of the men of war concerned were really merchant seamen, recruited incidentally by methods much more energetic than any of those employed to-day.

From those early days the development of British merchant shipping, which is inextricably bound up with the development of British sea power, has been entirely an achievement of private enterprise. We have considerably evolved commercially from the days of the Merchant Adventurers—those groups of mariners and merchants who often sailed in their own ships and gained or lost fortunes very quickly, and while the daily life of the shipowner to-day may be less colourful and less romantic than in those early days, I venture to suggest—and hope to illustrate to you later on—that the same spirit of courage and determination, the same gifts of imagination and flexible management are displayed to-day. These qualities have enabled British shipping to survive the upheavals caused by the change-over in turn from sail to

steam, from "wooden walls" to iron and steel hulls, from paddle to screw propulsion, from steam to Diesel, and now to gas-turbine, just as successfully as it will adjust itself, when the time comes, to the problems of nuclear power and so on.

As world trade developed and the business of seafaring became more organized, there came a tendency to form companies or groups of companies, and this is the position to-day—but while most of our liner interests are to be found in the hands of big shipping combines, there is still a refreshingly large number of small tramp companies, many of them owning only one or two ships.

TABLE I  
STEAM AND MOTOR VESSELS  
OWNED AND REGISTERED IN THE U.K., 30TH JUNE, 1950  
TRADING VESSELS OF 100 GR. TONS AND OVER

				Total 30th June, 1950	
				No.	Gr. Tons 000's
Foreign-going—					
Passenger-cargo liners	...	...	258	3,147	
Cargo liners	...	...	855	5,219	
Tramps	...	...	587	3,136	
Tankers	...	...	422	3,145	
Total	...	...	2,122	14,647	
Coasting and Home Trade—					
Passenger-cargo liners	...	...	145	232	
Cargo liners	...	...	229	217	
Tramps	...	...	758	623	
Tankers	...	...	83	49	
Total	...	...	1,215	1,121	
Grand Total	...	...	3,337	15,768	

Table I shows the composition of the United Kingdom's Merchant Fleet as at 30th June, 1950. These are the latest published figures available, and include all vessels over 100 tons gross register in private ownership. The table contains two main categories; foreign-going shipping and coasting and home trade tonnage. The various main types of dry-cargo vessels are shown, and there is a separate figure for tankers. I may perhaps usefully add a few remarks about the different sections.

The liner is of course a vessel which operates a regular service on a recognized itinerary, which sails at stated dates whether there is a profitable cargo or not, and charges rates of freight laid down in the tariff of the operating line. She may carry passengers only, passengers and cargo, or cargo only, and still be considered as a liner within the terms I have defined above. The task of finding sufficient cargo to fill these liners, and laying that cargo out for stowage so that the best advantage may be taken of the facilities the ship has to offer, lies entirely with the owners and their agents.

The tramp, on the other hand, is a vessel placed by her owners at the disposal of shippers and receivers operating in the world market for the carriage of full cargoes from and to any port in the world. To over-simplify what is a very complex business transaction, I would say that the party controlling the cargo hires the ship, as it were, from her owners, either for a single voyage, or for a period: voyage-charter and time-charter respectively.

Charter rates, or rates of hire, usually fluctuate according to the law of supply and demand, and harden or ease in quite close and rapid sympathy with market conditions. In the case of liner tonnage, however, the adjustment of freight rates to market conditions and to fluctuating costs is a much slower process than with the tramp.

Where coasting and short-sea tonnage is concerned, the same distinctions and the same considerations apply as those I have outlined in connection with their bigger ocean-going sisters. Very large quantities of coal, cement, and other bulk commodities are coasted around these islands by tramp tonnage, and there is still quite a large volume of small tonnage employed in the coasting liner trade, though it is meeting with increasing difficulties owing to competition from road and rail. The short sea liner trades provide a very busy field for that particular section of the British Merchant Navy in the carriage of raw materials and manufactured goods between this Country and the neighbouring Continent of Europe, and in acting as a "feeder" service for ocean vessels loading or discharging in our ports part cargoes originating from or ultimately destined to Continental Europe.

#### GROWTH OF TANKER BUILDING

Now a word about the tanker fleet. In common with most other shipbuilding nations, this Country has during the past twenty-five years or so gone in for a very extensive tanker building programme, and the tanker fleet now represents some twenty per cent. of our total Merchant Navy. I think it safe to say that we have been enabled to do this partly because of the fact that tankers enjoy a fairly certain future. Even in changing world conditions vast quantities of oil must continue to move about the world and, of course, there is no serious risk of competition from the air.

Dry cargo vessel owners are not nearly so favourably placed. The normal life of a ship may be considered as from 20 to 25 years and it requires no little courage to place orders at today's very high prices to cover such a period. The shipowner, and particularly the dry cargo shipowner, must endeavour to peer into the crystal and make up his mind when, if ever, the present chaos in world trade is likely to be reduced to some semblance of order. He must consider for example to what extent bulk buying and bulk selling—which interfere so much with his normal operations today—are likely to be done away with or reduced. He must ask himself how much relaxation can be looked for in the present restricted state of the commodity markets of the world, and how soon world trade will be able to go back to its normal flow based on free operation of supply and demand. International financial restrictions bring the shipowner many problems in trying to work out his future prospects. It is perhaps true that the tramp owners can to some extent, but only to a limited extent, hold back from building until they see a little more clearly how things are going to turn out, but a liner owner must go on building if he is to remain alive and active.



You will notice that I have omitted from this catalogue of rather gloomy and depressing problems facing the British shipowner any reference to the possibility of war. I do not believe that a shipowner can or should take that possibility at all prominently into the consideration of his problems if he is to continue and expand his business. I think he must in the nature of things go about his daily business on the assumption that it will be conducted in a world at peace, for any other outlook must surely derive from a gospel of despair and engender an attitude of mind which would unbearably clog and eventually completely vitiate all his efforts. Should war unfortunately come upon him, then he will cast out from his mind all thought of personal and private interest and contribute the whole of his effort and energy to the service of the Nation. I am sure you all know and recognize the success with which the British shipowner has performed that operation twice within the lifetime of most of us.

#### PROBLEMS OF REPLACEMENT

It must, however, not be deduced from what I have just said that the British shipowner can contemplate with equanimity the prospect of war because he has the comfortable feeling that the financial structure of his firm will not be adversely affected. Quite the contrary is, of course, the case. Twice in less than 40 years the British shipowner has had to make good enormous war losses, and to do this very largely from his own resources. At the outbreak of the late war in 1939, the total British Merchant Fleet was 16,892,000 tons gross register. At the end of 1950 it amounted to 16,557,000 tons gross register, and you will thus see that replacement has been achieved when tonnage built during 1951 is taken into account. When you realize that this has been done under a burden of crushing taxation, and during a time of steadily rising prices, I think you will agree that it is no mean achievement. The Government scheme for insurance of war losses, which operated throughout the last war, was of course a great help to shipowners, but it did not in any single instance bring them sufficient compensation to cover the cost of new building to replace the vessel lost. To illustrate my point, may I give you some comparative figures. A short sea cargo liner of 1,400 tons dead-weight which cost £70,000 to build in 1939 would have cost £160,000 in 1945, while today the price of a similar vessel may be fairly estimated at nearly £300,000. That is an increase of over 300 per cent. over the 1939 figure and about 88 per cent. over that prevailing in 1945. I can assure you that the bottom of the barrel has been scraped, and if by misfortune another war should come upon us with similar losses, British shipowners would be in no position to replace for a third time their war losses so largely from their own funds. Should such unhappy circumstances arise, it is hard to see how, failing a Government scheme for insurance recovery on a replacement cost basis, the British Merchant Navy could again raise its head among the maritime nations of the world. This contingency would be nothing short of disastrous for our island community.

The last war shewed us all very clearly, and it is scarcely necessary for me to remind an audience like this of the fact, that the Merchant Navy is really our fourth arm of defence. The part it played in keeping this Country fed and supplied, in taking the sinews of war to His Majesty's ships and to His Majesty's forces all over the world are matters of history which I need not here dilate upon. Almost overnight the Merchant Navy was expected to turn from peace to war, to supply armed merchant cruisers, rescue ships, landing ships, troop transports, and to do all sorts of other jobs in the strangest places with ships that were never designed to do anything of the kind.



But what of the British Merchant Navy's contribution to our national economy in time of peace? We hear a great deal these days about "invisible exports." It is estimated that the British Merchant Navy's contribution to this factor today is in the neighbourhood of £150,000,000 per annum, and I make no reference, except in passing, to the employment the shipping industry brings to all those connected either directly or indirectly with its operations. The number affected must run into many hundreds of thousands, and represent no mean share of our national activity and prosperity.

You may quite frequently hear it said that at the present time shipowners are doing pretty well. It would be foolish of me to attempt to deny that fact, although, when considered against the general inflationary background, things are not nearly so good as they seem. But shipowners need to do well. It is in the national interest that they should do well, for otherwise how are we to maintain the first class Merchant Navy which has been our pride for so many years past, which is such an essential part of our national economy, and an imperative necessity for our national defence. Unless the shipowner is allowed to plough back untaxed a large portion of his surplus, there is a very grave danger that he may not be able to keep his profit-earning plant—that is to say his fleet—up to date, nor will he be able to take full advantage of new inventions which cut down costs. If history is any guide, in shipping perhaps more than in any other trade, boom years are likely to be followed by a period of slump or depression. Is it too much to ask that the shipowner should be allowed to use the period of blue skies and smooth water to provide himself with a lifebelt or raft to give him the extra buoyancy required during the heavy weather and the gales and misfortune which may come upon him? Shipowners of today have the earnest hope that some means may be devised to relieve the industry of the crushing burden of taxation which at present lies upon it, so that they may make the best use of the profits they earn to prepare for the future.

#### THE CAPITAL INVOLVED

It follows quite naturally, I think, from what has just been said, that I should at least touch upon the amount of capital engaged in the industry. It is extremely difficult, if not almost impossible, to arrive at any reliable estimate of a figure in that connection.

The difficulty arises from the fact that the real capital of the industry consists to a great extent of reserves which have been built up over a long period by a conservative dividend policy, and invested by many companies to an unknown extent in ancillary assets. The task of making such an estimate is further complicated on the one hand because of the inter-relation of some of the companies concerned, and on the other, because there is no published information from private companies or firms of shipowners. I will confine myself to venturing a fairly close estimate of the global cost of the existing fleets, and this is probably the most realistic figure which can be quoted. Theoretically, the written down value might be a sounder guide, but the rate at which this should be calculated presents some practical difficulties. To base it on a writing off of 5 per cent. per annum on cost (which is the usual rate one has in mind for ships) would place no value at all on that substantial part of the fleet which is over 20 years of age. However, bearing this factor in mind, the cost of the existing Merchant Fleet of vessels owned and registered in the United Kingdom, such as I have referred to earlier in these remarks, is estimated at between £800 million and £900 million. This figure, of course, includes quite a lot of tonnage built at pre-

war prices. Since immediate replacement of the whole fleet is a practical impossibility one can only advance a hypothetical figure for this. It seems fair to estimate that present total replacement costs would involve a figure of over £1,500 million.

TABLE II  
STEAM AND MOTOR VESSELS  
OWNED AND REGISTERED IN THE U.K., 30TH JUNE, 1950  
BY YEAR OF BUILD AND OF 100 GR. TONS AND OVER

<i>Year of Build</i>	<i>G.R.T.</i>	<i>Year of Build</i>	<i>G.R.T.</i>
1925 and earlier ...	2,267,000	1938	350,000
1926 ... ..	189,000	1939	416,000
1927 ... ..	204,000	1940	466,000
1928 ... ..	419,000	1941	502,000
1929 ... ..	399,000	1942	996,000
1930 ... ..	410,000	1943	1,517,000
1931 ... ..	228,000	1944	1,458,000
1932 ... ..	117,000	1945	1,003,000
1933 ... ..	105,000	1946	724,000
1934 ... ..	88,000	1947	714,000
1935 ... ..	290,000	1948	762,000
1936 ... ..	486,000	1949	802,000
1937 ... ..	420,000	1950	436,000
Total G.R.T. ... ..	15,768,000		
Average age in years ... ..	11.85		

Table II sets out the composition of the fleet divided into age groups as at 30th June, 1950, and shows that the average age of the ships which composed that fleet was 11.85 years. But it also shows that nearly 4,000,000 tons was over 20 years old. This is just about 25 per cent. of the total, illustrating that a large proportion of our Merchant Fleet was at that time due for replacement on grounds of age—and the position is much the same to-day.

This brief digression on the financial structure of the industry and some of its problems will, I hope, have served to illustrate that the British shipowner must eventually relate all his operations to the fundamental question of costs.

It has been flippantly said that the Royal Navy is the one shipping company in Great Britain where expense is no object. This is, of course, quite untrue, but it is true that, for the merchant shipowner, expense is a very great consideration indeed. The Royal Navy, quite rightly, think of a ship primarily as a fighting machine, as a unit in a general scheme to carry out the fundamental naval tactics of destroying the enemy. Whether that ship is at sea or in port is a matter of tactics or strategy, the important point being, is she seaworthy, efficient, and ready for use immediately she is wanted?

#### THE IMPORTANCE OF A QUICK TURN-ROUND

For the merchant shipowner a "fleet in being" has not the same significance at all. His vessel must be working, she is useless when lying idle in port. There is a peace-time need for the quick turn-round of merchant shipping almost as urgent as that we knew so well during the war, although for very different reasons. I think I have already clearly indicated that ships to-day are very expensive units to build

and to maintain, and the shipowner must constantly strive to keep them at sea, thus ensuring the maximum number of voyages over a given period and thereby reducing the cost of transport to the community. In port, ships simply eat their heads off. I think it was Sir Colin Anderson who said that at one time ships were marine monsters which spent most of their time at sea and were occasionally found in ports. He went on to suggest that nowadays they are more often found in port than at sea. Delays in port, from whatever cause, are disastrous to the shipowner and the nation he serves, and every effort must be made to cut down such delays wherever possible.

It is sad, but true, that in spite of the very great improvement which has taken place in recent years in the working conditions of our dockers—a nation-wide scheme of decasualization has been put into operation, much attention is paid to welfare arrangements for the men, and a sincere effort has been made to rectify the admitted errors of the past—in spite of all this the rate of turn-round of ships in British ports falls well below that enjoyed by the shipowner in many Continental ports. One can only hope that the negotiations which are continually proceeding for the settlement of outstanding difficulties will lay stress on and eventually lead to a better understanding of the essential community of interest between the employers and the men, and a consequent improvement in the prospects of all concerned. There is no doubt whatsoever that increased use of the many mechanical aids available to-day would help to speed things up to everyone's benefit if the fears of present-day "Luddites" can be allayed.

The total number of persons employed afloat by British shipping is over 154,000. It is a matter of very great satisfaction to all British shipowners that in this connection relations between masters and men are of a very happy nature. The Shipping Federation, which is essentially an owners' body, represents the industry in matters concerning almost everything to do with the running of ships, and it is the medium through which owners are represented on the National Maritime Board. This body is composed of shipowners, and the representatives of Officers and Seamen's Unions, and one of its main tasks is to deal with the question of wages and conditions. The success achieved in this all important and very difficult question has frequently been praised by high authorities on both sides of the table.

It is very significant that during the last 20 or 30 years, which have been a period of intense industrial unrest, there has never been an official strike in the Merchant Navy, and the disturbances inspired by nefarious outside influences have scarcely evoked even a lukewarm interest among the vast majority of the men concerned.

Thus you will see that the initiative and progressive spirit which has always characterized the British merchant seaman is still as alive and as active as ever it was. Through democratic action in its own Parliament, if I may use that word in this connection, the industry has evolved an industrial charter which is looked upon as a model for others.

I have so far endeavoured to outline for you the structure of the Merchant Navy and the machinery of operation; I have reminded you that it has twice within living memory turned over from peace to war and back again, and have told you something of the problems which surrounded those two successful recoveries from the ravages of enemy action.

May we now turn to the consideration of some aspects of the duties of the Merchant Navy in its war-time role as "maid of all work" to the fighting Services?

In the last two wars there were two crises when shortage of shipping could have been the cause of our defeat. The first crisis occurred soon after the commencement

of hostilities, and there are grounds for suggesting that it was to some extent due to lack of sufficient planning and preparation before war broke out, although conditions in 1939 showed considerable improvement in this respect over 1914. It is encouraging to note that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is giving attention to this matter and it is to be hoped that, should there be a "next time," adequate steps will be taken to see that the mobilization of Western Europe's fighting strength is in no danger of being hamstrung by lack of shipping facilities. The second crisis came when the enemy had mobilized his full attack against shipping. The solution to this must lie, of course, entirely with the fighting Services.

#### THE ECONOMICS OF SPEED

Let us now look at the vital question of speed. The speed of any convoy is, of course, that of the slowest ship, and it is obvious that the Royal Navy's task of protecting our Merchant Navy in time of war would be greatly simplified if all convoys could be "fast" ones and if a much larger number of merchant vessels were of such speed as to be able to proceed independently. But speed is very costly. A cargo liner of 4,800 tons total deadweight capacity at present nearing completion will cost her owners about £550,000. She is 360 feet long on a beam of 55 feet and will have a service speed of 14 knots. This will be achieved by a set of Diesel engines of 4,400 brake horse power, with a daily fuel consumption of 14 tons. To increase her speed to 15 knots would increase her cost to some £610,000 and her fuel consumption to 17½ tons per day, because her engine power must rise to 5,500 b.h.p., and she will be 15 feet longer and 2 feet broader. Her total deadweight increases to 5,000 tons, but owing to the extra bunker capacity required, her cargo deadweight remains unchanged. To increase her speed to 18 knots puts the price up to £860,000, an increase of more than 55 per cent. over the 14 knot vessel; her length must again be increased to 450 feet on a beam of 62 feet, while her fuel consumption has risen to 31 tons per day, to supply engines of 10,000 b.h.p., more than double those required for the slower speed. Total deadweight rises to 6,000 tons, owing to extra bunker capacity, without any advantage to the owner in carrying capacity, though he would, of course, enjoy some advantage from the shorter time occupied while on passage at sea. In addition to these very heavy increases in prime cost, the cost of manning and operating also rises, marine insurance premiums are increased, as also are the various dues paid by the vessel in the ports of the world, most of which are based on her tonnage. And in addition to all this, the owner has got quite a different type of vessel from the one he had planned to meet the requirements of his trade. Further, this faster and much more costly unit will suffer the same expensive delays in port as her slower and cheaper sister.

While on the subject of convoys, I would like to renew the richly-deserved tribute which has frequently been paid to the gallantry of the Commodores of Merchant Navy convoys. The many war histories are full of epic stories on this subject—they all illustrate and underline the tremendous admiration and respect awakened in the hearts of Merchant Navy masters and their crews for these men of the Royal Navy who shared their hardships and perils in vessels for the most part only inadequately armed for their own protection. Ashore, in the planning and routing of convoys, there was excellent co-operation between the Royal and Merchant Navies, and I imply no criticism when I suggest that this may be a direction in which increased peace-time liaison and joint study could not fail to be advantageous to all parties.



## INTER-SERVICE CONSIDERATIONS

Although, as I have already suggested, the British shipowner must plan for peace rather than for war, and although there are definite limits to what he can do in the matter of speed, he is always prepared, and indeed welcomes, the opportunity to consult and co-operate with the fighting Services in an effort to match as far as possible his own designs and plans with their requirements. Much has been accomplished in this direction in the provision of gun stiffening, in the strengthening of decks and 'tween decks for the carriage of heavy tanks, M.T., etc., and the joint committees which are working on these problems are no doubt also studying the many other smaller ways in which close co-operation can produce worthwhile results.

It is not unusual for the Services to express some disappointment at the low lifting capacity of the cargo gear of many merchant ships, but here again it must be remembered that big heavy-lifting derricks are very expensive to install and to maintain, and may unnecessarily lock up much valuable capital in an unproductive medium, unless they are actually required by the owner in his peace-time operations—which is not usually the case. Of what use would a 50 or 75-ton derrick be to the average 10,000-ton tramp, catering for bulk cargoes on the oceans of the world, however useful it might prove should that vessel be called upon to carry tanks and heavy M.T. to a "blitzed" port or a roadstead in a distant theatre of war?

It is, I think, safe to assume that in any future war the British Merchant Fleet would continue, as on the two past occasions, to be manned and husbanded by owners or their agents, acting under the direction of the various Government Departments concerned. The Sea Transport Division of the Ministry of War Transport played a very important and successful part in the late war in providing the essential connecting link between the Merchant Navy and the fighting Services. Those who are loudest in the praises of that organization's past performance would, I think, nevertheless agree that here, as in all things, there is room for improvement. The pre-selection and training of officers for this particular work, and a scheme whereby they could be enabled to get first-hand knowledge of the Merchant Navy, its working conditions and the problems with which it has to contend, appear to me to be subjects worthy of earnest consideration.

The Turn-round Committees—or TURCOS, as they were called—set up towards the end of the late war to advise and assist local Naval Commanders-in-Chief with the complex task of maintaining and accelerating the turn-round of large numbers of small craft seemed to us, in the merchant shipping industry, to be an interesting and worthwhile experiment, with great possibilities. Is this another field in which pre-planning and prior training might usefully be undertaken?

You will realize that an adequate supply of shipping in time of war does not depend only upon numbers. The quick turn-round of shipping in port and its maintenance and repair are only slightly less important than numbers. The hold-up which shipowners are suffering to-day, both in ports and in repair yards, is disturbing when considered against this background, and the question seems to me to be one of capital importance in our peace-time planning.

A very large number of Merchant Navy masters are to-day following the various Defence courses organized by the Services, so as to prepare themselves for any emergency that may arise. Several very successful schemes for the exchange of experience and the increase of co-operation between the Merchant Navy and the Royal Navy, the R.N.R., and the R.N.V.R. are now in operation. The opportunity which is now being afforded to R.N. officers to make short voyages in merchant ships

is a very great step forward, and it is to be hoped that the idea will be encouraged and developed. The industry is lending an attentive and willing ear to suggestions for the extension of these activities.

For some years past the Royal Navy has included a Trade Week and a Merchant Shipping lecture in its Staff Course at Greenwich, and has allowed a number of representatives from the shipowners' side to take part. I venture to suggest that this is an example which the other Services might consider copying. Quite apart from the exchange of knowledge and experience which is to be gained from such an arrangement, I place quite a high value upon the personal contacts which are thus made. It is not mere platitude to say that the more the Merchant Navy and the fighting Services can get to know each other and to understand each other in times of peace, the fewer will be the avoidable difficulties they will encounter should they again have to work together in time of war.

In conclusion, I should like to acknowledge the valuable assistance I have received from the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom and from other sources in the preparation of this paper. The interpretation I have placed upon the facts with which they have supplied me is a purely personal one, for I must make it quite clear that I have been speaking as a private individual and in no sense as the mouthpiece of the industry. And finally, I thank you for giving me such a patient hearing—I will do my best to deal with any questions you may wish to put to me.

#### DISCUSSION

CAPTAIN A. R. FARQUHAR, R.N. : I believe there has been a very large increase since the war in the amount of shipping under the flag of Panama, with much lower standards, and hence shipping is more economical to run. Is that in any way interfering with the earnings of the British shipowners, or is world trade at present sufficient for that to be ignored ?

THE LECTURER : That question is never an easy one to answer, particularly when one bears in mind that the answer will possibly go beyond these walls. I think the short answer is that at the moment British shipping, as at present organized, has got just about as much as it can cope with, and therefore it looks with a benevolent eye upon these rather unusual activities—with an eye so benevolent, I believe, that the activities are not only fostered but even sponsored by certain British shipowners. I think that is as far as I can go in answering the question.

MAJOR-GENERAL B. T. WILSON : The lecturer said that the strength of the Merchant Navy was about 150,000 men of all grades. How many of them are British ? Is the percentage of foreigners appreciable ?

THE LECTURER : Unfortunately, I did not bring with me the table giving the composition of the total. Speaking from memory, I would say that the proportion of British seamen is very high indeed. If it is not 100 per cent., it is very close to it.

SUB-LIEUTENANT C. P. BURNE, R.N. : May I ask whether the manning situation presents any serious problem in wartime, or are there sufficient reserves ?

THE LECTURER : Perhaps I can best answer that question by telling you that within my knowledge (and I think my ship-owning friends would agree with me) on no occasion worth talking about was any merchant vessel held up for any considerable length of time by failure to get a crew. The worry was very much more on the part of the crews, who said, "I have lost my ship under me ; please, Sir, have you got another one for me ?" I think that the Chairman, Commodore Harrison, is in a better position to confirm that than I am.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. D. A. WILLIAMS : The lecturer told us that the overall gross tonnage of the Fleet is pretty well back to that of 1939, but I believe there is a significant fall in the tonnage of the second category, the coasting and home trade. What are the prospects of that short-fall being made up in the very near future ?

THE LECTURER : I believe that, so far as the home trade, which is really part of the short sea trade, is concerned, the leeway will be caught up quite quickly. When we look at the coasting trade proper, we find a different story, of course. That section of the industry, which is invaluable to us in wartime, is suffering under very great disabilities. It is meeting keen competition from road and rail, it is meeting competition from friendly foreign Powers ; and so far the industry has not found the answer. I believe that at the moment the best brains in the Country are engaged in trying to co-ordinate three things—road services, rail services, and sea services round our coasts. I can only say that I wish them luck. We all hope to see the coasting trade with a fleet even larger than before the war, but how it is going to pay for it I just do not know.

MR. R. S. F. LEGGE : The lecturer spoke about increasing the size and speed of ships not giving a commensurate increase in cargo space to cover the cost. He mentioned that a quicker turn-round, as a result of quicker loading and unloading at the docks, would help considerably, and he referred to mechanical lifts. A start was made in using these before the war, but there were strong objections from the dockers, who said that many would be put out of work. Have those objections been overcome, or are steps being taken to overcome them ?

THE LECTURER : Steps are continually being taken to overcome the objections, but this prejudice in the mind of the docker is very strong and will die very hard indeed. There have been one or two unfortunate experiences where perhaps the men have not been taken into confidence and had this thing explained to them in quite the way one might have wished.

I think there is no doubt that increased mechanization can speed things up, but again one comes back to the question of costs. A fork lift truck is an expensive vehicle to purchase and maintain, and a fairly skilled fellow is needed to operate it. It is fine provided that by using it one can save the labour of four other men ; but if one has got to have an expensive truck and to maintain it and to have a semi-skilled operator, plus the four other men as well, it just cannot be done. I believe it is true to say that the Americans, who went in for mechanization in a very big way indeed, have found that they have over-stepped the mark. In other words, there comes a sort of saturation point. One can get so far and then, spend what one will, it is not possible to get any further, and things are not speeded up any more.

I think the short answer to the question is that there is a field, which is limited, but that we have by no means achieved the limit yet for further saving of time by increased mechanization, if one can get a better understanding from the men (and one can find some sympathy with them) that this sort of thing will in the long run help them and not just put them out of a job and back on the dole.

MAJOR-GENERAL B. T. WILSON : Does the lecturer recall which is the best port for turn-round in Europe, and also how does the turn-round in the United States compare with that at ports in Europe ?

THE LECTURER : I hope I shall be forgiven if I do not answer that part of the question which relates to the United States. I was fortunate enough to spend ten days there. Those of you who have been there will understand it when I say that I was rushed from place to place and shown lots of wonderful things, and that I got a violent indigestion from that and from other hospitality ! That part of the world is not within the compass of my company's trade, and I would prefer not to say anything about it.

Coming to the Continent of Europe, I should say that the choice for quick turn-round would lie between three ports (and I prefer not to put them in any order)—Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Antwerp. There we find that, taking a range over those three ports, in

our own trades we get 40 per cent. better results than in London or anywhere else in this Country, except for the very small port which has got one ship and makes a fuss of it!

COLONEL F. H. SMITH : During the Boer War, with the usual shipping shortage, transports were instructed to turn-round in the quickest possible time. Old sailors working in the docks shore gangs made excellent stevedores for the handling of cargoes requiring rapid despatch, often in two or three days. One transport unloaded 12,000 tons measurement and took over 6,000 tons of cargo stores and coal aboard in 47 hours. Costs were then 10d. per ton for discharging and 15d. for loading, plus a small bonus for good work. Casual labour was then largely existent which often meant that men had to be up at 4.30-5 a.m. to be on the stand for selection by the foreman to start work at 6 a.m. on the ship. Could the lecturer with modern transports and latest machinery afforded to the 1950 stevedore improve on these figures and conditions of 50 years ago?

THE LECTURER : The questioner has opened up a subject which ought really to form the subject of a separate lecture altogether—and one which should be given by somebody who is much more qualified than I am.

I think it will be agreed that it is quite easy to take an isolated example of 50 years ago and remember how glorious it was and then to look at the position to-day and say how disastrous it is.

It is because of those abuses to which the questioner has referred (men called on to the stand, perhaps taken on for an hour, paid 10d. and then turned away) that the docker has surrounded himself with what to-day we call restrictive practices. In other words, over the years he has tried to protect himself against this "grinding of the faces of the poor."

We have moved a long way from that. We have tried to meet the docker. We have given him this Decasualization Scheme, to which I have referred, and which assures him that whether there is work or not he will get a reasonable sum of money per week, provided that he at least turns up and shows his willingness to work. We have provided him with canteens, with very expensive and elaborate places in which to wash and change, and all sorts of things like that. A great deal of care and thought are given to his welfare and the improvement of it. You may have seen in the Press not so long ago that quite a large sum of money is again being devoted to that purpose.

But we now come to what is, I think I may safely say, a national disease. People seem to be far too much obsessed with the fact that everything is lovely, that they get everything for nothing and that they have nothing to worry about, that they will be taken care of by the State from start to finish.

I look upon the remedy as being a process of education. I hope that we can look forward to the time when the people will understand that in this world of ours the only thing that you get without paying for it in some way or another is friendship. The docker has got to come to understand that, having got all these improved conditions, having got practically everything that he ever asked for and quite a number of things that he never even thought of, he has got to play his part in the scheme of things by taking his coat off and getting down to a solid, honest-to-God job of work.

Once you have a National Dock Labour Board which allocates the available labour to employers according to rotas, and according to the degree of priority which the work may have, then you must destroy the personal incentive, and you can only hope that eventually the men will find an incentive in the greater well-being of the Country as a whole.

I am afraid that is a very unsatisfactory answer to the question about the Boer War; I can only plead ignorance, because I did not manage to arrive until it was just over!

COMMANDER C. H. WILLIAMS, R.N.R. : The lecturer spoke of the Commodores of convoys during the war who were naval officers. I think it should be stated that in the majority of cases they were Royal Naval Reserve officers—that is to say, Merchant Navy officers serving at the time in the Royal Navy.



THE LECTURER: May I make an apology for that gross mis-statement? The point I wanted to make really was that here was a chap in naval uniform who rather expected to be put on board a craft that had got a lot of guns so that she would be able to hit back, but who instead was sent in a merchant ship that probably had only a popgun with which it was hoped to frighten off a raider should one come near.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think that I might perhaps make one or two remarks now. I should like first to thank the lecturer for referring to the Commodores. I had intended to mention myself that well over 50 per cent. of the Commodores of convoys were from the Merchant Navy itself.

With regard to the building programme, I have always looked upon it as one of the most difficult and important jobs of a chairman or the controlling authority of any shipping company to decide what sort of ships to build. It must be a most difficult problem to which to have to find the answer. There has to be found an answer to the question as to what sort of ship will be required in 15 years' time—which is the difficult period. It is perhaps not so difficult to say what sort of ships you would like to have tomorrow.

A remark was made about the reserves for the Merchant Navy. It is not for me to pay any tribute to my own Service, in which I have served happily for many years; but I should like to state a fact. Not only were the merchant seamen able to man their own ships, but many of them volunteered to go back to sea, and it is a fact that over 100 vessels under the White Ensign—quite large vessels—were manned by men from the Merchant Service, as well as a very large proportion of the officers and crews of others. Certainly 50 of the aircraft carriers were manned in the engine room entirely from the Merchant Service.

The importance of the Merchant Service to the Country has been stressed in speech and in print by the leaders and responsible men in all the Services and in politics. This should not be forgotten. On the Merchant Service depends our prosperity in peace and our survival in war. There is no other Service which is so vital to us. It has been put simply by one of our poets in a little rhyme about the steamer:

"For the bread that you eat and the biscuits you nibble,  
The sweets that you suck and the joints that you carve,  
They are brought to you daily by all us Big Steamers—  
And if anyone hinders our coming you'll starve!"

May I now ask all of you to join with me in expressing a very hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer, who has spared time from his busy job to come to give us such an interesting and inspiring lecture. (*Applause.*)

## A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE MIDDLE EAST

By MR. MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE

On Wednesday, 6th February, 1952, at 3 p.m.

LIEUT.-GENERAL H. G. MARTIN, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., in the chair

THE CHAIRMAN : The Council have decided that, despite the tragic news we have all just heard, this lecture will be given.

In memory of the King who has died and out of respect for the Queen Mother and our new Queen, we should all now stand up.

*The meeting stood in silence.*

We owe a great debt of gratitude to Mr. Muggeridge who has come here to talk to us. He is only just back from an exhaustive and, I am sure, very exhausting tour of Malaya, and naturally his mind is running on all that he saw and heard there. I am sure you will all agree that to ask him to switch his mind suddenly to the Middle East is asking a great deal. But fortunately there is no part of the world that Malcolm does not know intimately, and he holds the very strongest views about every part of it. Moreover, his knowledge of world affairs is profound, witness his editorship of those marvellous books, *Ciano's Diary* and *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*. I will ask him now to give his lecture.

### LECTURE

#### ONE GLOBAL FRONT

I HAD intended in any case to begin by an apology. First of all, I am quite sure that there are many people in this audience who are far more expert on the subject of the Middle East than I am. Naturally and inevitably, I approach it as a journalist and see it in terms of certain political considerations rather than in more technical detail.

Secondly, I was going to apologize because the situation in the Middle East is at the moment extremely fluid. It is changing almost from week to week, and any direct knowledge or experience one might have of it soon becomes out of date.

Thirdly, I was going to refer to the fact that I have just come back from a trip in Malaya, where, for a number of weeks, I have been concentrating my thoughts on the very grave and dangerous situation which confronts our Country in South-East Asia. As far as this last point is concerned, perhaps it is not as great a disadvantage in relation to my observations on the Middle East as might have been supposed, because the more one looks at the troubled condition of the world, the more one is struck by the fact that it is one problem, and not a series of problems ; that the war in which we are engaged in all but name is one war and not a series of wars. Indeed, I would go further and say that the sort of situation which confronts one, whether in Europe or in the Middle East or in the Far East, is strikingly similar. The same essential pattern presents itself ; so that if one has been thinking about Malaya and South-East Asia and the anti-Communist front there, those thoughts are not remote from the subject of the Middle East. It is, as I have said, one front, one global front, and any surrender in one part of that front directly affects every other part. If British influence were to collapse in Malaya, it would immediately have direct repercussions in Europe and in the Middle East.

## PERSIA AND INDIA

*A propos* of that, almost the first thing that struck me when I was in Teheran quite recently was that the sentry outside the British Embassy is an Indian soldier ; and if one asked about this Indian soldier, one found, alas, that he had become, like the Swiss Guards at the Vatican, a purely symbolic figure. He represented no army, no regiment ; and it seemed to me that from that single fact, one could derive, in a sense, the whole moral of what has happened to us in Persia and what had happened to British prestige and influence throughout the Middle East.

For it is quite clear that when we withdrew from India, in effect Persia and the Persian Government were immediately vulnerable. At that point, to a seeing eye, it would have been seen to be necessary to reconsider all our relations with the Persian Government and the whole status of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Nothing of the sort was done. It is one of the tragedies, in my opinion, of a system of government based on universal suffrage, that the realities always tend to be overlooked in favour of sentimental abstractions ; and people were so busy talking about this lamentable collapse of British power in India as a great act of statesmanship that they quite overlooked the fact that it had certain consequences elsewhere. One of these undoubtedly and obviously was in the Middle East and immediately in Persia.

It would seem clear to me—and I think it did seem clear to many people at the time—that the moment when we should have thought out again the whole basis of our position in Persia was when the Russians, under pressure, were forced to withdraw from Azerbaijan. At that moment, western influence in Teheran was strong, and it would have been an ideal moment for reconstructing the whole basis of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. It was not done. Future historians will note with interest, and perhaps amusement, that those who most strongly deplore what they call “colonial exploitation,” are liable to be particularly exorbitant when they are at the receiving end. It is, in any case, a fact that the Socialist Government refused to allow any serious modification of the arrangements made between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian Government, with consequences that were most lamentable.

## TECHNIQUES OF CONQUEST

I should like to break off here to point out to you a thing that is sometimes overlooked : that every age has its own method of establishing influence over others. We know that the Roman Empire established influence by constantly extending the range of citizenship. We know that in the Middle Ages influence was established by means—among other things—of dynastic arrangements. In our time, in the XIXth Century, the days of British power, influence was established by providing just government, law, and order.

At the same time, it is often forgotten that whatever those arrangements might be, they are based ultimately on the fact of superior force. No people accepts the domination of another unless in the last resort they believe them to be stronger. And when you abandon the idea of being stronger, then you automatically relinquish your right to establish influence over others.

To-day we see two different systems of establishing influence over others, and both of them are strictly relevant to the case of Persia, which is—in a sense—a battleground between them. One is the American method, the method of economic domination. The other is, of course, the Russian method, which is to establish in

another territory a subservient or satellite government which people are terrorized into accepting as their government. By this means, without ostensibly infringing its sovereignty, you make it a part of the sphere of influence of your own power system.

#### THE PERSIAN SITUATION

I made that slight diversion because, with our withdrawal from Persia, it is precisely those two systems that are struggling for influence there. I would like just to consider for a moment what the consequences of that are likely to be.

As you will recall, the crisis in Persia became outward and visible when the Premier, General Razmara, was murdered. General Razmara had approved of a new agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and was thereupon shot. Immediately afterwards, the Majlis unanimously voted against that agreement, and Dr. Mossadek took his place.

What has been and what is the attitude of the Americans towards this situation? The Americans take the view, rightly or wrongly, that if Dr. Mossadek were to fall from power, the only possible alternative would be for the Tudeh or Communist party to take over. They are therefore engaged in supporting Dr. Mossadek—grudgingly attempting to make conditions, attempting to get the best advantage that they can, but none the less supporting him. They believe that if he were to fall, Persia would automatically be sucked into this other system of imperialism about which I have spoken; that is, the Russian system. They think there would be a satellite government there which would, in effect, be a part of the whole Russian power system.

The British view has hitherto been that the American appreciation is incorrect, and that in point of fact if Dr. Mossadek were to fall, he would be replaced by another Persian politician who might well be prepared to enter into a reasonable agreement with us.

Which of these two appreciations is correct is anybody's guess. My own view is that the American one is much more likely to be correct than our own. On the other hand, one has to go on to admit the fact—the melancholy fact—that though it may be possible to sustain Dr. Mossadek with money for a time, sooner or later there must be an end to that process. Then the possibility of his being succeeded by a Communist or Tudeh government based on a Communist *coup d'état* would be only the more certain.

It is unnecessary for me to go over the melancholy story of the vacillations, the confused mixture of obstinacy and feebleness which led to our ignominious withdrawal from Abadan. But, alas, that withdrawal has taken place, and we are faced with the situation that I have attempted to describe to you. There it stands!

#### CONSEQUENCES OF ABADAN

Let us consider now some of its implications, and here I should like to go back in time to November, 1940, when—as you perhaps remember—Hitler and Molotov were sitting together in a bunker in Berlin, discussing the question of whether Russia was to come into the Axis alliance. One of the most extraordinary and revealing conversations took place—a conversation which can be read in that very remarkable State Department publication, the Diplomatic Documents relating to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which I am sorry to say has never been published in this Country. It is, in fact, one of the key documents of the time. It sheds more light on what is going on in the world at this moment than any other document extant, the reason being that it alone shows us Soviet diplomacy at work as manifested in the messages between the German and Russian Governments during the period of their collaboration.



In this famous talk in the Berlin bunker in November, 1940, Molotov was very anxious to know from Hitler exactly what he could look to get out of coming into the Axis. After a certain amount of beating about the bush, it became clear that what he wanted above everything was the right to expand southwards to the Persian Gulf and beyond. In other words, the situation which we have allowed to arise in Persia provides the opportunity which, in the end, not even Hitler was prepared to accord to the Russians for expansion southwards. There can be no possible doubt, I think, that the situation in the Middle East will be exploited in that sense.

As a result of what has happened in Persia, as a result of our humiliating withdrawal from Palestine, as a result of the very illusory character of those Arab sovereignties which we created after the 1914-18 War, this area—which, as I have pointed out to you, is one of the major targets of Soviet diplomacy—has become a power vacuum. There is nothing there, absolutely nothing! If an invasion were to begin tomorrow, there would be only negligible elements of resistance—a state of affairs which constitutes one of the most dangerous elements in the whole dangerous world situation.

It is unnecessary for me to stress the enormous strategic and economic importance of this area, which provides a large proportion of the oil requirements of the West and, as far as this Country is concerned, contains its only sterling oil resources.

#### AFTER PERSIA, EGYPT

Let us go on from Persia to consider what happened in Egypt. It is a platitude, but one that is too often forgotten, that in this world if you are weak in one place you are immediately and inevitably challenged in another. The success of Dr. Mossadek in liquidating, without firing a shot, the largest single overseas interest that Britain had, inevitably encouraged others to follow suit. The first to follow was Nahas Pasha, the Egyptian Premier. He saw that it was easy—or so it seemed from Dr. Mossadek's example—to cancel obligations, to abrogate treaties, and that the reaction of Britain to such action was not the application of force but a feeble attempt to negotiate followed by a virtual surrender. After Persia, therefore, the same storm broke in Egypt and, despite the present lull, is far from spent.

If you look into the character of these events in Egypt and throughout the Middle East, you will be struck, I think, with the fact that, as I said at the beginning, they conform to a single pattern. What is happening, it seems to me, is that two revolutions are in violent progress. One of these revolutions is a Moslem nationalist revolution based on a hatred of the Christian world. The other is a Communist revolution based on legitimate dissatisfaction with the miserable conditions of life, with the corrupt government, of most areas in the Middle East.

For the time being, we have the curious spectacle of these two revolutions, one reactionary and obscurantist, the other Marxist, in alliance. We find, for instance, that in Persia the organization Fida'yan-i Islam was working in close association with the Tudeh Party. We find in Egypt precisely the same thing. The Moslem Brotherhood is working in close association with Communist elements. Indeed, if you look into the unhappy rioting that took place recently in Cairo, you will see that the objectives in that rioting were as often Moslem objectives as revolutionary objectives. These two forces have been stirred up throughout the Middle East with different degrees of intensity. When a figure like King Abdullah attempts to resist them or to maintain a relationship with the West, he is murdered.

If I may glance a little further afield, exactly the same thing was true of Pakistan, where Liaquat Ali Khan was murdered for precisely the same reasons as King Abdulla

—that he was a Moslem who was attempting to resist these two violent currents which were flowing—a current of Moslem fanaticism and a current of deliberately stimulated Communist revolutionary fervour.

As far as Egypt is concerned, no doubt our troops could remain indefinitely in the Canal Zone, but that is no policy. We have now, in the Government of Egypt, a government which is obviously inclined, for the time being, to reverse gear a bit and attempt to move away from the position that Nahas Pasha created. But I am bound to point out to you that, even supposing it is possible to make terms with this new Egyptian Government, even if it is possible to arrange with them the institution of the Five Power Middle East Command which has been suggested, even if—and this is the biggest “if” of all—it is possible to find a solution to the question of the Sudan which is not a complete betrayal of our responsibilities there, even then, given the temper of Egyptian politics, it is almost certain that in one year, or two years, or three years, the same situation as has recently arisen will arise again. In other words, it would seem to me to be necessary to review the whole Middle Eastern situation as it actually exists today.

#### A NEW START

In the first place, I would say that it was necessary completely to co-ordinate our policy with that of America. This has not hitherto been done, partly because we have considered that we could manage alone, partly because the Americans themselves are singularly unversed in the particular problems which present themselves, and also because of a failure to co-ordinate our policy with that of America in other parts of the world. In other words, putting it plainly, our attitude to Communist China was, from the American point of view, so unsatisfactory that it left them little inclined to fall in with our purposes in the Middle East. This must be brought to an end, and we all hope—not without reason—that considerable progress was made in Washington towards its achievement by Mr. Churchill.

The first essential then, is that British and American policy should be completely co-ordinated, so that in all parts of the Middle East we are at least trying to do the same thing. Secondly, we should reconsider our whole attitude towards the elements which make up this Middle Eastern situation; consider who really are our friends and whom we can count upon. At the present moment in the Middle East by universal consent there are only two military forces which amount to anything. One is the Turkish and the other is the Israeli Army. I should like to speak for a minute about the Israelis.

Whatever we may think about the manner in which the State of Israel came into existence, whatever may be our attitude towards our past unhappy relations with it, the fact remains that it is and must be a westward looking state; whereas, as I have tried to suggest to you, the Arab states must, by their nature, move in the direction of being increasingly anti-Western. Therefore it would seem to me much wiser to base our strategy in the Middle East on the fact of a Turkish army on which we could rely and on the fact of the State of Israel which, whatever its particular sentiments may be, is forced, in the interests of its own continued existence, to throw in its lot with the West.

Lastly, I would say that an attempt should be made to work out some kind of Marshall Plan for the Middle East which would embrace the whole oil industry throughout that area. The profits of this so rapidly developing industry could then go back into the country in terms of a rising standard of life, of greater well-being,

rather than—as has too often been the case, as in Persia, for instance,—being merely a means of enriching a few unworthy individuals, all of whom have now become our bitterest enemies. It would certainly be a difficult undertaking, but I see no alternative. If we allow matters to drift on as they are doing, with British influence and strength steadily ebbing away, with America trying to shore up now this part, now that part of this ramshackle edifice with financial help, there can only be an ultimate collapse.

The oil areas are one of the strangest sights in the world, and I am sure that future historians will marvel at them. Suddenly the desert becomes a source of enormous potential wealth, of enormous potential power. That wealth has brought little benefit to any but a few, and the power it represents is now in serious jeopardy. The only answer to such a situation would seem to be that Britain and America should begin again—should think out this whole problem and see what has to be done both to stabilize economically and strengthen militarily this vital area. If the present process of deterioration should continue—then it would seem to me that our efforts in the West will turn out to be no other than a kind of Maginot Line, built up strongly in one part but easily by-passed. This would enable the Russians to achieve what I would remind you again was the one thing they tried to get during their period of collaboration with Hitler—the one price they wanted for helping the Germans—the right to expand southwards to the Persian Gulf and beyond. That price the Germans were unprepared to pay. If we are not careful, the Russians now will get it for nothing.

#### DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN: The meeting is now open for discussion.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFARD MARTEL: Our lecturer told us quite rightly and very clearly about the dangers if the Russians advance towards the Middle East, where we have our great oil lines, and so on.

There is one point that we might keep in mind and that is a little reassuring. From my rather close knowledge of the Russians and their Army and their fears towards the end of the war, I know that their greatest concern of all is the long lines of communication where there are no roads and railways. They are frightfully short of mechanical transport and I do not think they can do much in the Middle East where their communications would be thousands of miles long over sandy desert. The materials and the equipment they need for the transport industry to keep these communications going are far greater than the Russians can produce. This question of roads and railways is important, and it is a point we must keep in mind. It is, I know, very much on the Russian mind.

THE LECTURER: Perhaps I did not make myself quite clear. What I personally am always thinking about in the Middle East is not so much a Russian campaign as a series of political *coups* which would enable the Russians to acquire control of this area without any military operations whatever.

Supposing, for instance, that tomorrow this old man, Mossadek, were to collapse and supposing the Tudeh party were to take over, which is—Heaven knows—by no means impossible. You would have a Communist Government in Persia. You would have a satellite Government, which could be represented on the United Nations, to which nobody could conceivably object. Yet it would involve the whole economy of Persia and the strategic advantages of the Persian Gulf falling to the Russians. That is what I personally regard as an infinitely greater menace than the idea of the Red Army marching into the Middle East.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFARD MARTEL: I did misunderstand you. I do think your wording was such that it sounded like an advance by the Russians in that direction.

REAR-ADMIRAL R. M. J. HUTTON : In your survey of the Middle Eastern situation, you gave me the impression that we well know who are our two great friends in that part of the world from the military point of view, or who could be made our friends—Turkey and possibly Israel. You gave me the impression that the Moslem countries were likely to be "anti us" over a long period. I wondered whether that is really true. After all, Pakistan, a very great Moslem country, is a member of the Commonwealth and in many ways is friendly to us—I should say increasingly so. I would like to argue in this way : that we know perfectly well that there are some fanatical members of the Moslem Brotherhood who have committed these murders, but do these people really represent Islam ? Are they not a very small minority, and should not we work far more with the idea of getting not only Israel but the Arab world united on our side as well by our good statesmanship to resist the over-riding fear of Communism ?

THE LECTURER : Of course we should work for that, but I would myself take the view that the Moslem world has turned against the West. I agree that Pakistan is an exception ; but I would have said that the temper of the Arab world to-day, indeed the whole temper of Asia, is by and large an anti-Western temper, largely because it is felt there that the West has ceased to be strong.

If I might mention Malaya, the Chinese there are anti-Western, and they are anti-Western because they consider that the West has "had it." The West is weak. I would think that to rely on Arab support, whether in Tunis or in Egypt or in Arabia, or even, in the long run, in Iraq, was relying on something which would be unlikely to be trustworthy if and when any kind of show-down came. That does not mean, of course, that we should abandon the idea of exerting every conceivable diplomatic effort, but in exerting it we should also be realistic, and we should see that in terms of actual strength the support that a person like Nuri Pasha, for instance, represents is little, because Nuri, in the last resort, could be swept away by these two movements of Moslem fanaticism and economic and political discontent about which I have spoken.

CAPTAIN A. R. FARQUHAR, R.N. : Arising out of the last question and answer, could you tell us something about Ibn Saud ? In the twenties, when we were supporting Hussein, we were a long way from him. In the thirties Ibn Saud became very much closer. What is the position now ? He is a very big Moslem. Has he any power in the Arab League, and could he influence these Moslem fanatics you speak of ?

THE LECTURER : Ibn Saud has never joined the Arab League. He has always kept out of it. His position at the moment, as I understand it, is based on the fact that he receives an enormous number of dollars from America. He is an old man and he is very content with that situation. His present inclination is to hold aloof from Arab politics, to content himself with his great wealth, his many wives, and the various sycophants who inevitably gather round him.

MAJOR-GENERAL L. O. LYNE : I absolutely agree with the lecturer that there are two major facts in the Middle East so far as the Arab world is concerned. The first is their extreme nationalism, which is coming out for the first time—or showing itself in the present form for the first time. This is coupled with the anti-West crusade of the more fanatical Moslems. The second is that the Arab world—having been in close touch with the West for the last 200 years—has not advanced educationally, culturally, or industrially as the West has. They are therefore suffering at the moment from a deep feeling of inferiority complex which may have been made more acute by seeing how very quickly Asian nationalism is making itself felt. That is a factor one has to appreciate, because it seems to me that now, of all times, is our opportunity to give all the help we possibly can to the Arab countries which, after all, as the lecturer pointed out, stretch from the Atlantic Ocean to India and is an area which strategically we cannot put on one side.

We see here a very difficult situation. Where else can we go for friends ? I would be the first to agree that Turkey is an old friend. I would also think that the key may possibly lie with Israel. If only Israel and the Arab States could be brought together, it would be



the practical answer to the prosperity of that part of the world. Israel, being in the centre of all this, might well be able to share with the Arab States, backward as they are industrially, many of those gifts which she has for promoting commerce and industry.

Do you feel that in all this turmoil, besides the two factors you have already mentioned, there is the third factor of backwardness?

THE LECTURER: On the whole, I agree. In fact, I ventured to suggest in the vaguest possible terms that it would exert very considerable influence if we could use this enormous wealth oil is producing in the Middle East to raise the standard of life. It seems to me the only coherent answer, but would need to be done on an Anglo-American basis.

As far as Israel is concerned, the whole tragedy was that King Abdullah looked on it exactly as you do, and was, in fact, ready to settle with the Israelis. This would have provided a combination of Jordan and Israel, with the Jordan waters developed jointly. That is precisely the sort of thing he wanted before he was murdered, and it was an additional reason for murdering him. This narrow and terrible Moslem fanaticism goes even farther than Gandhi in saying that things like the oil industry and western science and thought are an error, an illusion. If you talk to the Grand Mufti about these things, and after all he is the person whom we chose, you come up against a terrible, destructive, and negative fanaticism.

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BRIGADIER K. B. S. CRAWFORD: We see that even Turkey insists upon having an American admiral in the Eastern Mediterranean in preference to a British admiral. This surely shows that power is the deepest and strongest current in the Middle East, as every where else.

THE LECTURER: I absolutely agree. Any idea that you could exert a moral influence unsupported by power, especially with the Arabs, is a fantasy. Even the American idea that you can exert an economic influence unsupported by power may well, in my view, turn out to be an illusion. In the last resort it is always a question of power.

BRIGADIER R. BARROW: How far, in your opinion, is the Middle East situation having an influence in Tunis? Are they in any way connected?

THE LECTURER: I am sure it is. What is happening in Tunis is yet one more manifestation of exactly the same thing—the feeling that the West is weak and, being weak, is contemptible. Therefore the moment has come to get rid of it. That is where our relations with Persia, our attempts to negotiate with Persia, were so pitiful. The argument that it is to the Persians' economic advantage to remain in relation with the West is one which makes no appeal to them, none whatever. They have the feeling that the West has forfeited its right, through being weak, to exert its influence. At every point you like to mention—Tunis, everywhere—you will find the same thing. Western influence will be challenged. It will be no use saying to the Sudan, "We have developed the arable area of your country by a thousand square miles and raised your standard of life and increased your population." All these things will be true and they will have absolutely no effect.

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REAR-ADMIRAL R. M. J. HUTTON : In your survey of the Middle Eastern situation, you gave me the impression that we well know who are our two great friends in that part of the world from the military point of view, or who could be made our friends—Turkey and possibly Israel. You gave me the impression that the Moslem countries were likely to be “anti us” over a long period. I wondered whether that is really true. After all, Pakistan, a very great Moslem country, is a member of the Commonwealth and in many ways is friendly to us—I should say increasingly so. I would like to argue in this way : that we know perfectly well that there are some fanatical members of the Moslem Brotherhood who have committed these murders, but do these people really represent Islam ? Are they not a very small minority, and should not we work far more with the idea of getting not only Israel but the Arab world united on our side as well by our good statesmanship to resist the over-riding fear of Communism ?

THE LECTURER : Of course we should work for that, but I would myself take the view that the Moslem world has turned against the West. I agree that Pakistan is an exception ; but I would have said that the temper of the Arab world to-day, indeed the whole temper of Asia, is by and large an anti-Western temper, largely because it is felt there that the West has ceased to be strong.

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Iraqi military mission, we had a job to get any equipment. It is a strong point for the future.

The Russians are, I think, hated and feared. I was up at Rowanduz in northern Iraq and they still remember 1914-18, and there is quite a considerable amount of nationalist feeling against the Russians, certainly in Iraq. Communism cuts across that, but there is a definite nationalist dislike of the Russians. I feel that could be exploited. It seems to me that there would be considerable friendly feeling if we were to supply the Arab powers with material. What do you feel about that?

THE LECTURER: I quite agree that the Arabs are far from being a band of brothers. Even the Arab League itself is full of the most appalling antagonisms. But I would also think that if we are going to look at things in terms of the future and of the possibility of creating certain elements of resistance to this tide which is sweeping over the world, it would be an illusion to suppose that even the Iraqis would stand by us in a show-down. It would be an illusion because our manifestations of weakness have been so appalling and, of course, there is also the whole Israel story. The Arabs hate us, as they see it, for putting Israel there. But I would not for a moment suggest that we should write them all off. I only say we have to deal with them not, as has happened too often in the past, on the assumption that they are our friends with a kind of sentimental regard for the Arab as such, but to see them as very unstable States which mean very little in terms of power. We can exploit their antagonisms, of course, insofar as it can be done. It is true, also, for instance, in Jordan that, when you have someone like Glubb Pasha, a very fine Arab force can be created.

LIEUT.-COLONEL R. W. TOBIN: You said that, through the withdrawal from India, a new state of affairs had arisen in Persia which necessitated a re-designing of the set-up of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Have we not reached the same state of affairs with regard to our position in the Suez Canal? Is not our position now based on the fact that 80, 90, or 100 years ago we were strong in the Indian Ocean? Has the time come now, before it is too late, and before things are forced on us by events, to recast our position in the Suez Canal Zone?

THE LECTURER: I fully agree. It is absolutely vital that we should do that, and the way we should do it is the way Mr. Churchill has suggested. We should insist that the Suez Canal is an international interest and we should insist that the Americans, even if only by a token force, participate with us in its defence. We should point out to them that the defence of the Canal is just as much a part of the global war as the defence of Korea. That should be our main objective, because the idea that we can sit tight and hold that area alone for ever is, as you say, completely nonsensical.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would you agree that the importance of the Suez Canal Zone is primarily as a base rather than as a canal?

THE LECTURER: I do not think that the Canal as a canal is any longer of any strategic importance whatever. If in concert with Jordan and Israel we had developed Akaba, it would have been just as good, provided it had been built up in time.

WING COMMANDER F. DUNWORTH: Another famous journalist often speaks of "the great rejection of the West" when he refers to the rest of Africa. Does the lecturer consider that this whole movement is one, or is it divided into his particular line of country and the rest of Africa?

THE LECTURER: I am sure it includes the rest of Africa. I cannot in any way pretend to be an expert, but it would seem to me to be clear that this racial question in Africa is part of the same story and presents precisely the same dangers. If you get to the bottom of the whole thing, this influence and power which we have exerted in various parts of the world was based on the idea of our supremacy. As that position is challenged in one place, so inevitably it will be challenged in another. As you yield to local clamour, such as it is,



and establish what seems to me to be a nonsensical parliamentary government in the Gold Coast, so you prepare the way for infinite troubles in every other part of the African continent.

LIEUT.-COLONEL G. A. MACMUNN: With regard to the lecturer's remarks about Moslem sentiment and the anti-West feeling. Since the creation of Pakistan that country has, with some hopes of success, tried to become the leader of the Moslem world. For example, about a year ago the World Moslem Conference was held in Karachi. Would the lecturer say whether he feels that there is any hope of Pakistan, with all the Ministers of moderate views it has at the moment and the great body of moderate opinion in the country, helping to keep the other Moslem countries of the Middle East nearer to the West, or not?

THE LECTURER: I am rather sceptical about that. I agree that the present set-up in Pakistan is the best hope we have. My own personal opinion is that the gravest error of judgment was made in the manner in which British policy seemed to lean all the time on the side of India. But I would doubt two things about what you say. I would doubt, first, whether the influence of Pakistan with Moslems in the Middle East would ever be very considerable and, secondly, whether the people who are governing Pakistan now who are, I agree with you, the most admirable collection of men, will be able, in the long run, to prevent the same currents flowing in Pakistan as have flowed in the Middle East.

I do not know whether you ever see the Pakistan press, which is obviously not an exact replica of public opinion. All the same, you see in it the same trends, the same sentiments, the same blind hatred of the West, as in the corresponding Middle Eastern newspapers. And if it were not for Pakistan's preoccupation with the question of Kashmir, I wonder how they would have reacted to these events. I would not be sure. I suspect that it would have been incomparably more difficult for people like Nazimuddin to hold the situation.

LIEUT.-COLONEL MACMUNN: I quite agree.

REAR-ADMIRAL R. M. J. HUTTON: This question of our attitude to the Moslem world is very interesting. I would like to ask a supplementary question about it. I have met a number of high Pakistani officials and officers recently, and there is no doubt that many of them feel most strongly that Russian Communism is a real menace to them. Quite a few of them are sympathetic towards the question of religion. As you know, many Moslems—although they do not regard Christ as we do—regard him as a great prophet. I would like to know whether, in your opinion, the fear of Communist domination from Russia is not likely to be, in the long run, a thing which will unite the Moslem countries, particularly Pakistan and Turkey. If they are tied the others will quite likely follow. Is that not likely to be a stronger force to tie them to the western world than their dislike on some grounds of the West which tend to put others against us?

THE LECTURER: It may be, but there again—though I hate to be pessimistic—I would say this: that the upper classes in these countries, which are a very small element, certainly do fear Russia, and this applies even to the Egyptians. Undoubtedly this change that has taken place in Egypt is an expression of fear on the part of the few, the oligarchy that controls Egypt. But I wonder whether the actual masses do. Quite apart from having any affection for Russia, they are enormously and immediately attracted by the idea of being given land. The Communist propaganda line in every Asiatic country is extremely formidable, because it offers the people what they want, people who are utterly incapable of thinking out whether they are really going to get it or of comprehending what is really happening in Communist countries. It does offer them something that they deeply want, namely, land. You notice in the Indian elections, which interest me very much, that the places where Communism has succeeded are in the old southern Indian States—Travancore, Hyderabad—where the agrarian question is the vital question. There is no doubt that the Communists do succeed in getting support simply on that. How can the Indian peasant or the Pakistani peasant know anything about all the questions

that the people you are referring to do understand? All he is told is, "You have been paying money to a landlord. Now you are going to have your land free." It is a powerful propaganda appeal throughout Asia.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** It remains for me to thank Mr. Muggeridge for his most enthralling talk. I thought before we started that it would possibly give rise to argument, and we have had a most interesting discussion.

There is one point I should like to emphasize, and that is his reference to the necessity of influence being backed by strength. The other day I was in Ankara and I was talking to the Canadian Ambassador. He is, I should say, the best informed man in Ankara, because he is in the confidence of the Turks and everyone else. We were talking about the Turks and the Four-Power pact, and he said the Turks were realists, and the one thing that appealed to them was force. If we expect them to come into our Middle East Command, there will have to be a display of real strength by the other founder members of the Command, who will have to make contributions to it commensurate with those of the Turks. (*Applause.*)

**REAR-ADMIRAL R. M. J. HUTTON:** I am sure you would like me, as a member of the Council, to thank our chairman, General Martin, on your behalf, for coming here and acting as chairman of this meeting and making, at the end, his brief but very cogent remarks. (*Applause.*)

## THE ESCAPE OF THE SCHARNHORST, GNEISENAU AND PRINZ EUGEN

### DID WE LET THEM SLIP THROUGH OUR FINGERS?

By WING COMMANDER J. D. WARNE, D.S.O., D.F.C., R.A.F.

**H**ISTORY may yet reserve its final judgment on the difficult question of whether we could have done better than we did when the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Prinz Eugen* escaped up-Channel ten years ago on 12th February. But at least a more objective appraisal can now be made of the factors involved than when the official Court of Enquiry sat immediately after the Germans had taken the wind out of our sails in so humiliating a manner.

At the time, the man in the street considered it a case of a bold surprise stroke achieving success against disproportionate odds. In fact, it was not simply a question of the Germans catching us napping; there were many good reasons why the enemy could not hope to sail the ships up the Channel without our knowing in advance of their intentions. After the months they had spent in dry dock, they had to do a minimum of working-up before attempting a break-out through such narrow waters. This meant that minesweepers and at least a part of the surface escort of destroyers and E-boats had to be assembled at Brest for some days before the break-out. The relief E-boats and the minesweepers for the last-minute sweeping had also to be deployed beforehand in the Channel ports. Brest and the Channel ports were kept under constant surveillance and, whenever there was a chance of the three vessels sailing, air patrols were established off Brest and in the Channel. The German jamming of our radar on the South coast shows that they were not, in fact, counting on surprise. It had exactly the effect that could have been anticipated, and stimulated us into sending a reconnaissance to see what was happening. In fact, it gave us our first information that something unusual was afoot, although the ships were first identified by a fighter patrol unconnected with shipping reconnaissance.

The Germans apparently weighed the risks involved in taking the Channel route as opposed to sending the ships out into the Atlantic and around the North of Scotland, and they adopted the logical course of action. They had the example of the sinking of the very much more powerful *Bismarck* only a few months before to remind them of the dangers of coming to grips with the Home Fleet. Dangers there were on the Channel route also, but they were by no means overwhelming and could be reduced to a minimum by the choice of the right conditions.

The surface threat, for example, was limited to a number of M.T.B.'s and six 20-year-old destroyers employed on convoy duties on the East Coast. Such attacking forces would, in daylight, be a prey to the heavy guns of the German battle cruisers. They would be more dangerous by night, but the Germans could provide their ships with a strong air and surface escort. We had, in addition, two fast minelayers, but the Germans could sweep the whole route fairly soon before the passage of the force.

The air threat might, at first sight, have appeared more formidable. It consisted of three Beaufort and one Swordfish torpedo bomber squadrons and nearly 300 heavy bombers. An analysis of the capabilities of these forces, however, would reveal a different picture, and after two years of war who was in a better position to judge the efficacy of our air forces than the Germans? The Swordfish was an obsolete aircraft and our Beaufort squadrons had had very little operational experience in their true trade, having for a great part been employed on other duties. Our bomber

crews had not been trained in the difficult art of bombing moving targets, and bombing attacks would have to be carried out from at least 8,000 feet in order to achieve any worthwhile penetration on these armoured ships. For the Germans to select a day in February with cloud cover below this height would be a relatively simple matter. The greatest danger facing them would be that we might employ our bombers as minelayers, since minesweeping cannot be carried out at much over eight to ten knots, and the Germans could obviously not risk sailing their ships up the Channel at this speed. Minelaying was, moreover, a task which Bomber Command was capable of undertaking without any special training. It would, however, take many aircraft mines to sink a ship such as the *Scharnhorst* or *Gneisenau*. Thus, although risks were involved, the Channel was obviously the safer route and, in the circumstances, to twist thus the lion's tail was a perfectly feasible operation of war.

For our part we failed, however extenuating the circumstances may have been, to make a complete appreciation of what was likely to occur and exactly what we should do about it. We realized that the Germans would take the Channel route but, having reached this conclusion, we failed to appreciate correctly the conditions which the Germans would be most likely to choose. Our first, though not greatest, mistake was to count on their making the passage of the Straits of Dover at night. In the words of the Court of Enquiry, "the probability that the enemy would pass the Straits of Dover in the dark hours coloured all actions of Coastal Command and the Admiralty and influenced the arrangements made for the patrols both as to their design and application." There was, continued the report, some justification for such an assumption, "especially during the winter nights." But was there, in fact, any such justification? Patently the Germans would not present us with the most favourable conditions for our attacking surface forces, i.e., during the night, unless the air threat during the day was greater. In fact, it was a simple question of which were likely to be the more dangerous, our surface forces or our torpedo bombers, since the air mining threat would be the same by day or night and Bomber Command could be discounted completely in a bomber role by the choice of the right weather.

The Germans apparently considered the surface threat at night to be the greater. It was more difficult for us to judge objectively the capabilities of our forces, particularly as we were still prone at that time to over-estimate the aircraft, and in particular the bomber as it then was. But if we had taken the trouble, or had had the pertinacity, to reduce the question to the simple issue of torpedo bomber threat against surface threat, should we not at least have been equally prepared for the German ships to appear by day or night which, as will be seen later, would have made some appreciable difference? The cardinal error, however, was our failure to realize that it would be of little use to employ Bomber Command in a bombing role, but that a minelaying role offered distinct possibilities.

The Court of Enquiry attributed our failure to the weakness of our forces and the delay in our detecting that the German ships were at sea. They entered a rider, however, that it was "only fair to remember that the prevalent opinion held was that the enemy's most probable course would be to try to pass the Straits of Dover by night. . . ." Already the Court's first conclusion is seen to need qualifying: it was as much the misemployment of our forces as their weakness for which we should blame ourselves. ("It is clear," states the report, "that the most numerous force employed, Bomber Command, played a comparatively ineffective, if gallant, part in the battle.") Furthermore, the Court's rider amounts to excusing ourselves because we had made a bad appreciation of what the enemy would do. Final judgment cannot, however,



be passed on whether we let the German ships slip through our fingers until we have gauged the effect that our tardiness in detecting that they were at sea had on the course of events.

The first indication that something might be in the wind occurred on 23rd January when the *Tirpitz* was found to have moved from Germany to Trondheim. By 2nd February, there was no doubt what was afoot. Eight destroyers and a number of E-boats and minesweepers had been detected at Brest, E-boats and minesweepers were taking up their stations from Le Havre to the Hook of Holland, and the three ships had been seen exercising off Brest. Accordingly, on 3rd February, the long-standing arrangements to deal with a break-out up Channel were put into effect: air and surface forces were brought to readiness, naval and air mines were laid in the Channel and off the Frisian Islands, and nightly patrols were instituted off Brest and in the Channel.

At 1400 hours on 11th February, a warm front approached the British Isles from Iceland and at 2100 hours on the same day the three ships with their strong surface escort weighed anchor and sailed.

Fortune was not on our side on this night of the 11th. The aircraft that should have detected the force leaving Brest encountered a Junkers 88 on the way to its patrol line and, when the ASV was switched on again, it was found to be unserviceable. The second patrol, in the Channel, fared no better. At the crucial moment its ASV was suffering from a fault of an "obscure and unusual nature which is still under investigation." The remaining patrol was too far East to pick up the ships, being disposed on the assumed German predilection for the witching hours.

Fortunately for us, however, the Germans themselves came to our rescue on the morning of the 12th. They began to jam our radar on the South coast. The resulting reconnaissance found, at 1030 hours, what was taken to be a convoy of 20 to 30 ships 15 miles West of Le Touquet. It was 1115 hours, however, before the Admiralty and the R.A.F. Operational Commands had positive information that the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Prinz Eugen* were at sea. By this time the ships were within 25 miles of the Straits of Dover, which they passed at about mid-day.

The ships were first engaged by the guns at Dover. Fire was maintained for some time but no results were observed.

The next to attack were five M.T.B.'s of the Dover Flotilla, which sighted the Germans at 1223 hours off Dunkirk. They were, however, unsupported by fighters or Motor Gun Boats owing to the limited notice and were compelled to launch their torpedoes at longish range short of the enemy surface escort.

The M.T.B.'s were followed by Lieut.-Commander Esmonde with his six Swordfish. He also was hampered by lack of support. He had only a small fighter escort and most of his aircraft were damaged by enemy fighters before reaching the target area. They were met by heavy A.A. fire and Esmonde was shot down as he pressed on over the surface screen. The other two aircraft in his flight released their torpedoes but, in turn, crashed into the sea. Some survivors of these two aircraft were picked up later. How the second flight fared is not known, none of the aircraft returned and there were no survivors.

The next to attack were four single Beauforts. A concerted attack by all the Beaufort squadrons was not possible as one was in Cornwall and the other was returning from Scotland, where it had been detached to watch the *Tirpitz*. Seven aircraft made a co-ordinated attack at 1600 hours, but the final detachments did not

reach the ships till nearly 1800 hours, by which time the gathering gloom and the poor visibility made attacks impossible.

Concurrently with the earlier Beaufort attacks, the six destroyers were coming rapidly into the picture. They were, fortunately, at sea when the news was received that the three ships were off Boulogne. As it was, an interception was only possible by crossing the mine barrier between the rows of shallow mines. They sighted the ships at 1543 hours and immediately went into the attack. They fired their torpedoes at varying ranges but no results were observed. In making their hazardous attacks the destroyers were frequently straddled by enemy salvos. That only one ship was hit was due mainly to the weather, which was deteriorating during the afternoon with the approach of the warm front.

The first aircraft of Bomber Command were arriving as the destroyers were making their attacks. Very few of the 240 odd aircraft sent out were, however, able to attack owing to the weather. Fifteen failed to return.

At the eleventh hour, a final attempt to achieve something was made. At the request of the Admiralty a small force of Lancasters was sent to lay mines in the Elbe estuary. It has since been established that both the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau* were damaged by air-laid mines, the former twice. (The *Gneisenau* was heavily damaged in an air raid whilst still in dry dock in Kiel the following July and took no further part in the war.)

The delay in detecting the Germans can thus be seen to have had an appreciable, though probably not a critical, effect on the attacks of our forces: the M.T.B.s had to attack without fighter escort or support from their Motor Gun Boats; the Swordfish did not have their full fighter escort; the torpedo bombers could not make a concerted attack and, in common with the aircraft of Bomber Command, were hampered by the deteriorating weather of the late afternoon. The attacks of our destroyers were unaffected, except that they benefited from the weather. We might have done better had we been less pressed for time, but the fact that two of the ships were damaged by aircraft mines would surely seem to emphasize our mis-use of Bomber Command. Only the *Prinz Eugen* was damaged by other means.

Final judgment must thus be withheld once again until the question of whether we could, in fact, have sunk the vessels if the bombers had been employed laying mines has been considered.

The report of the Court of Enquiry states that "on the afternoon of the 12th the mining of the enemy's expected route by aircraft was impossible owing to weather conditions." This statement would, however, seem to need qualifying in one way or another because, apart from navigational difficulties, there are no weather limitations on mining from aircraft. There may not have been time, as events turned out on this particular day, to load the aircraft with mines in time for them to get to the target area before the warm front reached the ships in the gathering darkness at about 1800 hours, at which time there would have been navigational difficulties, but that is another matter. One cannot escape the impression that the Court's "mining of the enemy's expected route by aircraft was impossible owing to weather conditions" hides a multitude of sins.

Aircraft mines alone would, of course, be unlikely to sink the ships. But what might not have happened if a large number of aircraft mines, which there would be no chance of sweeping, had been laid in the path of the oncoming German vessels while they were under air and surface attack? Only the Gods could say! A mortal

with his feet on the ground could, however, point to some practical difficulties. Not all of the Channel is suitable for air-laid mines; magnetic mines are not always effective against ships travelling at high speed owing to the time lag in detonation. And quite apart from these technical considerations, such an operation would have been difficult to execute, and on this particular day would certainly have depended for success upon early warning of the enemy's departure from Brest. This brings us back to the "breakdown of our night patrols and omission to send out a strong morning reconnaissance."

The reason, one supposes, why we did not send out such a reconnaissance was that the third patrol had apparently not suffered any technical relapse. We are back then full circle to the faulty appreciation. If we had been mentally prepared for either a day or night passage of the Straits, not only would "some officers at the Admiralty (not) have considered on the 10th that the odds on his (the enemy) leaving Brest were receding as on that date the a.m. high water time at Dover began to occur in daylight hours," but we should either have positioned the third patrol differently or realized that, with the failure of the other two, a morning reconnaissance was necessary.

The verdict must be, then, that we could undoubtedly have done considerably better than we did, even if it had had to be a question of putting the whole of Bomber Command on to the task of laying mines in the Elbe estuary. But when so much hangs upon the fortune of war, and with the odds on balance seemingly stacked against us, who but an "airborne" prophet would say that we could have sunk the ships, that we let them slip through our fingers?

As a postscript, we must recognize that, as with most operations of war, it did not require a visionary to be wise before the event. The door was there for anyone who knew how to knock. Forewarned is forearmed, but foresight comes first.

## STANDARDS AND COLOURS IN THE BRITISH ARMY

By COLONEL H. C. B. ROGERS, O.B.E.

**A**LTHOUGH symbols in various forms have as great a practical use as ever in the Army, it is unfortunate that, in spite of the wealth of traditional military heraldry at our disposal, so many of the badges and flags in use to-day are of crude and amateurish design. The Standards, Colours, and the majority of regimental and corps badges originated at a period when heraldic knowledge was far more widespread, and the design of the two former is, of course, under the rigid control of the Inspector of Regimental Colours at the College of Arms. But formation badges and the flags which flutter from the poles of barracks and camps are often very inferior. Nevertheless, in spite of their frequently poor artistic standard, the enthusiasm with which they have been produced and the affection which they have inspired testify to a widespread love of military symbolism. And yet, in its Standards and Colours, the Army has the ideal emblems of which it makes all too limited a use. "A consecrated Colour," said the late King George V, "is a sacred emblem to be venerated and treasured as a token of the trust to your Sovereign and your Country. It is something more. It is the outward and visible sign of a regiment's traditions."

From their earliest days until the middle of the last Century, Colours had two functions: moral and tactical. It is probable that the moral has always been the more important of the two, but the number of Standards and Colours carried, until their final disappearance from the field of battle, have always been governed, rather naturally, by purely tactical considerations. Their abolition from employment in war was, too, a purely tactical decision. An unimaginative War Office confidential letter of 17th January, 1882, directed that in future Colours were not necessarily to be taken on active service owing to "the altered formation of attack and extended range of firing." General Officers Commanding were to decide in special cases.

Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry carried a Regimental Colour, which had been worked for it by the Princess, right through the 1914-18 War, and it was always at Regimental Headquarters, even when the battalion was in action. On the 8th May, 1915, the battalion was subjected to tremendous attacks with no support on either flank. Under the inspiration of their shell-torn Colour, Princess Patricia's held their position.

The history of the Colours of the British Army really starts with the emergence of an organized system of heraldry in the second half of the XIIth Century. Military ensigns were, of course, carried in England at a far earlier period. But there is a continuity of tradition and practice from the armorial banners of mediæval chivalry to the present day; a continuity which does not embrace the Standards of the Anglo-Saxons or the Eagles of Rome. These latter were the forerunners of our present system, but not its ancestors.

It was probably the Third Crusade that was mainly responsible for the rapid growth of armorial flags. Not only did they serve an obvious tactical purpose in an allied army of many nationalities, but banners which had been carried in defence of the Holy Places of the Faith would acquire an almost mystical significance, and a son would be proud and anxious to bear the emblem which his father had carried with distinction against the infidels.



The banner, a square or rectangular flag, was carried by barons or knights banneret and was emblazoned with its owner's arms. The ordinary knight followed the banner of his feudal lord. His own arms or badge were borne on a pennon, a small swallow-tailed flag attached below the lance-head, and would appear upright when the lance was held in the horizontal position. Banners heading small parties of knights would probably be grouped under the banner of one of the greater barons, thus forming a rough analogy to a regimental and company organization. At the siege of Carlaverock in 1300, there were over 100 banners and approximately 25 to 30 knights to each banner. In addition to the knights, of course, there were various types of armed retainers and followers.

In 1277, there is the first mention of the flag of St. George, the red cross on a white field, which appears to have been adopted as the banner of the King's personal troops, to differentiate them from the baronial forces.

The red cross of St. George and the armorial banners of the barons waved over the fighting forces of England until the Battle of Bosworth, in 1483, brought to an end the civil conflict known as the Wars of the Roses and broke the power of the great lords. Following the control by the Sovereign of all the armed forces of the realm, there was a gradual change in the Army's flags. An engraving of the siege of Boulogne in 1544, made in 1772 from a contemporary painting, shows a number of armorial banners flying from the tops of tents; but the only Colours with the Infantry and Artillery in the field are the cross of St. George, a flag with bars<sup>1</sup> of an unknown colour, and St. George impaled<sup>2</sup> with this barry device. The Cavalry carry various Standards which include the Lion of England between Fleur-de-Lis, pictorial emblems, and the cross of St. George.

The origin of the flag with bars is a mystery. It may be that the captain of a "band" of infantry bore a Colour which was barry of the livery colours of his arms instead of the arms themselves.<sup>3</sup> These barry or striped flags became very popular, however. They were introduced into the Navy in 1574 as ensigns, generally with the cross of St. George in the dexter canton,<sup>4</sup> and lasted until 1625. Different designs seem to have been used to distinguish individual ships, so that there was a close analogy to army Colours.

In the Elizabethan wars, the infantry unit was the company (replacing the older term "band," the descendant of the baron's band of knights and men at arms). The Company Colour was generally of the barry pattern, sometimes having St. George in the dexter canton. Occasionally it may have borne the arms of the captain and sometimes it was completely plain.

<sup>1</sup> "Bars" in heraldry are horizontal stripes.

<sup>2</sup> "Impaled" means that two armorial bearings are placed side by side on the same shield or flag. In this case the flag would have the red cross of St. George on a white field on the half of the flag next to the hoist, and the barry pattern on the other half.

<sup>3</sup> It is likely that the term "Colours" is derived from these variously coloured flags.

<sup>4</sup> A "canton" is a rectangular charge or area occupying one of the upper corners of a flag or shield. "Dexter" is the right hand side of a shield from the point of view of the wearer; or the left hand side as one looks at it. The dexter side of a flag is that next to the pole or pike. The fly is the sinister or left hand side. If unspecified, a canton is always assumed to be dexter.

A regiment or "battle" (i.e., battalion) was only formed when required and usually consisted of five companies, though the number varied according to the situation. A battle might be placed under the command of one of the captains, though later a colonel<sup>5</sup> was appointed and probably bore the flag of St. George as his Colour. A contemporary picture of the siege of Enniskillen in 1593-94 shows the Colours of the battles of the Governor, Captain John Dowdall, and of Captain Bingham. The Governor's battle consisted of six companies, four of which had barry Colours, one a barry Colour with St. George in the canton and one a plain Colour. There were only three companies in Captain Bingham's battle. One of the Colours was the St. George, one was plain, and the third was the barry design. Cavalry bands, according to contemporary illustrations, carried swallow-tailed pennons charged with the red cross.

Some time before the start of the Civil War, a definite system of infantry Colours was adopted, and this system with some modifications is that still in use in the Regiments of Foot Guards to-day. Captain Thomas Venn, in his *Military Observations* of 1672, thus describes it: "The Colonel's Colour, in the first place, is of pure clean colour, without any mixture. The Lieutenant-Colonel's only with St. George's Armes in the upper corner next the staff; the major's the same, but with a little stream blazant,<sup>6</sup> and every captain with St. George's Armes alone, but with so many spots or several devices as pertain to the dignity of their several places." This system was used by both sides in the Civil War, so that it must have been in use for some years before it. From 1625, red ensigns gradually replaced the old barry variety in the Navy, so it may be that army Colours were changed at about the same time. Cavalry Standards during the Civil War were generally left to the personal taste of the officer who raised each individual troop, but the King's Regiment of Life Guards had six Standards, each being the cross of St. George impaling different Royal badges, and some regimental regularity appeared on the Parliamentary side as the war progressed.

At about the time that Thomas Venn wrote, the St. George was being removed from the dexter canton of the infantry Colours and drawn throughout the flag. Where the field was other than white the red cross was fimbriated (i.e., edged) white. The emblems borne by the different regiments, and the devices used to indicate the seniority of the captains of companies, varied considerably. They were frequently taken from the armorial achievement of the colonel of the regiment. Except where figures were used, the number of charges on Company Colours increased with the juniority of the captain. The colonels' Colours in the Regiments of Foot Guards remained quite plain (1st Guards, red; Coldstream, white; Scots Guards, white) but in most of the Regiments of the Line the principal device borne on the other Colours of the regiment was now placed in the centre of the otherwise plain field of the colonel's.

Cavalry Standards still followed no fixed system, but troops were now all regimented and Standards conformed to a regimental design. Like the Infantry, the

<sup>5</sup> The colonel remained a company officer but in practice his company was commanded by an officer known as a lieutenant-colonel, or assistant to the colonel. In his capacity as an assistant, the lieutenant-colonel was in due course removed from company duties himself.

<sup>6</sup> The "stream blazant" is generally known in heraldry as a "pile wavy." On a colour it is a wavy stripe starting at the dexter chief (or top corner next to the pike) and tapering to a point towards the centre of the flag.

charges on the Standards were generally armorial. The Household Cavalry and the Royal Dragoons bore Royal badges and cyphers; whilst the Standards of the remaining regiments were emblazoned with crests or charges from the arms of their colonels, with cyphers (if the regiment had a colonel of the Royal family) or were entirely plain. Guidons<sup>7</sup> were used for Dragoon Regiments, and the various troops of the Horse Guards (now Life Guards) each had a Guidon in addition to the rectangular Standard.

During the reigns of William III and Anne, infantry Colours were gradually reduced to three in each regiment. Regiments at the start of this period were organized in three divisions, with pikemen in the centre and musketeers and grenadiers on each flank. The Colours retained for these divisions were those of the colonel, the lieutenant-colonel, and the major. When bayonets were introduced, the pikeman disappeared and the Colours were accordingly reduced to two—the colonel's and lieutenant-colonel's. The Regiments of Foot Guards were not affected. In the Cavalry, the Standards were reduced from one to each troop to three in each regiment.

The Union with Scotland in 1707 resulted in a change in infantry Colours. The St. George's Cross on the lieutenant-colonel's Colour was replaced by the new Union device of the two countries. The St. Andrew's Saltire, which had been borne by Scottish regiments, was similarly replaced. Some Regiments of the Line still had their Company Colours at the time this change took place and the Union device appeared on these as well. On the colonel's Colour of many regiments a small Union was later placed in the dexter canton.

The Warrant of 1st July, 1751, introduced new regulations for Standards and Colours which have remained in force, with certain modifications, to the present day. In the Infantry of the Line the colonel's and lieutenant-colonel's Colours changed places. The Union became the 1st, or King's, Colour. The 2nd Colour was the colour of the facing of the regiment with the Union in the dexter canton, except in the case of those regiments which were faced with white or red, whose 2nd Colour was the red cross of St. George on a white field with the Union in the canton. In the centre of each Colour the number of the regiment was painted in gold Roman figures within a wreath of roses and thistles. Royal regiments and certain others, known as the "Six Old Corps" who had special badges, however, placed these in the centre of their Colours instead of the number and wreath; the number being inserted without the wreath in the dexter canton. There was little change in the Regiments of Foot Guards. The colonel's, lieutenant-colonel's, and major's Colours became (as they still are to-day) the King's Colours of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions respectively. The Regimental Colour of each battalion was one of the Company Colours taken in rotation.<sup>8</sup> This Warrant also forbade colonels to put their arms, crest, or livery on the Colours.

<sup>7</sup> A Guidon (from the French "Guide-homme") in its modern military form, has curved ends and is slit at the fly. As originally used it was regarded as of less importance than the Standard. Dragoons, being originally a form of mounted infantry and a less expensive arm than the Horse, carried the lesser flag. Dragoon Guards carried Guidons from their formation in 1746 till 1837, when they were ordered to carry Standards. Light Dragoons when they were first raised, carried the normal Guidon with rounded ends. In 1768, they were authorized to use a Guidon with triangular shaped swallow-tail ends. In 1834, they were ordered to discontinue their use altogether.

<sup>8</sup> The badges borne on the Company Colours are still taken in rotation for the Regimental Colours.

The Guidons of the Dragoon Guards and the Standards of the Regiments of Horse were directed to be made of damask, embroidered and fringed with gold or silver, whilst the Guidons of Dragoons were to be silk. The King's, or first, Standard of each Regiment of Horse was crimson, with the crowned rose and thistle in the centre above the motto "Dieu et Mon Droit." In the first and fourth corners was the White Horse of Hanover and in the second and third corners the number of the regiment. The second and third Standards were the colour of the facing of the regiment with its badge in the centre, or, if it had no badge, its number within a wreath of roses and thistles. The motto of the regiment was underneath the central device. In the first and fourth corners was the White Horse and in the second and third the Rose and Thistle. The third Standard was distinguished by the figure "3" underneath the motto. The regulations for the Guidons of the Dragoon Guards and Dragoons were similar.

The number of Standards (or Guidons) in each regiment varied. During the latter part of the century there were generally two in a regiment with an establishment of six troops. Regiments with more troops, and most Light Dragoon Regiments, had three. Later, regiments with an increased establishment of ten troops had five Standards or Guidons and the 1st Dragoon Guards with twelve troops had six.<sup>9</sup>

On the Union with Ireland on 1st January, 1801, the red saltire of St. Patrick (or Fitzgerald) was added to the Union device and the shamrock to the Union wreath on all Standards and Colours.

In 1806, following various irregularities in design, Mr. George Naylor, York Herald, was appointed inspector of Regimental Colours.

During the XIXth Century, there were several alterations to the centre devices borne on Colours, battle honours came into general use, there were various reductions in size, county titles appeared on many Colours, and the Royal Crest of England replaced the spear head on the top of the pike.

In 1858, the Standards of Dragoon Guards and the Guidons of Dragoons were reduced to one in each regiment. This was to be crimson and was to bear the "authorized badges," devices, distinctions, and mottoes. Household Troops were not included in this order and were to carry one Standard in each squadron.<sup>10</sup>

In 1881, infantry Regiments of the Line having only one battalion were linked in pairs to form new two-battalion regiments, and Militia and Volunteer units were amalgamated with regular regiments. The Union was removed from the canton of

<sup>9</sup> Regiments of Horse and Dragoons were for many years organized in troops, and the fixed squadron organization is comparatively recent. Troops were, however, normally grouped in squadrons in war and on many ceremonial parades. The Royal Dragoons, for instance, on an inspection in 1715, paraded its six troops in two squadrons. Each squadron was in three ranks, each rank being one troop. The number of Standards was based on the tactical, i.e., squadron organization. In the latter part of the XVIIIth Century squadrons of heavy cavalry had three troops, and light cavalry two troops. The two-troop squadron was later adopted by heavy cavalry.

<sup>10</sup> The Standards carried by the Household Cavalry are as follows:—(a) The Sovereign's Standard, which bears the Royal Arms; (b) Squadron Standards charged with the Union Badge (the united rose, thistle and shamrock). Both the above bear the Regiment's battle honours. The Royal Horse Guards, in addition to these, have a Regimental Standard charged with the Regimental Cypher and the battle honours, and a Guidon presented by King William IV, which is, however, no longer carried.



the Regimental Colour and the number of the battalion was added in the upper corner of both Colours near the pike.

In 1922, an Army Order appointed regimental committees to select ten of the 1914-18 War battle honours to be emblazoned on the King's Colour.

The Clothing Regulations of 1926 laid down new instructions for regimental Colours. The King's Colour was to bear in the centre the title of the regiment, surmounted by the Imperial Crown. The Regimental Colour also had the title of the regiment in the centre and "the ancient badges, devices, distinctions, and mottoes as given in the Army List." If the regiment had no centre badge, the number of the battalion was placed in the centre instead of in the dexter chief corner. If the number of battle honours exceeded nine, laurel branches were to be introduced and the scrolls bearing the names of the actions entwined thereon.

In 1930, an Army Order gave the King's approval for a badge to be selected by each regiment not already entitled to bear one.

For 700 years the Banners, Standards, and Colours of our armies led our troops to victory and rallied them in defeat. They were an inspiration in mortal danger; a visible sign of the honour and traditions of the band, company, troop, and regiment. Men fought where the Colours stood and gave their lives to save them. But from first to last their influence on morale was probably never officially recognized. Decisions as to their employment in battle, their numbers, and their final abolition from war were all taken on purely tactical grounds.

As regards their moral value, it may be argued that troops have fought just as well without their Colours as with them. It is a difficult objection to answer, as our regimental histories are, rather naturally, not very candid about the rare instances of failure or partial failure in battle. But it may be that there are many soldiers who, in reviewing their own personal experiences in the last two great wars, will recall incidents when the presence of the Colours might have influenced the narrow balance between success and failure.

The priority of the moral over the physical has been constantly emphasized by the great captains of the past and present. But the only moral values of primary importance in an army are those which influence soldiers in battle, and it seems that we are in danger of placing the wrong emphasis on our morale training. Men will die for their faith, their country, their regiment, their honour, or for a symbol which represents these things. It is doubtful whether any British soldier has ever consciously laid down his life for the principles of democracy and material well being.

## UNITED STATES SUBMARINES IN THE BLOCKADE OF JAPAN IN THE 1939-45 WAR—PART II<sup>1</sup>

By MAJOR C. S. GOLDINGHAM, R.M., F.R.HIST.S.

### ELECTRONICS AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICE

**I**N February, 1943, after six months of hard fighting, the Americans completed the conquest of the small island of Guadalcanal, in the southern Solomons, valuable for its great airfield, Henderson Field. During the crisis in the South Pacific in the Autumn of 1942, when it seemed possible that the Americans might not be able to maintain their footing on Guadalcanal, additional Central Pacific submarines had been sent to Brisbane. These boats were not employed on the blockade proper, but were used to reinforce the American cruiser and destroyer forces engaged in preventing the enemy reinforcement of their garrison on Guadalcanal, upon which, and upon reinforcement by the Americans of their troops ashore on the island, the outcome of the campaign depended.

By day, Allied air maintained reasonable ascendancy over the sea lanes to the island; but the night belonged to the Japanese. Results of the Solomons' submarine warfare were meagre, however. Although there was a heavy flow of traffic the Japanese, like the Americans, used small high-speed ships, such as old, converted destroyers. Few of the Brisbane submarines were fitted with radar, and those only from mid-Autumn, 1942, onwards. Lacking it, high-speed night traffic was difficult both to locate and hit.

Rear-Admiral Lockwood soon began withdrawing these boats from the South Pacific for work more specifically directed against the Japanese lines of communication. The 24 submarines that remained based in Australia, at Fremantle or Brisbane, were less than the number in the old Asiatic Fleet, a measure of the importance attached to the attack on trade.

Admiral Lockwood issued the first operation plan of the Pacific Submarine Force in June. Three duties were specified for the submarines: destruction of shipping; minelaying in enemy waters; special operations. Though target priority put warships, larger than destroyers, and oilers at the head of the list, the specifying of focal points of trade for patrol pointed the importance of the war against trade. The lowest priority was given to Japanese destroyers for, though technically poorly equipped for A/S work, they could not be attacked with impunity. By this date, however, the American submarine officers had taken the measure of the offensive potentialities of the Japanese anti-submarine equipment; and from this date Japanese research supplied to their hunting units little that was new or more dangerous than their existing equipment.

The power of attack of American submarines on the other hand, had now greatly increased. They had begun the war with the superhuman hearing given them by sonar gear; soon they had superhuman vision also. Tactics had been revolutionized by radar, the fitting of which was begun in the Summer of 1942 and was complete throughout the Service 12 months later. Daylight or dark, sunshine or fog, were all one to the radar-fitted vessel. Whilst night rendered the hunting submarine invisible, it had no power to hide its quarry. In 1942, less than a third of submarine attacks were made at night; in 1944, the percentage had increased to far more than half. By the end of the war many American submarine commanders preferred night to

<sup>1</sup> A sketch-map faces page 98 of the Journal for February, 1952.

day attack, and some Japanese submarine captains came to prefer to surface their vessels for charging batteries by day rather than by night when they knew the American search radars were operating.

The remarkable development of the science of electronics in the U.S.A. during the war, and the correspondingly meagre results achieved by Japan's research workers, placed Japanese submarines and anti-submarine vessels at a serious disadvantage and contributed largely to the successes of the American submarine service. The fault lay not with the Japanese scientists, but with the system which kept civilian research separate from that for the Army and Navy; the fighting services carried out their own research.

#### SUBMARINE MINELAYING

Minelaying by submarines was provided for in the United States war plan, but it was not until the Autumn of 1942 that boats could be made available for the work, for until the war-time building programme began to take effect, torpedo attack took precedence. The first minefields were laid in the coastal waters of Siam and Indo-China as a stop-gap during the period when, to meet the emergency that arose in the Solomons after the landing at Guadalcanal, several of the Fremantle submarines which covered that area had to be withdrawn to strengthen the Brisbane force. The shortage of torpedoes, which was one of the legacies of the destruction by air attack of Cavite Naval Base and the hurried evacuation of the Philippines, also determined the date at which certain submarines should be sent into enemy waters with a partial load of mines in place of torpedoes.

The initial minelaying operation was carried out by seven submarines in October and November, 1942. The *Thresher* laid the first mines off Bangkok and three days later the *Gar* extended the field. The *Grenadier* and *Tamber* laid their mines in the Gulf of Tonkin and the *Tautog* off C. Padaran, Indo-China. Alone of the seven, the *Whale* and *Steelhead* went to Empire waters, the former laying her mines in the Kii Suido, the passage into the Inland Sea between Honshu and Shikoku. The *Steelhead*, after laying her mines off Hokkaido, bombarded the Nihon Steel Works and the Wanishi Iron Works at Muroran from a range of 4,000 yards.

A few weeks later a second group of three submarines was sent to mine Japanese waters, and one of them, the *Trigger*, had the unusual experience of seeing a freighter sunk by a minefield she had just laid 60 miles East of Tokyo.

The results of these operations furnished basic data and Admiral Nimitz established an analytical section on mine warfare, to determine the most fertile areas for submarine minelaying. Whilst the torpedo shortage continued, opportunity was taken of part loading with mines submarines proceeding to patrol areas suitable for mining. Mostly the minefields were laid in coastal waters, to force shipping into depths where they could be attacked by submarines.

After 1942, however, when the torpedo shortage was overcome, minelaying became almost entirely an activity of the air forces, for the torpedo was the submarine's most effective weapon.

#### THE EMPIRE PATROLS

The invasion of the Sea of Japan by submarines in July, 1943, opened up to Allied operations the last area in which Japanese merchantmen still sailed without fear of underwater attack. These enclosed waters carried the coal and iron for Japan's war material factories, and other valuable raw materials.

For the pioneer boats, *Plunger*, *Permit*, and *Lapon*, entry called for a certain sangfroid. There were four entrances. The northernmost, between Sakhalin Island and eastern Siberia, being Russian territory, was not available. Both the two southernmost, the Tsushima Strait (between Japan and Korea) and the Tsugaru Strait (between Honshu and Hokkaido) were known to be mined. Entry was accordingly made *via* La Perouse Strait, between Hokkaido and Karafuto, the Japanese half of Sakhalin Island. La Perouse Strait was reached by crossing the cold, foggy, often dangerously shallow waters of the Sea of Okhotsk, about which little was known. Only four days were allowed for patrol, after which the submarines had orders to withdraw.

The results of the patrols were disappointing, and after some dozen ships had been sunk the area was abandoned following the loss of *Wahoo* in October, 1943, and was not entered again for more than 18 months.

Another area which contributed little in the way of shipping attrition was the Japanese Mandated Territory. Passages from the submarine bases to the area were long, and a system was consequently adopted whereby submarines proceeding to or from the South-West Pacific could be ordered to carry out a patrol in the Caroline, Marshall, or Gilbert Islands *en route*. During the operations for the capture of Guadalcanal, in August, 1942-February, 1943, some five submarines were regularly employed in the blockade of Truk, the legendary base in the Caroline Islands which the Japanese had constructed in secret between the 1914-18 and 1939-45 Wars. The successful conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign in February, 1943, almost doubled the number of submarines available for blockade, and they were further augmented by a reduction in the number of submarines in the Central Pacific. From February, 1943, until the submarines were required in connection with the preliminary operations for the great East to West trans-Pacific advance which began at the Gilbert Islands in November of that year, no more than a single submarine covered the Marshall Islands, two or three Truk, and one Palau in the western Carolines. The Pacific Force submarines thus released joined the Empire patrols and, during the second quarter of 1943, nearly three times as many submarines were employed on these patrols as during the first quarter. During the Summer and Autumn of that year nearly half the total number of submarines in the Pacific Fleet on patrol were operating against the sea routes to Yokohama, Kobe, Nagasaki, and other great Japanese ports. Some 40 per cent. of all shipping destroyed during this period was sunk close to Japan.

The most prolific patrol areas were in the South and East China Seas and around southern Honshu and the two southernmost islands of Japan. The northern Honshu-Hokkaido area was abandoned during the latter part of 1943 as shipping there was spread too thinly; and by the time there were submarines to spare for an area of such little profit, shipping had disappeared from it.

In February, 1943, the *Wahoo* entered the shallow Yellow Sea, no inconsiderable feat. Working North with disappointing results, she was off the Shantung Peninsula on 19th March, and by the 29th had sunk nine ships.

#### WOLF PACKS

By September, 1943, the number of submarines in the Pacific Fleet sufficed to permit a wolf pack trial. For this purpose, on 1st October, the *Cero*, *Shad*, and *Grayback* sailed from Midway for the East China Sea, under a division commander. The group was not particularly successful. The submarines sank three large ships



and damaged seven others, but they did not co-operate tactically, their practical co-operation being limited to passing to one another information that enabled contacts to be developed. A second wolf pack of similar size two months later sank seven ships in the Mariana Islands, but here again attacks were not made strictly in co-operation.

By the following Spring, wolf packing was effective, but the tactic was not attended with success similar to that achieved by the Germans in the Battle of the Atlantic, and it did not develop along lines similar to the German. For the Japanese anti-submarine effort was sporadic, and their convoy system inefficient. Small attack groups of three or four submarines were adequate, for no large concentration of boats was needed to defeat enemy anti-submarine measures in the Pacific. The evolution of American wolf packing was along lines congenial to the temperament of the submarine commanders, namely co-ordinated patrolling to increase the likelihood of making contacts, and independent attack after making contact.

#### THE CENTRAL PACIFIC

During the campaign in the Central Pacific, from November, 1943, until the Marianas were reached in June of the following year, several submarines were employed to disrupt the Japanese supply line for war stores freighted down from the home islands to Saipan and Guam for onward distribution to the enemy-held islands in the Gilbert, Marshall, and Caroline Islands. The great empty spaces of sea favoured dispersal of shipping, and the submarines were concentrated at the focal points. Between September, 1943, and May of the following year, 20 ships were sunk off Tanapag Harbour, Saipan, and 15 in the approaches to the vast lagoon West of Babelthup in the Palau Islands.

The latter had been investigated a year previously and the entrance used by the Japanese discovered with some trouble. On 30th March and 1st April, 1944, aircraft carriers of the U.S. Fifth Fleet completed the work of the submarines by heavy air attacks, in which they sank eight cargo vessels and four tankers. The passages to focal areas were so long in the Pacific that attack by carrier borne aircraft was found to be more economical than by submarines. In two attacks on Truk on 16th and 17th February, 1944, aircraft sank nearly 30 ships, whereas during the previous six months submarines had sunk barely half a dozen. Further eastward, towards the Marshalls and Gilberts, sinkings by submarines dwindled to nothing.

"One must visualise each sinking as a cargo or shipload going under—tons of rice, oil, bauxite, clothing, iron ore, cobalt, beef, coal. Boxes of tea, rifles, shoes, hand grenades, radio gear, revolvers, beer, A/A shells. Barrels of aviation gasoline, fish, cereals, lubricants, paint, chemicals. Cases of medicine and cartridges. Crates of machinery. Tanks, howitzers, tractors, field pieces, A/A guns."<sup>2</sup>

#### CARRIER AIRCRAFT JOIN IN THE BLOCKADE, DECEMBER, 1943

The closing months of 1943 witnessed an intensification of the blockade. Re-armament of the American submarines with a reliable torpedo was complete and, as already stated, in November and December aircraft entered as a causal agent of shipping attrition and in the early months of 1944 caused some very large losses at the Japanese bases, Truk and Palau. The fewness of ship repair yards outside the main islands of Japan often necessitated damaged ships remaining at South Pacific bases awaiting removal, and many whilst thus immobilized fell victims in the carrier

<sup>2</sup> *United States Submarines in World War II.*

air raids of the American Third or Fifth Fleets. The abandonment by the enemy of Rabaul and Truk in February, 1944, was the result of such raids.

In October, the curve of sunken tonnage began to rise steeply and within three months that of available Japanese tonnage took a catastrophic downward plunge. Despite the great increase in merchant shipping tonnage constructed in 1943, as compared with the previous year, Japanese shipyards were already behind schedule in the Summer of 1943. Replacements did not make good half the sinkings: they never did so throughout the war. Losses in 1943 amounted to no less than 1,800,000 tons, submarines being responsible for 1,367,000 tons of this total. At the end of the year Japan had some five million tons of merchant shipping afloat, including tankers, the number of which latter, as we shall shortly see, had actually increased since the outbreak of war. Of this total, 530,000 tons were unserviceable in the Shipping Control Association's (civilian) and tanker fleets, a figure double that at the beginning of the war.

#### INSTITUTION OF ESCORT FLEET AND CONVOY ROUTES BY JAPAN

In November, 1943, in an attempt to stem the losses, the Japanese instituted an Escort Fleet under a senior Admiral independent of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, and responsible only to the Emperor. This officer had authority over local commanders in matters relating to escort, anti-submarine operations, and emergency rescue of ships. This put an end to the system under which local commanders detailed such vessels as they had available or felt they could spare for convoys passing through their areas; and it also obviated the need for fresh sets of sailing instructions when a ship or group of ships passed from one area to another. There were at first very few escort vessels available; and though there was a reduction in sinkings of nearly 50 per cent. in the month following the creation of the Escort Fleet, this was probably due to other causes, for by the New Year, though escort vessels were coming forward in greater numbers, sinkings by submarine were back again at their former level.

Air escort was provided by the 901st Air Fleet, consisting of some 150 aircraft. The difficulties of communication between aircraft and anti-submarine vessels continued, however, to prevent effective co-operation. The aircraft composing the 901st Air Fleet, like the pilots who flew them, were second grade, for by the end of 1943 the drain of war on naval air pilots had been so severe that few first class men were available.

Simultaneously with the formation of the Escort Fleet, further convoy routes were established. They were tenaciously maintained in face of ever growing attacks and despite terrible losses. From mid-1944 onwards, the network of routes had to be progressively abandoned as the Allies advanced. The Japanese had left the Marshall Islands to defend themselves without the support of the fleet after the carrier aircraft raid of December, 1943, and Rabaul had been left to its own resources in the same month on account of the menace of land-based air attack involved in the Allied northward advance in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The use of the fleet in defence of New Guinea was abandoned a month later. The occupation of the Mariana Islands by the Americans in the Summer of 1944 provided advanced operating bases for submarines which shortened greatly the time spent on passage to and from patrol areas.

In October, 1944, the American advance across the Pacific from East to West under Admiral Nimitz, and the Allied advance through New Guinea and the Moluccas

under General MacArthur, reached the Philippines. All convoy routes East of Java had to be abandoned. This had the effect of bringing the available escort vessels into better relation to the number of ships they served. Still they were unable to protect their charges. Carrier-based air attacks rendered even the West coast of the Philippines unsafe, and shipping was driven to adopt the longer route off the China coast. The tendency grew more and more for convoys to hug the coasts for the sake of the land-based air protection thus afforded, with resultant delays. The great carrier air raids of the Autumn, 1944, and Winter, 1944-45, on the Philippines, Formosa, and the China coast added to the high toll of shipping losses. October was the submarines' peak month of the war: they sank over 300,000 tons. Throughout the year 1944, which saw the Japanese driven, fighting desperately, westward, there was seldom a month in which the total losses by air and submarine attack failed to reach a quarter of a million tons.

The effectiveness of the remaining ships was also diminishing. Convoy has always a hindering effect on shipping, even if the most careful and far-sighted measures are adopted. Some delay in port whilst the ships are being assembled is inevitable, and ships take longer to turn round owing to congestion caused by heavy simultaneous arrivals. Not only was there heterogeneity within convoys, but the Japanese were compelled to use ships so unseaworthy that entire convoys had to put into port to enable them to weather a storm.

Reorganization of the Escort Fleet in August, 1944, in the course of which it lost its independence and became part of the Combined Fleet, had no effect on mounting losses. It is, indeed, open to question whether the step was advantageous, for the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, could now divert escort vessels to operational uses as he wished, whereas formerly there were frequent occasions when the Combined Fleet was inactive, on which light craft were lent temporarily for escort purposes. For in September, 1943, the defence line had been drawn in, largely on account of the heavy naval air losses during the fighting in the South Pacific, and the Fleet was not again committed until the American assault on the Marianas in June of the following year. There was consequently a period of nine months during which the Combined Fleet engaged in no major activity.

#### BREAKDOWN OF THE SYSTEM OF ALLOCATING SHIPS

The year 1944 saw the Allied attack on Japanese shipping reach its peak. During each of two separate months, February and October, losses amounted to nearly half a million tons. Sinkings by submarines during the year reached 2½ million tons, and by other agents rather more than half this figure. The great and most creditable effort which was made by the shipyards could not even come within measurable distance of replacing losses.

Year	<i>Shipping, including tankers</i>		
	Losses (tons)		Construction (tons)
1942	...	953,000	260,000
1943	...	1,803,000	769,000
1944	...	3,834,000	1,699,000
1945 (first two quarters)	...	1,602,000	503,000

It was no longer possible to maintain any orderly system of requisitioning and releasing shipping to the three fleets, army, navy, and civilian: the deficit was too great for equitable distribution. Contrary to what might have been expected in Japan, it was the civilian fleet that came off best.

"The power of the shipping control association in the Government had so increased that they were able to keep a lion's share of the new construction and absorb a comparatively small share of the net loss. The 1st September, 1944, found the serviceable cargo fleet of the shipping control association still in excess of 1,100,000 tons, about 79 per cent. as big as it was on Pearl Harbour day, whereas the Army and Navy cargo and transport fleets had shrunk under the impact of attack and civilian demands at home to 28 per cent. and 43 per cent. respectively, of their Pearl Harbour tonnages."<sup>3</sup>

This was a reversal of the state of affairs prevailing up to the end of 1942, when the failure of the Army and Navy to return to civilian use shipping temporarily requisitioned for the southern operations led to a policy of shifting cargo traffic from coastal shipping to the railways. The transport of coal from Hokkaido and Kyushu for the industrial areas and railways of Honshu, for example, was diverted from water to rail carriage.

In May, 1945, the three merchant shipping fleets were consolidated into a single pool under the control of a joint board composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Ministry of Munitions, Ministry of Transport, and the Shipping Control Association. But the reorganization came too late to be of practical assistance.

#### TANKERS AND OIL IMPORTS

Though by the end of 1944 Japanese merchant shipping losses had reached a total of more than 6½ million tons, the tanker tonnage was actually larger by some 50 per cent. than at the beginning of the war. The figure rose steadily from 575,000 tons in December, 1941, until the second half of 1943, when it remained more or less stable at about 850,000 tons until January, 1945, after which a rapid decline set in.

During the first 15 months of the war, sinkings were negligible—under 10,000 tons. The main oil routes were remote. They ran from Borneo to Japan, and from Java and Sumatra to Japan *via* Singapore where oil was transhipped into large tankers from the shallow draft vessels in which it was loaded at Surabaya and Palembang. The South and East China Seas, through which these routes ran, were distant. The Fremantle submarines, which during the Spring of 1943 were as few as eight boats, were unable adequately to cover the southern half for which they were responsible; and the Central Pacific submarines were at the time mainly concentrated off the large eastern ports of Japan. Generally, too, tankers were faster than dry cargo freighters, and the slow "S" boats, which composed a large part of the early South-West Pacific Submarine Force, were at a disadvantage when attacking them. Moreover, as we have noticed, shipping on the routes through the China Sea was usually escorted.

"Had submarines concentrated more effectively in the areas where tankers were in predominant use after mid-1942, oil imports probably could have been reduced sooner and the collapse of the fleet, the air arm, merchant shipping and all other activities dependent upon fuel oil hastened. With the lag required to shift the emphasis of shipbuilding to tankers, Japan could never have caught up, even temporarily, with the rate of sinkings that might have been produced by such preference. And the fuel shortage might have been acute at the end of 1943 rather than a year later."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *The War against Japanese Transportation, 1941-1945.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*



Despite the high priority given to tanker targets in the Pacific Force Operation Plan of June, 1943, it was not until the following year that the South-West Pacific submarines were in a position to join in a concerted offensive against tankers. In the first three months of 1944, nearly a quarter of a million tons of tanker tonnage were sunk, more than during the previous two years of war. Nevertheless, this had but a transitory effect in reducing the total tanker tonnage afloat. The rise in the total over the first 18 months of war, and its maintenance, was due to three causes, building, capture, and conversion. Captures fell off after 1942 and conversions ceased altogether for nine months after May, 1943; but by that date a considerable building programme of tankers was under way, and between May, 1943, and March, 1945, when building ceased with the abandonment of the oil route from Singapore, nearly one million tons were constructed. The conversion of dry cargo freighters began again in March, 1944; but by that date the captures which had provided the Japanese with a total of more than three-quarter million tons of shipping had dwindled to insignificance, and almost every vessel converted to a tanker entailed the withdrawal of one from the dry freighter fleet.

Despite the considerable increase in tanker tonnage, the fleet, the air arm, merchant shipping, and all industries dependent upon oil had for a long time been suffering from shortage. In the Spring of 1944, the battle fleet had to be sent South to Singapore for this reason, in order to be near the sources of supply. It was a clear case of *l'appétit vient en mangeant*, for imports were of the order of three times as great as in peace-time. The requirements of the war machine, however, were greater still. Not all the tanker tonnage was engaged in import of oil into Japan: probably between 15 and 20 per cent. was not so employed. A proportion was engaged in servicing the Navy, in addition to the fleet oilers. With the paucity of storage accommodation in the Far East, tankers were tied up in port to act in that capacity. Moreover, the Singapore run, on which tankers were mainly engaged, suffered more than any other from the reduction in efficiency of the ships using it, owing to evasive routeing, anchoring at night in sheltered waters and other convoy delays, so that before the route was abandoned in the early Spring of 1945, the normal ten-day voyage to Japan was taking up to 24 days; and in the December quarter of 1944, when the tonnage of tankers engaged in importing oil into Japan reached a peak of more than two million, imports were no more than 217,000 tons—little more than a tenth of the tanker tonnage. During 1943, on the other hand, tankers imported more than  $3\frac{1}{2}$  times their tonnage, despite the fact that imports slumped badly during the first three months of the year consequent upon teething troubles following the introduction of convoy on the Singapore run. The restrictions on the use of the China Sea routes had a greater effect on the imports of oil and other commodities than the actual sinking of ships. The seriousness of the situation was recognized by the Japanese and the most determined attempts were made to bring in oil.

The captain of the *Sarawak*, a tanker which left Japan for Singapore on New Year's Eve, 1944, relates a typical experience of the oil route. The convoy consisted of five tankers, five cargo vessels, with eight escort vessels. Off Formosa, one tanker was sunk by a submarine. In Takao harbour, Formosa, three tankers were sunk by air attack. One escort broke down and quitted the convoy. On the way down the coast of Hainan Island the convoy put back to Hong Kong on news of the approach of American carriers. The latter attacked the convoy in Hong Kong harbour next day, sinking four of the cargo vessels and damaging three of the escorts so badly that they dropped out, as did also the remaining cargo ship. The remnant of the convoy,

now consisting of four escort vessels and one tanker, was attacked by a submarine off Malaya and one of the escort vessels was damaged and dropped out. On 27th January, 28 days after leaving Japan, the convoy reached Singapore. The *Sarawak*, the sole surviving tanker, struck a mine in the channel and had to be beached.

It was in circumstances such as these that the Allies fought convoys through to Malta and Russia, but their trials were fortunately of shorter duration than the Japanese and the teeth of their escort vessels were sharper. The Japanese convoys could be attacked, at any rate by aircraft, with comparative impunity. The last tanker came through from Singapore in March, 1945, after which Japan had to rely upon the meagre production of the Inner Zone which amounted to about one-sixth of her total needs. The seriousness of the situation was made clear in a report by the Japanese Total Mobilization Bureau, which stated:—

“The preservation of liaison between the southern occupied territories and Japan is an absolute necessity for . . . the maintenance of national material strength. It is recognized that if the resources of the South, especially petroleum, are abandoned, with the passage of time we will lose our ability to resist attack.”

#### CHANGES IN THE SOURCES OF IMPORTS

The constriction of the convoy routes through the South China Sea, the reduction in the tonnage of shipping available, and the decline in operating efficiency not only caused a decline in imports but brought about changes in the sources of Japan's supplies, the emphasis being shifted from the South Seas to the Inner Zone. This had the effect of giving impetus to the Japanese attempt to render the Inner Zone self-supporting. The effort to effect this, which if successful would so immeasurably have improved Japan's defensive position, had been going on during the war simultaneously with the development of the southern areas. After the war began, for example, there were practically no imports of rice or iron ore from the Outer Zone, though the latter previously supplied a large proportion. When imports of bauxite from the South began to be curtailed by the blockade in 1944, an attempt was made to substitute North Chinese aluminous shales. As supplies of zinc from Indo-China declined from 38 per cent. of the whole import in 1941 to under 10 per cent. in 1944, the Inner Zone proportion rose from 20 per cent. to 90 per cent. In 1942, Burma supplied a fifth of Japan's imports of lead and in 1943, Malaya supplied a third: in 1944, 98.7 per cent. and in 1945, 100 per cent. of Japan's import came from the Inner Zone. The import of irreplaceable commodities, such as rubber and tin, which could only be obtained in the South, continued, however, as long as shipping was able to move.

By 1945, the remaining Japanese shipping had been driven back to the coast lines and shallow waters of Japan and the mainland of Asia. American submarines followed it. By the end of March, traffic in Indo-China coastal waters was stopped, and British submarines from the Indian Ocean were working to effect the same purpose in the Gulf of Siam. By mid-May, traffic between Singapore and Siam was reduced to a trickle.

The Pacific ports of Japan were dying. Some of the principal ones, such as Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe had been declining since quite early in the war. The ports on the Sea of Japan, on the other hand, had maintained their activity for the most part fairly well up to the latter part of 1944, and even in a few cases increased it, a reflection of the altered sources of imports. Most of these ports, however,

handled comparatively little traffic. The iron ports on the Sea of Japan, such as Wakamatsu and Yawata, began to decline in 1943. Moji, on the Inland Sea, the least exposed to submarine attack of all Japanese ports and during the war the busiest, to which even Yokohama, one of the great ports of the world, had to yield the palm, suffered little decline until the late Autumn of 1944, being the port of export of Kyushu coal which, when forced onto the railways instead of being distributed to the industrial areas of Honshu by sea, was passed across the Strait to the rail terminus at Shimonoseki. The fall in the production of the mines and of the manufacturing capacity of Japan in the latter part of 1944 hit Moji hard; its decline was rapid and was completed in May, 1945, by the mining of the Strait.

#### STATE OF THE NATION AT END OF 1944

The food situation had been deteriorating throughout the war years, as the result of diminished imports, a series of poor crop years, and the pressure of the war effort on the civilian population with consequent drain upon manpower. By 1944, domestic food production was down to 75 per cent. of the pre-war average.

In a report on the state of the nation submitted to the Cabinet at the end of 1944, the Total Mobilization Bureau summarized the shipping situation up to the Summer of that year as follows: "Shipping lost or damaged (since the beginning of the war) amounts to two and one-half times newly constructed shipping, and forms the chief cause of the constant impoverishment of national strength." The end of the year coincided with the exhaustion of the rice reserve, and a tightening up of the rationing system became necessary. From April, 1945, onwards practically all shipping remaining afloat was employed in bringing in foodstuffs.

At the beginning of June, 1945, another survey of national resources was undertaken. In the Introduction, the food situation was reported to have worsened, and it had become increasingly difficult to meet the requirements of total war. But the national morale was evidently giving the authorities almost more anxiety, to judge from the space allotted to it. "The people are losing confidence in their leaders, and the gloomy omen of deterioration of public morale is present. . . . It is necessary at this time to make careful preparations to cope with public reactions in case the Okinawa campaign results in a disaster." The volume of available shipping space remaining was no more than one million tons, and there were fears lest Japan's last remaining life lines, the communications with the continent, should be cut. "If the [Okinawa] campaign turns to our disadvantage, we cannot hope to maintain planned communication after June."

#### COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CONTINENT CUT

The ink on the report was barely dry before what the Japanese feared came to pass and, with the resumption of submarine patrols in the Sea of Japan, the Americans cut the last lines of communication with the mainland of Asia.

The destruction of the *Wahoo* in the Sea of Japan in October, 1943, had been attributed to a mine, for the suspicion that the Sea was guarded by minefields was gradually confirmed by captured documents, Japanese prisoners, and other sources of information. No further patrols were ordered in the area until mine detecting equipment which could be used by submarines was developed. By the Spring of 1945, such a device had been invented and tested, and a pack of nine submarines, divided into three groups, sailed from Guam, the main Central Pacific naval base, for the Sea of Japan. Entry was this time to be made *via* the Tsushima Strait, in

the South. Provision had been made for the submarines, in case of emergency, to enter Russian waters and claim 24 hours' sanctuary.

Between 9th and 20th June, the submarines sank 27 merchant ships and the submarine *I-122*, though so small were the few ships still remaining in Japan's merchant marine, that they averaged only 2,000 tons apiece. One submarine, the *Bonefish*, was lost, a Japanese report revealing that she was destroyed in Toyama Bay, a large inlet on the West coast of Honshu.

From now onwards, submarines operated continuously in the Sea of Japan, and few sinkings took place in any other area, so completely had Japan been isolated from such of her conquests as still remained in her hands. From December, 1944, onwards until the end of the war, submarines contributed a dwindling share to the totals of ships sunk. Indeed, after the tremendous carrier-borne aircraft sweep of the South China Sea from Saigon to Formosa in January, 1945, in which 275,000 tons were sunk, the total sinkings each month resulting from the operations of submarines dropped to figures reminiscent of the earliest days of the war.

Japan was defeated. Her economy was so completely ruined that neither her two million unbeaten troops nor her host of suicide aircraft could prevent the systematic destruction in turn of her arsenals and factories, the houses of her people, her transportation system. The work of the submarines was finished, and it was for the air to make an end of resistance. The atom bomb made a quick end of Japan's ordeal.

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## THE STORY OF THE ROYAL WEST AFRICAN FRONTIER FORCE

By BRIGADIER F. A. S. CLARKE, D.S.O.

**F**OR over half a century our two African Forces have given good and faithful service in their own territories, in other parts of Africa, and overseas. But far too little is generally known of their history and exploits, or of the part played by the British officers and n.c.o.s who have trained and led them under the most diverse conditions, winning a loyal devotion which has been most marked. The object of this paper is to give some account of the origins and service of the Royal West African Frontier Force.

No regimental history has been written about this Force which consists of contingents from Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia, organized in units named after the Colony of their origin. Nigeria provides the major quota. Colours were awarded in 1922 and the Force became a Royal Corps in 1928, with H.M. King George V as the first Colonel-in-Chief. The badge worn, officially described as: "On a Mount a Palm Tree," represents the common oil palm of West Africa.

### EARLY DAYS

From the earliest times the Gold Coast trading castles had armed guards or short-lived European units of very poor quality. These were followed later by rudimentary police forces, the forebears of the *Gold Coast Constabulary*. As Nigeria was opened up, local corps were formed there by various authorities. These constabularies helped to create some security for commercial development and served in a number of expeditions before being absorbed into the West African Frontier Force.

*The Lagos Constabulary*, raised by Captain J. Glover, R.N., in 1864, formed the nucleus of "Glover's Hausas" who served in the Ashanti War and earned the first battle honour for the Nigeria Regiment: "Ashantee, 1873-74." Early in 1873, part of the Gold Coast hinterland under our protection was invaded by the Ashantis, and a kind of *sitzkrieg* ensued. Eventually Colonel Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent out from home, with three battalions and some special service officers, to command and administer the Gold Coast. After careful preparations the advance to Kumasi began. The main column, consisting of the British battalions, a Naval "Brigade," detachments of the West India Regiment, and hastily formed local units, moved North from Cape Coast Castle and entered Kumasi after several sharp actions. Glover's column of Hausas with some tribal Allies marched North-West from the mouth of the Volta, and after much difficulty reached Kumasi only to find that the main body, having achieved the object of smashing the Ashanti "army," had just withdrawn. But Glover, by his influence with the Africans and loyal co-operation, greatly facilitated Wolseley's movements.

*The Royal Niger Company's Constabulary*, formed soon after the grant of the Charter in 1886, was mainly employed in protecting commerce on the Niger. The Corps, however, earned distinction in the Bida and Ilorin expeditions of 1897. In both cases the troops were attacked by mounted and dismounted warriors belonging to the slave raiding Emirs but, though greatly outnumbered, their steady discipline, backed by some small guns and Maxims, proved decisive.

*The Niger Coast Constabulary*, whose headquarters were at Calabar, was first raised in 1892 as the "Oil Rivers Irregulars." At the outset this parent unit, whose strength was only 40, earned the title of "The Forty Thieves," but the Corps improved rapidly. It was blooded in an expedition up the Cross River in 1893, and took part in combined operations with the Royal Navy in 1894, at Brohemie. In the Benin campaign, three years later, the Corps, acting always as advanced guard, is said to have borne the brunt of the fighting. Moreover, the troops cheerfully undertook extra guards, etc., to relieve the Naval "Brigade," who were suffering from the climate and surroundings. Afterwards, Admiral Rawson, Naval C.-in-C., expressed his appreciation of "the exceedingly able manner in which the officers and men carried out their arduous and trying duties . . . they have proved themselves a very valuable force."

#### FORMATION OF THE WEST AFRICAN FRONTIER FORCE

In 1897, owing to French encroachment on the Niger Company's territory, the home Government decided to form regular military units in Northern Nigeria. Brigadier-General F. Lugard (later Lord Lugard) became the first Commandant and raised two battalions and two batteries in 1898. By 1900, when called upon for its first major campaign, the West African Frontier Force had become a well-organized efficient force with some experience of active service in trying conditions.

#### THE FORGOTTEN DRAMA OF KUMASI

In 1896, a second expedition to Kumasi had been necessary, though the force, consisting of two British battalions and the Gold Coast Constabulary, reached their objective unopposed. The Ashanti king was deposed and the country taken over.

Late in March, 1900, the Governor of the Gold Coast was at Kumasi when a rising broke out, and with his lady, and other Europeans of both sexes, had to take refuge in the fort. The garrison consisted of 150 Gold Coast Constabulary but, on 7th April, the Governor ordered up another company from Accra and a few days later called in all available men and ammunition from the recently occupied Northern Territories. Then the telegraph was cut, though not before an appeal for help had been sent to the other West African Colonies.

The Lagos Constabulary arrived on 29th April, just after a second unsuccessful attack on the fort. All their officers had been wounded and 140 casualties incurred out of 250 rank and file in an action just South of the Town. On 15th May, the Northern Territories column fought its way in after a very long march. Thus, all the available troops, far more than were necessary to hold the place, became immobilized in Kumasi. Short of supplies and ammunition, and with little hope of timely relief, they faced the prospect of starvation, capitulation, and a ghastly death. Eventually the Governor was persuaded to attempt a break-out after dark on 23rd June. After overcoming some opposition at the outset the party struggled into friendly territory, and so to the coast. There remained in the fort two officers, a doctor, and 115 Africans of the Lagos and Gold Coast Constabularies, 90 of whom were unfit to march. Rations for three weeks on an inadequate scale were left for the garrison.

On 4th May, two W.A.F.F. companies disembarked at Cape Coast, the commander, Captain Hall, having been ordered by the Chief Secretary to join the Governor at Kumasi. Taking forward small parties of the Lagos Constabulary and Sierra Leone Frontier Police, who had also arrived, Hall marched, though without

carriers to move essential supplies. Shortly after, Colonel Willcocks, Commandant of the W.A.F.F., was ordered by the home Government to take command of all forces assembling in the Gold Coast. On arrival he found the civil authorities in a state of anxiety bordering on panic. No organization existed and operations had been conducted without an effective plan; each officer arriving with reinforcements had been hurried towards Kumasi beyond reach of the telegraph. The new commander's first preoccupation was to gain control and make administrative arrangements. He asked for reinforcements, especially a force of reliable carriers.

By 29th June, Willcocks had assembled a force of 1,500 on the borders of Ashanti and, on 1st July, gained touch with Hall at Bekwai, some 20 miles South of Kumasi. It was not until 4th July that he heard of the Governor's escape or that a garrison left in the fort had only rations to last until 15th July. Concentrating at Bekwai, he left on 13th July with a flying column consisting mainly of 700 W.A.F.F., with three 12½-pounder mountain guns and large quantities of supplies and ammunition. Moving by bush paths in drenching rain, the force reached the outskirts of Kumasi late on 15th July, its flanks and rear having been harassed all day. Further advance was blocked by a large number of Ashantis holding stockades, but the methods and offensive spirit of the troops, plus the effect of the new mountain guns, quickly shattered the opposition. But only just in time. Willcocks afterwards paid tribute to the three gallant Englishmen and their handful of devoted, though broken down Africans, who had endured this last ordeal in the fort.

Reinforcements arrived from East Africa while the area around Kumasi was being cleared. The last major action was at Obassa, on 30th September, where the final assault which broke the Ashanti "army," who fought well, was made by the W.A.F.F. and Central African Regiment (now The King's African Rifles). So ended the third expedition to Kumasi, but the first in which native troops alone had begun and completed the task, thus confounding the prophets who had argued that Africans unsupported by British units could not defeat the redoubtable Ashantis. It was a hard campaign in steamy tropical forest with long marches in persistent wet weather, in spite of which the spirit and cheerfulness of the troops never wavered. The W.A.F.F., as well as the Lagos and Gold Coast Constabularies, received the battle honour: "Ashanti-1900." This was the Constabularies' last campaign but the honour passed to their descendants, the Southern Nigeria and Gold Coast Regiments.

#### CONSOLIDATION

During 1901, all the West African Forces were modelled on the same lines and under the same designation as those formed by Lugard, the original W.A.F.F. units becoming the Northern Nigeria Regiment, to which a mounted infantry battalion was added in 1903. Part of the Royal Niger Constabulary was absorbed into the Northern Nigeria Regiment; the remainder, with the Lagos and Niger Coast Constabularies, were embodied in the W.A.F.F. to form the Southern Nigeria Regiment. The Gold Coast Constabulary became the Gold Coast Regiment (W.A.F.F.) and a similar force in Sierra Leone grew into the Sierra Leone Battalion (W.A.F.F.)<sup>1</sup>.

The Force was employed during the first decade of the XXth Century only in patrols and minor expeditions, except in Nigeria where the Northern Provinces were

<sup>1</sup> The original W.A.F.F. was an Imperial unit. After the amalgamation each Colony bore the cost of its contingent and the Force came under the Colonial Office, though officered from the Regular Army. This system lasted until the outbreak of the 1939-45 War.

not yet under control. In 1901, after the return of the old W.A.F.F. units from Kumasi, operations were undertaken against Bida and Kontagora, followed by expeditions to Yola and Bornu. In 1902, Zaria was cleared; in the following year Kano and Sokoto were occupied. Though the walled city of Kano was easily captured, sharp fighting occurred in the open country to the North where onslaughts of fanatical warriors, mounted and on foot, had to be met in square formation. In the Hadeija campaign of 1906, a small square broke and lost heavily. Retribution followed quickly and, after inflicting a crushing defeat on the tribesmen, the W.A.F.F. occupied Hadeija.

In 1902, an expedition was sent against the recalcitrant Aro tribe who, owning the infamous "Long Juju," used it to terrorize a wide area in South Eastern Nigeria. Columns of the Northern and Southern Nigeria Regiments converged on Aro Chuku, seat of the Juju, which they captured after a hard-fought and protracted action.

All these operations involved severe hardships and long marches in great heat. In the 1906 campaign, for instance, a column marched to join the main body from the Benue, covering 312 miles in 12½ days across difficult country at the hottest time of the year<sup>2</sup>. Though the African General Service Medal was awarded for most of these expeditions, no battle honours were granted. In January, 1914, the Northern and Southern Nigeria Regiments of the W.A.F.F. were amalgamated. The combined strength of the Nigeria Regiment was then one M.I. battalion, four infantry battalions and two batteries.

#### THE 1914-18 WAR

In August, 1914, the W.A.F.F. invaded Togoland with the object of capturing the German high-power wireless station there. This was quickly accomplished, the Germans surrendering on 29th August. The same day the M.I. attacked Garua in the Cameroons. The place was captured but the Nigerians were driven out by a strong counter-attack. An attempt to take the small hill fort at Mora also failed. In the South, a force moved up the Cross River and occupied the post of Nsankang on 30th August. A strong counter-attack developed a week later and after a stubborn resistance the W.A.F.F., all their ammunition being expended, cut their way out with the bayonet. Losses were heavy. These actions were the first in which the W.A.F.F. encountered African troops armed with modern weapons, led and trained by professional officers, but in the hour of defeat the Nigerian soldiers gave convincing proof of gallantry and devotion to their own officers.

Meanwhile, an Anglo-French expedition, supported by a naval squadron, moved up the Cameroons River. The French troops were Senegalese; the W.A.F.F. were represented by battalions from Nigeria, Gold Coast, and contingents from Sierra Leone and Gambia. There were also units of the West Indian and West African Regiments.<sup>3</sup> Duala, the chief port, surrendered on 27th September after a bombardment; the enemy retired to Edea, which was captured a month later, the Germans withdrawing towards Yaunde. By the end of the year the capital, Buea, was in our hands.

In 1915, the W.A.F.F. from the Northern Provinces, with some French troops attached, captured Garua on 11th June and began to move South. On 6th November

<sup>2</sup> The famous march by the Guides from Mardan to Delhi in May, 1857, was 586 miles in 26 days.

<sup>3</sup> The West African Regiment was an Imperial unit recruited in Sierra Leone, and usually garrisoned Freetown. It was disbanded in 1928.



they took Banyo after an action said to be the most arduous ever fought by African troops up to that date. At the same time the main body advanced on Yaunde, as did French columns from the South and East. The place was occupied on 1st January, 1916; a few days later all four columns joined hands, most of the Germans retiring into Spanish territory. The last enemy detachments in the Cameroons surrendered on 18th February. The W.A.F.F., whose conduct had been splendid, and of whom it was said "no day appears too long, no task too difficult," were awarded the battle honours: "Kamina," "Duala," "Garua," "Banyo," and "Cameroons, 1914-1916."

The W.A.F.F. contributed a Nigerian Brigade, a Gold Coast battalion, and a Gambia contingent for the campaign in East Africa. The Gold Coast unit was brigaded with the King's African Rifles on whose officers it made a noteworthy impression. The W.A.F.F., soon known as the "Green Caps," were engaged in some of the heaviest fighting against von Lettow Vorbeck. Few pitched battles took place but much manoeuvre of a "hare and hounds" nature. More than once a column, whose advanced guard was groping through the bush for the enemy, had its rearguard attacked and, on one occasion at least, had to turn about and mount an attack towards its tail. Casualties were heavy and there was much sickness, especially among the carriers, but the units' gallantry and the uncomplaining way in which they bore the hardships of a long and particularly arduous campaign won the highest praise. Many decorations were awarded and the battle honours granted to the W.A.F.F. were: "Behobeho," "Narungombo," "Nyangao," and "East Africa, 1916-1918."

In 1917, the Senussi persuaded the Touaregs of the Southern Sahara to rebel. The French forts at Zinder and Agadez were besieged, and most of the troops left in Nigeria moved North to guard the frontier and to aid our Ally. The Nigerian Brigade returned from East Africa in March, 1918, and was soon involved in suppressing the Egba rebellion in Southern Nigeria.

#### THE YEARS BETWEEN

In its early days the W.A.F.F. had often to assist the civil power, but as the Police gained in strength and efficiency the units were able to concentrate more on soldiering. In between the wars many small stations were abandoned, a course which facilitated collective training. In 1929, however, the Nigeria Regiment had to be used in the Aba riots, or "Woman's War," in Southern Nigeria.

Several changes in organization took place, and some units were disbanded, including the M.I. Efficient signal units appeared, which some years before 1939 were equipped with portable wireless sets of considerable range; the Vickers guns in battalions were replaced by mortars; and anti-gas training commenced. Mobilization schemes, etc., were overhauled and preparations made to send an expeditionary force overseas at short notice. In 1938, Nigeria had three battalions, light battery, and signal unit at war strength in Africans, two battalions on a lower establishment, and a depot.

A W.A.F.F. battalion on the 1938 War Establishment consisted of headquarters, headquarters company, and four rifle companies, each of four platoons. Platoons had three sections, two L.M.G.'s, and nine carriers. Headquarters company had four platoons: intercommunication, mortar, A.A.L.M.G., and administrative. The total strength of a battalion, apart from British personnel, was 591 African troops and 219 carriers; the armament included 36 L.M.G.'s, four 3-inch mortars, eight anti-tank rifles, and rifle grenades. The carriers, enlisted and trained men,

were not simply porters ; they formed an integral part of sub-units and weapon teams.

Though much had been achieved since the days when Government House, Lagos, was "a corrugated iron coffin containing a dead Governor once every year," West Africa remained a "Dark Continent"—and still does. In 1937, the following orders were explained to the troops and printed on the programme of the annual regimental sports: "Any team or individual displaying a juju, or anything purporting to be a juju or charm, or claiming to possess a juju, will be disqualified." No comment is needed!

#### THE 1939-45 WAR

In 1940, an expeditionary force was again sent to East Africa, consisting this time of two brigade-groups, one from Nigeria, the other from Gold Coast. These formations, after helping to defend Kenya, distinguished themselves in the Abyssinian campaign, the Gold Coast particularly on the Juba and the Nigerians in the amazing advance from Mogadishu to Jijiga and beyond. Once more they won praise for their dash and cheerfulness, which did not desert them when they left the hot plains for the cool mountains of Ethiopia.

In the meantime, the formation of new units and services proceeded rapidly in West Africa, and when the brigades returned from Abyssinia it was possible to organize two divisions—81st and 82nd West African—for service in Burma.<sup>4</sup> One Brigade (3rd Nigerian) joined the Chindits; the rest served in the Arakan, a difficult jungle area where their ability to do without normal transport was a great asset.

No battle honours have been awarded yet, but the W.A.F.F. achieved much and displayed the usual fortitude in spite of the short service of most of the troops. The following unsolicited testimonial, translated from a captured Japanese diary, runs:—"The enemy soldiers are not from Britain but from Africa. Because of their belief they are not afraid to die, so even if their comrades have fallen they keep on advancing as if nothing had happened. It makes things rather difficult. They have an excellent physique and are very brave, so fighting against these soldiers is somewhat troublesome."

#### CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in a necessarily compressed narrative to tell something of the W.A.F.F. story. Though the Force habitually wore a scarlet zouave jacket, fez, and cummerband on ceremonial parades, and still does on occasion, it has never been merely a "picturesque constabulary" as some would now have us believe. The W.A.F.F.'s superiority over the old local corps was quickly established and, as early as 1900, their efficiency and fighting spirit enabled their commander to relieve Kumasi just in time. A tribute is due to the carriers, regular and temporary, whose services are so often overlooked. In most W.A.F.F. campaigns, conditions made it necessary to employ masses of carriers who bore their heavy loads of ammunition and supplies for hundreds of miles along narrow bush paths under a blazing sun or in torrential rain, and frequently under fire. Without them the troops would have been helpless.

<sup>4</sup> See "The Development of the West African Forces in the Second World War," *Army Quarterly*, October, 1947.

<sup>5</sup> See "The Story of the 1st West African Brigade in the Arakan," by Major-General Swynnerton.

The great expansion in the last war could not have been carried out with anything like the same success had there not been a strong cadre of experienced, highly-trained, long-service African n.c.o.s and men available. In pre-war days the greatest care had been taken to enlist the best recruits, who usually came from the Northern bush districts of each Colony. Other types had to be taken during the war, mainly for the ancillary services, but even the bushmen developed an amazing aptitude for mechanical things.

Throughout their long and splendid history much has depended on the military knowledge and personality of the British cadres. There are several factors which affect the value of African units: the most important is still the quality of leadership. If this be kept at the old standard, we may expect our African soldiers to maintain their fine traditions, and to render a good account of themselves in the future, as they have done so often in the past.

## THE ARMY AS A CAREER FOR GRADUATES

By LIEUT.-COLONEL FREDERIC EVANS, M.B.E., T.D., M.A.(Cantab.)

(Formerly Educational Adviser to the War Office Regular Commissions Board)

**C**OMPULSORY National Service has made the Army a democratic institution and representative of all sections of the community. It is worth the consideration of adventurous young graduates, both men and women, as a possible career. Full particulars of the conditions of service and prospects are issued in respect of graduates from time to time by the Adjutant General at the War Office, but it may be worth repeating the essentials here.

### PROMOTION

Promotion up to the rank of major is by time. Provided an officer maintains the necessary standard of professional efficiency, promotion to the ranks of lieutenant, captain, and major will be granted after two, six, and 13 years' service respectively. Thereafter, promotion to the higher ranks is by selection. For promotion to lieutenant-colonel, the age is about 42, or 40 in the case of outstanding officers. Promotion prospects are such that the average officer can reach this rank. In the technical arms such as the Royal Engineers and Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, the prospect is particularly good. At least a third go on to higher rank at the age of about 45.

Above the rank of major, outstanding officers are given accelerated promotion and it is possible to become a major-general by the age of 46, even in peace-time.

The compulsory retiring ages for officers passed over for further advancement are as follows :—

	Major	Lieut.-Colonel
Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Signals, Infantry, Royal Army Service Corps ... ..	45	48
Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers ... ..	48	51
Royal Army Pay Corps ... ..	55	57

Majors and lieutenant-colonels, however, who have been passed over for further advancement will have the option either of retiring on the full pension rate at the ages stated, or of continuing to serve, in the case of a lieutenant-colonel, as a retired officer, or as a major as a serving officer, to the age of 55, provided he remains fit and efficient. The old idea that a Regular officer may become redundant in the middle forties is now quite dead. We must remember, too, that the further employment of many older officers will be possible in the expanding Territorial Army. With the general rise in the proportion of older people in our population and the longer expectation of health and life, our ideas as to compulsory retirement are bound to be modified.



## PAY

The basic pay of officers is as follows :—

Rank	Service	Annual Pay
Second Lieutenant ...	...	£ 319
Lieutenant ...	On appointment ...	356
	After 2 years in the rank ...	391
	" 3 " " " " " " " " " " " "	429
Captain ...	On appointment ...	529
	After 2 years in the rank ...	566
	" 4 " " " " " " " " " " " "	602
	" 6 " " " " " " " " " " " "	639
Major ...	On appointment ...	767
	After 2 years in the rank ...	803
	" 4 " " " " " " " " " " " "	840
	" 6 " " " " " " " " " " " "	876
Lieut.-Colonel ...	On appointment with less than 19 years' service	1,013
	With 19 years' service or after 2 years in the rank	1,059
	" 21 " " " 4 " " " "	1,104
	" 23 " " " 6 " " " "	1,150
	" 25 " " " 8 " " " "	1,195
Colonel ...	On appointment ...	1,332
	After 2 years in the rank ...	1,387
	" 4 " " " " " " " " " " " "	1,442
	" 6 " " " " " " " " " " " "	1,497
Brigadier ...	...	1,551
Major-General ...	...	2,190
Lieutenant-General ...	...	2,738
General ...	...	3,194
Field Marshal...	(When in full-time military employment wholly remunerated from Army funds.)	3,650

In addition, an officer in the Royal Engineers, Royal Signals, and Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers receives £55 p.a. special qualification pay. Qualification pay, varying from £45 p.a. for a lieutenant to £91 p.a. for a major, is issued to officers when they possess certain qualifications, such as "passed Staff College," "passed Technical Staff College," or successful completion of certain long specialized courses.

Further, married officers aged 25 and over are granted marriage allowance, up to the rank of major, of £338 p.a. if they are not provided with quarters, £283 p.a. if so, and there is a correspondingly increased rate for officers of higher rank. Unless in receipt of rations in kind, a £61 p.a. ration allowance is issued. The financial prospects of an army officer are now very good. All allowances, however (in addition to pay, of course), other than ration allowance, are now subject to income tax.

## RETIRED PAY AND QUARTERS

The standard rates of retired pay of officers are as follows :—

Rank for retired pay	Standard Service periods	Standard Service pay rate
Captain or below ...	20 years	£400 a year
Major ... ..	22 "	500 "
Lieut.-Colonel ... ..	24 "	675 "
Colonel ... ..	26 "	875 "
Brigadier ... ..	28 "	1,000 "
Major-General ... ..	30 "	1,200 "
Lieutenant-General ... ..	30 "	1,400 "
General ... ..	30 "	1,700 "

Where the officer's reckonable service is less than the standard service for his rank, the rate of retired pay will be reduced by one deduction, according to the following table, for each year or part of a year of the deficiency.

Rate of retired pay	Each deduction
Above £1,000 a year ... ..	£50 a year
£1,000 and above £600 a year... ..	£30 "
£600 and above £400 a year ... ..	£20 "
£400 and above £300 a year ... ..	£15 "
£300 and above £200 a year ... ..	£10 "
£200 a year and below... ..	£5 "

In addition to the above, a terminal gratuity of £1,000 is paid, provided the officer has not less than 20 years' service.

Furthermore, the university graduate who makes the Army his career and retires at 45, or 55 even, still has a special negotiable qualification which would help him into a congenial appointment on retirement. He will therefore enter no blind alley, but into a life of activity, contact with men, and with a sense of satisfying service. Few professions can offer these in such good measure.

Army life means a great deal of movement from place to place, including terms of service in garrisons and stations overseas. To many this will be an attraction, but it does mean, in this Country, difficult problems of accommodation for the officer and his family as he grows older and marries. The provision of officers' married quarters is well below the need, although strenuous efforts are now being made to build new quarters for all ranks, and in a few years' time the accommodation problem ought to be considerably eased. The new quarters now being built are models of good housing and tasteful, attractive furnishing.

## DEGREES AND ARMS OF THE SERVICE

There is some weight given to the suitability of the degree course in relation to different arms of the Service. The following table will show this briefly :—

<i>Arm of Service</i> (a)	<i>Specified Degrees</i> (b)
Household Cavalry Royal Armoured Corps Royal Artillery Foot Guards Infantry of the Line Royal Army Service Corps Royal Engineers	Agriculture, Arts, Economics, English, Forestry, Geography, History, Law, Mathematics, Modern Languages, Natural Science, Oriental Studies.
Royal Signals	Applied Science, Engineering (all kinds), Mathematics, Mining and Metallurgy, or any other subject, providing Mathematics to degree standards is included. Any degree in :— Engineering (all kinds), Natural or Applied Science. Honours degree in Mathematics.
Royal Army Ordnance Corps	Commerce, Economics, Natural or Applied Science.
Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers	(a) Mechanical or Electrical Engineering. (b) Natural Science, providing Physics was included in the final examination.
Royal Army Pay Corps	Any subject
Royal Army Educational Corps	Any subject, preference being given to those candidates with a teacher's diploma in addition to a degree.

The interpretation of the description of the types of degrees listed above as acceptable as specified degrees for the various arms will be determined according to the statutes and regulations of the university conferring the degree.

The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, is, of course, the normal training which Regular army officers, other than medical, dental, veterinary, and pay officers, undergo, and as this course is only 18 months in duration, the relation of this type of entry to that from the universities is important from the point of view of seniority. To align the university entry with the Sandhurst entry, antedates to candidates born after 1st February, 1928, will be given as follows :—

<i>Qualifications</i>	<i>Antedate</i>
(a) 1st Class Honours in any degree and 2nd Class Honours in specified degrees.	To the same date as they would have been commissioned had they entered the R.M.A., Sandhurst, at first possible date.
(b) 3rd or 4th Class Honours or pass in specified degrees and 2nd Class Honours in unspecified degrees.	To the same date as they would have been commissioned had they joined R.M.A., Sandhurst, with the entry next following that to which a candidate under (a) is aligned.
(c) 3rd or 4th Class Honours or pass in unspecified degrees.	To the same date as they would have been commissioned had they joined R.M.A., Sandhurst, with the entry next following that to which a candidate under (b) is aligned.

To qualify for the above antedates, a graduate must have entered the university not later than the October nearest to his 19th birthday or, if he completes his full-time National Service before starting university studies, in the October next following completion of such service. He must also proceed from the university to a commission at the proper time without delay. If he does not fulfil these requirements, the period by which he is delayed will not count towards antedate.

#### CREDIT FOR HONOURS

Credit will be given for the class of the degree obtained in relation to officers in the same corps whose seniority dates from the same day. This seniority will be decided in accordance with these conditions :—

- (a) University graduates with 1st Class Honours.
- (b) Officers commissioned from the R.M.A., Sandhurst, in the top 25 per cent. in the order of merit of passing out.
- (c) University graduates with 2nd Class Honours.
- (d) Officers commissioned from the R.M.A., Sandhurst, in the top 50 per cent. in the order of merit of passing out, other than those referred to in (b).
- (e) University graduates with 3rd or 4th Class Honours.
- (f) Officers commissioned from the R.M.A., Sandhurst, in the bottom 50 per cent. in the order of merit of passing out.
- (g) Other university graduates.
- (h) Officers commissioned from other sources.

Officers with the same class of degree will take precedence according to their date of birth.

There are also special conditions which apply to candidates for the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and for the Royal Army Educational Corps. The former allow credit for engineering experience obtained prior to entry into the university, and the latter for work in the civilian schools as a teacher prior to entry into the R.A.E.C. There are also special conditions, applicable up to and including 15th August, 1951, except where otherwise decided by the War Office, for graduates born before the 1st February, 1928. Prospective candidates should, obviously, see a copy of the scheme and decide how they are affected and how the University Training Corps (T.A.) is brought into the picture. The chairman of the University Military Education Committee, or other competent university authority, is asked to report on each candidate in respect of his choice of studies; his progress, and his general character. His appearance before the Regular Commissions Board may be made before he completes his second year at the university, and if accepted by the Board this acceptance will be subject to a satisfactory completion of his degree. A graduate who does not apply to be registered for a Regular commission in the Army while in residence at a university may apply within one month of the date on which the pass list of the final examination is published.

#### SELECTION AFTER GRADUATION

So much for the preliminaries at the university. But it does not at all follow that the acquisition of a degree will guarantee entry into the Regular Army as an officer. The Regular Commissions Board makes the final selection from graduates, as they also do for young candidates for Sandhurst, on the basis of character and leadership suitability, and not all graduates are cut out for careers as Regular officers.



The introspective studious type, who may have poor contacts with his fellows, often does not pass the tests at the Board, although he may be admirably suited to other walks of life.

After serving on this Board for a number of years, the writer has attempted to describe the qualities of leadership and personality which are looked for. It is perhaps best to set out these qualities—or the most important of them—*seriatim*. The candidate is tested and interviewed for :—

His sense of service to the Commonwealth rather than his desire for security and self-advancement.

His ability to co-operate with and to be helpful to others.

His will-power to overcome unexpected difficulties, coupled with a practical and not merely a theoretical approach to problems, and the strength of character not to be easily discouraged by adversity.

His initiative and steadiness ; his physical and intellectual courage ; his sense of responsibility and of urgency. Will he put his men or himself always first ?

His acceptability to others of the same age and his compatibility with people of all ages and types. His ability to co-operate in the games and pastimes of his colleagues of all ranks.

His ability to discuss everyday affairs in an educated, tolerant, balanced, yet definite manner. His ability to "disagree agreeably."

His capability of being natural in manner in all circumstances and equal to the occasion—that is, to have poise. The gift of profiting from experience and from well-informed criticism.

His sense of purpose with some genuine and definite object in life.

His sense of humour and a sanguine attitude to life ; a looking outward toward his fellows rather than introspection.

His ability to command, not by a display of force or arrogance, but through the inspiration of all his manly qualities and abilities ; that is, the quality of the discipline he is likely to maintain.

The acceptance by others of his leadership ; the answer to the key question, "Will the men have confidence in him and follow his lead under the stresses of war ?"

His "potential." Has he a sufficiency of intelligence, education, force of character, interest in his chosen profession, and physical and mental drive to develop through training, and to continue to develop after that, both as a personality and as an officer ?

His decision in action and his calmness in crisis.

These qualities are not set out in the order of their importance. Indeed, they form a pattern in a character rather than separate items within watertight compartments.

#### SEARCH FOR LEADERSHIP

These tests are a search for courage and leadership in young men as yet perhaps immature. Is it possible to estimate the attribute of courage possessed by someone apart from actual danger ? We can only make the attempt by ascertaining the qualities which usually are associated with courage. Courage is a control of the undisciplined self, of that primitive urge for personal safety, so that in the face of

peril a secondary and acquired character takes control of the personality and higher principles replace the selfish primitive reaction. Thus human morality is the appreciation in thought and action of the rights and well-being of others, and this characteristic in peace becomes, through the alchemy of peril, courage in war.

This identification of the individual self with the good of the community is an essential factor in self-sacrifice and therefore, in the face of danger, of courage. There may be exceptions to this rule—or apparent exceptions—but basically this principle is bound to be true. We can ascertain reasonably well, under conditions of tranquillity, the moral fibre of the individual and thus obtain a fair idea of what his probable reactions would be to a dangerous assignation in war. Then there is not only this courageous attitude to a situation fraught with peril to discover, but at the same time the ability to make plans which have a good chance of success and of being able to obtain the following of others, in the face of death, when these plans are put into operation. Short cut tests to discover the rudiments of such qualities are designed to find that decisiveness in action and calmness in a lesser crisis in the young aspirant for the Army.

#### TESTS

The tests at the Board, worked out by psychologists and educationists in conjunction with serving officers, consist of:—

Group discussion which break the ice and enable the members of each group—eight in number—to learn what the others are like. They also introduce an element of friendly competition.

Group situations which require a certain amount of co-operation as well as competition, and wherein the natural leaders in the group tend to emerge quite naturally and be accepted as such. These are practical in character.

Planning projects—where a certain task has to be done or a problematic situation has to be resolved. These are of both theoretical and practical types.

Exercise in speech and thought, such as short lectures on individually selected subjects. These bring out poise and the ability to select essentials.

Taking command of the group in order to perform a certain practical task. This test shows if the candidate has the leadership to keep control in his own hands, and to be successful in the working out of his plan.

The practical tests are done on a testing ground where a number of obstacles or actual physical problems, such as might be met under field conditions, are established, the apparatus being simple and capable of varying combinations of its parts, to secure a successful result. A fair amount of physical agility is necessary and the obstacles give every opportunity for a practical approach to be successful. It is interesting to see, in a group task where the solution or the overcoming of the physical obstacles is left for the group to solve, how the natural leaders, accepted tacitly by the others, emerge, while other candidates wait on events or just act as the "hewers of wood and drawers of water" for those who display initiative and drive. A sense of urgency, of responsibility, and of control is evinced in some more than others, and all this is observed sympathetically by the officers of the Board. Occasionally, because a natural leader tends to take complete charge in a group task, he is made a "casualty" so that the remaining members in the group shall be given the opportunity of emerging with some measure of command. The "command"

tasks are definitely set for each candidate in turn, but in spite of this, where the selected candidate is lacking in such powers, it is often seen that the task is actually controlled by someone else. The deduction to be made from this is obvious.

#### THE QUALITIES LOOKED FOR

These practical tasks, to the skilled and sympathetic observer, provide much incidental, but none the less valid, information about what might be described as the character qualities of the candidates. The readiness of the helping hand, the identification with the purpose of the group, the humorous acceptance of hurt or difficulty, the acceptability to others, the will to persist against disappointing results and the amount of personal drive which are evinced in these tests is remarkable, and could never have appeared in a mere interview or at an examination room. The faults which appear, inevitably, in some of the candidates, are: fading out when things become difficult; awaiting events from the action of others; a lack of interest in these perhaps primitive activities and even sheer laziness; the absence of any sense of urgency; and incompatibility of temperament with such trials of patience and ingenuity. Candidates who prove negative in this way are not necessarily unsuited for professions of the desk and sedentary type, but for the army officer active qualities of leadership are essential.

It is usual to call up candidates from the universities together and not mixed with other types of candidates, such as Short Service or Emergency commissioned officers wishful of converting their commissions into Regular ones, or suitably qualified ex-officers, now in civil life, who wish to be so considered. But occasionally mixed groups are inevitable, and there may be one or two graduates in a group otherwise of non-graduates. What is the best attitude to take then? In the discussion the graduate will, naturally, be expected to take a prominent—or perhaps the word is “telling”—part. He should avoid talking too much and being pontifical. His contribution should reflect his graduate status without being dogmatic, prosy, or garrulous. He should speak with due respect to other opinions, and on no account put on an attitude of intellectual superiority. He will have to work and live in the Army with people who have not had the advantages of a university education, and the right personal relationships are all-important. An insufferable intellectual prig has no place in the Army, but if the graduate has good manners and the right approach, his higher educational status will receive its due, without essential friendships and cordial personal relationships being in any way endangered.

#### THE UNIVERSITY AND THE SANDHURST MAN

There is a factor to which, perhaps, reference should be made in respect of Regular officers who have entered the Army under the universities scheme, and that is that the great bulk of their fellow officers will have been intensively trained at Sandhurst and these will have made there life-long friendships and useful acquaintanceships. The graduate officer may find at times this “freemasonry” something of a handicap in his career when the higher ranks are to be reached, for there is in the Army a great deal done on the basis of personal knowledge and contacts. It is remarkable how everyone in the Regular Army seems to know everybody else, and here Sandhurst (and formerly “The Shop” at Woolwich as well) provides a common denominator. Nevertheless, the advantage of a good degree in the Army today is bound to be appreciated when the higher appointments are being made.

The Regular Commissions Boards have, from time to time, been subjected to criticisms. The old school tie is said to count more than ability. It is true that the

Boards consist of public school and Sandhurst men almost entirely (although the writer is a product of a "board school" and found this no disadvantage whatsoever), and there may be a certain amount of unconscious prejudice when grammar school products are being tested and interviewed. Yet it is the writer's view, and that of heads of grammar schools and of representatives of the public, the press, and the Civil Service Commissioners, who have stayed with the Board and watched it at work, that this prejudice rarely affects the issue. Schoolboys from the great public schools usually have wider views and a richer background than the average grammar school product, but in the character tests the latter often emerge triumphantly, and Sandhurst does the rest. In the case of university candidates, would-be entrants are of maturer age and of wider experience, and the school background becomes of less importance.

#### THE MORE SPECIALIZED CORPS

A separate note must be made in respect of medical officers who enter the Royal Army Medical Corps. The Army Medical Department makes its own arrangements for admitting qualified medical men into the Service as Regular officers, and this is usually done now through Short Service commissions.

There are openings for medical officers in the Royal Army Medical Corps and candidates up to the age of 40 years are now being accepted for Short Service commissions, with a period of from two to four years on the active list. Candidates are accepted either during their period of National Service or direct from civilian life, and previous service as a medical officer on full pay counts for increments of pay and for promotion. Short Service commissions are gratuity earning and carry an option of appointment to a permanent commission, but candidates over 35 years on first entry have little prospect of a permanent career.

Entry into the Regular Army through a Short Service commission is, at present, also possible to graduates (and others) who may first have obtained, during their period of compulsory National Service, an Emergency commission through a War Office Selection Board, and converted this, if they are accepted, into a Short Service commission. Such officers may apply to appear before the Regular Commissions Board for acceptance into the ranks of Regular officers.

#### TECHNICAL OFFICERS

There is one criticism that can be made of present methods of selection of Regular officers which is of particular application to candidates of high educational qualifications, which is that the Board, by its present terms of reference, as a rule looks mainly for positive leadership qualities and, perhaps, not sufficiently for leadership (or ability) of other forms that are necessary in modern war. This is especially true of candidates for the technical arms, and a disquieting feature is the frequency with which technicians from civil life, even those with previous technical service during the war, fail to pass the Regular Commissions Board's tests of leadership, which are designed to find leaders of men in the field rather than the men with the brains behind a laboratory or mechanical workshop. It is as if a technical education, obtained very often by dint of hard work, self-denial, and persistence in the various technical colleges and in the universities, too, does not enable those qualities, arising from wide human and social contacts, which are required in "over-all" leaders of men, to emerge in such candidates. What is the place of highly specialized technicians in the Army? It is obvious that we must have a great number of them if our defence



against possible mass attack by huge armies is to be through our more intense and superior technology. Indeed, there can be no other defence. And yet some of our best technicians, when they apply for entry into the Regular Army, often do not exhibit, at that stage, enough signs of leadership ability in the general sense. So marked is this that a special technical grading is perforce in use by the Selection Board, since by the normal leadership standards these applicants would not secure entry into the Army at all. It is true that many of them will develop sound qualities of leadership through example and experience if they are fortunate in the units to which they are subsequently posted for service.

This difficulty of obtaining an efficient entry for the technical corps with also high qualities of leadership has now resulted in the consideration of a scheme by the Secretary of State for War to provide an alternative to the Sandhurst entry by admission to a two-year course at the Military College of Science "for young men who have done a short period of National Service and who have a scientific or technical bent." The course would lead to a B.Sc. degree. The Minister is also considering an army scientific boys' school which, at 16, boys could enter "and get a liberal education with a technical bias." These proposals were announced during the debate on the Army Estimates for 1952/1953.

#### A "ROYAL ARMY?"

But this situation does give rise to a question that has occupied some acute military minds: shall we establish a "Royal Army" in which the leadership and administration would be in three kinds? First, the "over-all" leaders with those personal qualities and a sufficiency of ability and knowledge to lead in the old sense of leadership; secondly, the technicians and the "back-room boys" who may not, necessarily, make leaders in the field, but will do much of the planning and the thinking; and, thirdly, the administrative and executive officers who will carry out the details or "logistics" in the organization as laid down by the leadership, in other words, the "chair-borne" quartermasters, movement control officers, and so forth. The third category would be recruited largely from the older Regular personnel, but direct entry into this class of work for suitable people would be well worth while. This triple organization of control and duty is already, and of necessity, that followed by the Royal Navy, by the division of its officers into quarter deck officers, engineers, and administrative officers, and, to a large extent, in the Royal Air Force as well. The modern mobile land "task force" with a high-powered "punch," such as is visualized as our only answer to mass of numbers, is indeed analogous to the concentration of force in a battleship or an air squadron. The leadership and staff organization should therefore be similar in the land "task force," in order to eke out the various types of qualifications and personal qualities to obtain the best effect. How this plan of officer organization could be made to fit in with the older regimental conception is, without experience of it, difficult to foretell, but it has and is working in the other Services and in an incipient form it is already doing so in the Army. For example, in the R.A.M.C., non-medical administrative and company officers work well under the leadership of officers who are medically qualified. There is no reason why officers with different definitely established duties and responsibilities should not function harmoniously together. In many battalions of the 1914-18 War the regimental medical officer often became more of a guardian of the regimental tradition than many members of the regiment itself.

## VALUE OF TRADITION AND COMPETENCE

Regimental traditions must be retained and safeguarded. Any new plans for officering the units must conform to these traditions, just as they do in one of H.M. Ships. The important thing is to employ talents and personal abilities to the best advantage of the Service, and thus satisfaction all round can be achieved. Modern warfare of the highly technical type cannot be controlled in all its parts by "all-rounders," as was the case even in the Boer War. The age of the specialist has dawned, whether we like it or not: the problem now is of co-ordination and the full use of specialist knowledge under an understanding "over-all" command. Thus in our administrative stream of officers should be these linguists, technicians, psychologists, etc., who often may not have all the accepted qualities of higher leadership and would therefore not easily pass the selection tests required for "over-all" command. The three types of admission ought to secure such people for the Army. In officer training, also, the development, to degree standard, of linguistic ability in officers should be provided for just as at present, apart from the direct entry of graduates into the Army. Serving officers in the technical arms only are enabled to reach graduate status, either at the Military College of Science or at Cambridge University. Then what of similar developments in courses suitable for political officers, geographers, and so forth? Through this mobilization of character, brain, and brawn only can we meet the more amorphous threat of continental millions.

## "THE ANATOMY OF COURAGE"

Leadership is a very subtle thing, and while competence is of its essence, it is not all; it is competence *and* character, and where competence has been gained by dire struggle there may be a danger that the character is impaired. "Getting on" is an admirable quality in some ways, but it is not the basic one to produce great or even competent leaders of men. We impinge here upon moral values. As Lord Moran, in his *The Anatomy of Courage* so well says: "Courage is a self-discipline, a moral quality. . . . Fortitude in war has its roots in morality; selection is a search for character, and war itself is but one more test—the supreme and final test if you will—of character. A man of character in peace becomes a man of courage in war."

So, for leadership, education in the narrow sense is not enough. And it may be said that for whatever profession or trade a man is being trained, these character qualities are nevertheless necessary if society is to continue upon a moral basis. But to leaders of the Army, with the strain that may come upon them in the supreme test of war, this is even more true.

## BRITISH COMMONWEALTH NAVAL OPERATIONS DURING THE KOREAN WAR—PART III<sup>1</sup>

*The first and second parts of the narrative of British Commonwealth naval operations during the Korean War were published in the JOURNALS for May and November, 1951—EDITOR.*

**D**URING the period covered by this report, the Armistice talks have continued with alternating periods of deadlock and advance. The land front has remained more or less stable, the main event being a United Nations offensive in early October, which was led by the 1st Commonwealth Division.

Naval operations have been unaffected by the Armistice negotiations. The main Commonwealth effort has been applied on the West coast, although the East coast has not been without a quota of H.M. ships. The 41st Independent R.M. Commando has operated on the East coast, under American command throughout the period. For the sake of continuity this report deals separately with operations on each coast and separate sections are devoted also to naval air operations and the activities of Commonwealth ships in the Han Estuary.

### WEST COAST OPERATIONS

In the latter part of June and the first half of July, 1951, surface operations consisted of routine patrols and bombardments required to keep the West coast blockade complete. The following ships formed the blockading force at various times during this period :—H.M. Ships *Ceylon*, *Black Swan*, *Cardigan Bay*, *Morecambe Bay*, *Whitesand Bay*, *Mount's Bay*, *Consort*, *Constance*, and *Alacrity*, H.M.A.S. *Warramunga*, H.M.C.S. *Nootka*, and H.M.N.Z. Ships *Hawea* and *Rotoiti*. By 15th July, this force had been left very short of ships for various reasons, but they had the welcome support of H.M.S. *Kenya*, wearing the flag of Rear-Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff.

The second half of July produced an interesting task for the West coast forces. This was the recovery of a crashed MIG-15 aircraft, the presence of which had been reported in shallow waters South-West of Hanchon, some 100 miles behind the enemy lines. The wreckage was sighted and, not without difficulty, the position fixed by Sea Furies of No. 804 Squadron from H.M.S. *Glory* on 11th and 13th July. The position of the crashed aircraft was well within range of enemy air bases. The surrounding area consisted largely of shoals and mudbanks which, with the treacherous tides, made navigation hazardous, the approach to the crashed aircraft lying up a 40-mile channel bounded by sandbars. It was evident that the recovery must be made by small craft, covered from the nearest deep water channel by a frigate. H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* was allotted this task and cover from seaward was supplied by aircraft from H.M.S. *Glory* and by H.M.S. *Kenya*. For the actual recovery a shallow draught landing craft (L.S.U.) was made available by the United States Navy.

At first light on 20th July, H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay*, leading a South Korean motor boat and the L.S.U., set off up the channel. Navigation was assisted by Sea Furies from H.M.S. *Glory* who flew along the channel to indicate deep water. At the end of the main channel H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* lowered her motor boat which led the South Korean motor boat and the L.S.U. to the wrecked aircraft. The team from H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay*, together with the U.S. naval crew of the L.S.U. and army and air force technicians who had been specially embarked, worked with such a will that nearly all parts found had been collected when darkness set in. Early on 21st

<sup>1</sup> A sketch-map of Korea faces page 258.

July, work started again and, the morning tide being lower, more parts were found and recovered.

The enemy made no attempt to interfere with the operation, although aircraft from U.S.S. *Sicily*, who had taken over from H.M.S. *Glory*, drew light and heavy A.A. fire when they dived on batteries only a mile from the scene. On completion of the operation, the guns of H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* and aircraft from U.S.S. *Sicily* combined to score direct hits on an enemy gun position. The whole party withdrew successfully on 21st July.

The end of July saw the start of operations in the Han Estuary which are described in a separate section of this report. This required the concentration of most of the available Commonwealth forces, but a second operation, South of the 38th Parallel in the vicinity of the Haeju Estuary, was carried out under the direction of H.M.S. *Ceylon*, who took charge of both operations on 29th July. H.M.S. *Glory* was also on duty on the West coast from 29th July and her escort included H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* and H.M.C.S. *Huron*. On 5th August, U.S.S. *Sicily*, escorted by H.M.S. *Cossack* and H.M.S. *Charity*, took over from H.M.S. *Glory*, and, on 7th August, H.M.S. *Kenya* relieved H.M.S. *Ceylon*.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff visited the Han River operations on 11th August. He flew his flag in H.M.C.S. *Huron*, and this was a fitting last duty for this ship before returning to Canada after an adventurous participation in the Korean War.

August is the bad month for typhoons in the Japan-Korea area, and the Yellow Sea, particularly the Han Estuary, is no place to be caught in one of these unpleasant things. When, therefore, typhoon "Marge" was reported as moving West-North-West with winds of 110 knots at the centre, she rather rudely interrupted operations. This must have been a great relief to the enemy as it involved withdrawing all ships to the southward until "Marge" showed her hand. This she was slow to do and it was not possible to resume operations against the enemy until 25th August.

Whilst "Marge" had interrupted operations, she had not interfered with normal reliefs, and when proceedings were re-started the forces available were U.S.S. *Sicily*, escorted by two U.S. destroyers, H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*, H.M.A.S. *Anzac*, who had recently relieved H.M.A.S. *Warramunga*, and the Blockade Group consisting of H.M. Ships *Ceylon* and *Charity*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*, H.M. Ships *Mouni's Bay* and *Morecambe Bay*, and H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea*. The last three returned to the Han River.

A notable absentee was H.M.S. *Kenya*, who left the war zone on 25th August to refit and recommission at Singapore. She had been in the Far East since the outbreak of hostilities and had carried out 19 patrols of between 14 and 40 days, steaming over 63,000 miles. H.M.S. *Kenya* had rescued ten ditched carrier airmen and had fired 3,386 6-inch and nearly 1,000 4-inch shells.

All the usual activities were taken up with renewed vigour and H.M.S. *Ceylon* bombarded an enemy area by day and night on 25th August. On the same night a small landing party, consisting of an officer and ten marines from H.M.S. *Ceylon* and seven ratings from H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*, went ashore to reconnoitre a suspected enemy gun position. The party landed in boats from H.M.S. *Charity* and H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* and the raiding section, consisting of the R.M. officer, three Royal Marines and three able seamen, achieved complete surprise until they came to an enemy strong-point about half a mile inland. A short, sharp fight followed and unfortunately one able seaman from H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* was killed. The enemy was silenced by a grenade thrown by another able seaman from H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*, but as they were



obviously now thoroughly alert, and to avoid further casualties, a withdrawal was made onto the remainder of the party who were holding a beach-head. The whole party then withdrew and re-embarked without further casualty under machine-gun fire and covered by a heavy bombardment from H.M.S. *Charity* and H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*.

This was not H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*'s first experience of "raiding." Lieutenant-Commander Turner had taken the opportunity, when in a port where R.M. Commandos were stationed, to have a selected party of his crew trained in such operations. An offensive patrol provided the occasion to land his "commando" to destroy a military post which had previously been bombarded. Under cover of the ship's gunfire, the commando, six strong, landed. H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* then shifted fire to the cliff top, where she destroyed the tree thought to hold the military post. Meanwhile two A.B.s scaled the cliff and at the top were confronted by three North Korean soldiers, one in the act of throwing a grenade. The two New Zealanders opened fire and killed him outright. The other two North Koreans surrendered without firing a shot and were escorted down to the beach under fire from a Communist patrol which had appeared. This patrol was kept at a respectful distance by accurate fire from the covering party, and an orderly withdrawal was made under the protective fire of the ship's guns. No casualties were sustained in this operation.

H.M.S. *Belfast*, recently returned from a refit at Singapore, relieved H.M.S. *Ceylon* on 31st August and was quickly on the job with bombardments. H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* took over from H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* on 2nd September and H.M.S. *Concord* later joined the screen.

During the first part of September, bombardment and patrols occupied the West coast forces. On 10th September, H.M.S. *Cossack* relieved H.M.S. *Belfast*. On the same date U.S.S. *Sicily* returned to the West coast, screened by H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan*, H.M.S. *Comus*, and two U.S. destroyers. H.M.C.S. *Sioux* relieved one of the latter on 13th September. The patrol, which started on 21st September, was H.M.S. *Glory*'s last before her relief by H.M.A.S. *Sydney*. H.M.S. *Glory* then left for Australia for a well earned rest and refit.

Early in September, two aircraft from H.M.S. *Glory* had force-landed on the beach at Paengyong Do off Choppeki Point, where they had been slightly damaged. It was decided to salvage them and an L.S.U. was borrowed from the Americans and escorted to the island on 21st September by H.M.S. *St. Bride's Bay*. A maintenance team from H.M.S. *Unicorn* was embarked in the L.S.U. The aircraft duly recovered, the L.S.U. transferred them to H.M.S. *Unicorn*, escorted by H.M. Ships *Cossack* and *Comus*, on 22nd September.

Two new arrivals to join the West coast forces early in October were H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* and H.M.S. *Alert*. The former relieved H.M.A.S. *Anzac* whose next duty was to escort H.M.S. *Glory* to Australia.

There was much land activity in the northern group of islands in the Yalu group. From the 9th to 12th October, H.M.S. *Cossack* supported a landing on the largest of these islands, and on the night of 12th H.M.S. *Ceylon* covered the successful withdrawal. On the night of 9th October, H.M.S. *Belfast* and H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* carried out heavy bombardments in the area. H.M.S. *Belfast* also bombarded troop concentrations in the Haeju area on 18th and 20th October. On 30th October, H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* had about 100 rounds fired at her by three 76-mm. guns. She received several near misses but fortunately without damage or casualties.

On 9th November, H.M.S. *Black Swan* left the theatre for the United Kingdom. One of the originals, she fought her first action of the Korean war on 2nd July, 1950. Since then she has steamed 40,000 miles and fired about 4,500 rounds of 4-inch ammunition in support of the U.N. forces. At one time she spent 60 out of 68 days at sea.

#### THE HAN RIVER OPERATIONS

The Han River Estuary lies just South of the 38th Parallel on the West coast of Korea. The northern bank is occupied by Communist forces. The Estuary is shallow and the many sandbanks are inaccurately charted. Up to this time the Estuary waters had been penetrated only by occasional South Korean patrol craft. The tides are strong, the waters muddy, and there were no navigational marks. The decision to send some of H.M. frigates into the Estuary was, therefore, quite an undertaking.

The pioneers were H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* and H.M.A.S. *Murchison*, with South Korean Frigate *P.F. 82*. H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea* acted as communication guard. On the evening of 26th July, the three frigates entered the Estuary by the western entrance. They penetrated as far as they could that night, then anchored and bombarded. The following morning they extricated themselves from the mudbanks, ably guided and advised by aircraft from U.S.S. *Sicily*, and moved round to the eastern channel, where they were joined by H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay*. Through this channel they eventually penetrated to within gun range of the northern bank.

There were few good targets at first and little enemy retaliation, but a lot of hydrographic information was collected. The reliefs for the pioneers were H.M.S. *Mount's Bay* for H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* and H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* for H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay*. H.M.A.S. *Murchison* was pulled out for a few days' rest. Then these ships relieved each other in rotation and the work of bombarding, probing, and surveying the winding channels went on until interrupted by typhoon "Marge." Operations started again on 25th August and a new member joined the team on the 29th—H.M.S. *St. Bride's Bay*. On 14th September, H.M.S. *Amethyst* took her first turn in the Estuary.

The enemy's complete passivity ended on 21st September when a South Korean Motor Launch, whilst surveying, was hit by a 40-mm. or field gun. On the same day H.M.S. *Amethyst* reported splashes near her in this area. Nothing further was heard from the enemy until 28th September. On this day H.M.A.S. *Murchison* was carrying Rear-Admiral Dyer, U.S.N., accompanied by the Surface Blockade Commander (Captain G. A. F. Norfolk, R.N.), under whose immediate orders the Han River operations were then being conducted. She came under heavy fire from a number of guns and mortars in concealed positions on the North bank, at a range of about 2,000 yards. H.M.A.S. *Murchison* immediately returned the fire. At the end of her beat she had to stop, turn on her anchor, and run the gauntlet on the return journey at increased speed. Fire was again opened on her and she replied, knocking out one gun. Although hit four times, no damage was done and only one rating was slightly wounded. On the following day, while carrying out the same patrol, the *Murchison* came under much heavier fire and was hit and holed above the waterline in a number of places, but fortunately without serious damage and with only one serious casualty. The enemy on this occasion included about a platoon of riflemen hidden in the paddy fields. Again the ship replied to the fire with considerable success.

On both occasions H.M.A.S. *Murchison's* fire had temporarily silenced the opposition, but it was virtually impossible to deal with all the guns. This opposition

was not unexpected. It was only surprising that it had not occurred before. However, it could not be allowed to pass unchallenged. Accordingly, on 3rd October, H.M.S. *Black Swan* made a feint along the North bank, which was synchronised with air strikes from U.S.S. *Rendova*. The air strikes were followed by heavy bombardments by H.M.S. *Black Swan*. The treatment was repeated on ensuing days and, although a great deal of damage was done, enemy guns continued to fire from various positions. On each occasion they were engaged by counter-battery fire from the frigates.

H.M.S. *Black Swan* was relieved by H.M.S. *St. Bride's Bay* on 6th October and, on 7th October, H.M.S. *Amethyst* relieved H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*. On this day the latter took the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, and Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff to see the situation. This was a very suitable task for her last day's operations before returning to New Zealand. H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupo* arrived in the theatre on 10th October to relieve H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*. She joined the Han River force at once and carried on the good work.

On 29th October, H.M.S. *Comus* became the first destroyer to enter the Han River. The first position chosen for her proved unsuitable, due to the strong tides. Even with two anchors down and constantly steaming to them to ease the strain, she dragged periodically at alarming speed across the Estuary. An anchorage out of the fierce tide was then found for her, where she did good execution when firing over a hill with the frigate in the forward anchorage acting as spotter.

H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* was welcomed to the force in early November. This period also brought up the 100th day since the first entry into the Estuary. At this date the scores, in numbers of days spent in the area, read as follows:—H.M.A.S. *Murchison* 44, H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* 29, H.M.S. *St. Bride's Bay* 19, H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* 18, H.M.N.Z. Ships *Hawea* and *Taupo* 16, H.M.S. *Mount's Bay* 15, H.M.S. *Black Swan* 14, H.M.S. *Comus* 3, H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* 1. Some other statistics of this operation are that the 14 ships concerned in it have spent a total of 235 days in the Estuary. They have steamed about 2,100 miles, made 74 passages of the entrance channel, and grounded 14 times. 85,000 soundings have been taken in surveying a 26-mile channel and 33 navigational buoys have been laid. 15,370 rounds of ammunition have been expended on the enemy.

#### AIR OPERATIONS

Since the outbreak of the Korean war, the Commonwealth navies have had a light fleet carrier operating in the theatre and they have all made history. The first was H.M.S. *Triumph*, followed by H.M.S. *Theseus*. The period of this report has shown a marked increase in the volume and efficiency of enemy anti-aircraft fire.

At the end of June, H.M.S. *Glory* had been on the station for two months. Her squadrons were No. 804 (Sea Furies) and No. 812 (Fireflies). During a patrol beginning on 22nd June, she flew her 1,000th operational sortie and was well on the way to establishing a record with a daily average of 50 sorties when a catapult defect reduced her output for the last two days. Her targets on this patrol varied from junks to railway bridges and troop concentrations, in addition to giving close support to ground troops, and she filled in the intervals by providing spotting aircraft for bombardment from the sea. Among her records on this occasion was a total of 46 rocket-assisted take-offs in one day.

Her next patrol began on 11th July and, apart from the usual targets, included locating and fixing the position of the crashed MIG-15 aircraft referred to elsewhere in this report. She also gave cover to the force engaged in the recovery of the wreckage and her Sea Furies provided navigational assistance to the ships by flying along the deep water channels. This patrol was completed on 20th July, but she was back again on 26th July to join with U.S.S. *Sicily* in covering the entry into the Han River and in spotting for the frigates' bombardments. Throughout July bad weather hampered air operations, though this is not evident from the tasks undertaken by the carriers. Six hundred sorties were flown in this month and she had completed her 2,000 for her tour by the end of it. More than 250,000 cannon shells, over 600 rockets, and 1,010 bombs had been expended. Her "kills" included 15 bridges and four railway tunnels.

August was H.M.S. *Glory*'s unlucky month, her main patrol period coinciding with typhoon "Marge" which prevented operations. However, she celebrated her return to the West coast by flying 395 sorties between 2nd and 9th September. This period included a blank day, 6th September, when she fuelled. This considerable achievement, an average of over 56 sorties a day, was crowned by a record 84 sorties on 9th September, the last day of the patrol.

On 16th September, H.M.S. *Glory* started her last patrol on the East coast, transferring to the West coast on 21st September and leaving the area on 25th September. At Kure, on 30th September, she found the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, who said good-bye to her and congratulated her on a job well done before her departure for a well earned refit and rest in Sydney.

The relief of H.M.S. *Glory* by H.M.A.S. *Sydney* was another historic landmark, for it was the first time that a Dominion carrier had gone into action. Her squadrons, No. 805 (Sea Furies), No. 808 (Sea Furies), and No. 817 (Fireflies), were determined to show that they could beat any records existing, and they were not slow to start. Her first patrol began on 4th October on the West coast, but on 8th October she was ordered round to the East coast to take part in a special operation there on the 10th and 11th. She broke her first record on 11th October by flying 89 sorties (the new light fleet carrier "best ever") and totalled 147 in the two days.

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* started her second patrol on the West coast on 18th October. She celebrated Trafalgar Day by a highly successful strike of Sea Furies against a gathering of junks in the area South-East of the Yalu Estuary, which was posing a threat of invasion to friendly islands in the area. Close air support for the Commonwealth Division and particularly, of course, for the Royal Australian Regiment, was a popular task. Fireflies concentrated on bridge busting and had considerable success.

On the last day of the patrol, 26th October, a Firefly was shot down over enemy territory. The pilot made such a good crash landing that neither occupant was hurt. Then followed one of the most exciting and courageous rescues of the war, as there was not only the enemy, but darkness also to overcome. At 1620, H.M.A.S. *Sydney*'s U.S.N. helicopter was sent off to the scene. Sea Furies gave cover over the position of the crash and were joined by R.A.A.F. Meteors of No. 77 Squadron. As the air group commander of H.M.A.S. *Sydney* flew low over the survivors to tell them that the helicopter was coming, his aircraft was hit and he had to "limp" to a friendly airstrip. On the ground the two airmen helped the Sea Furies to keep the encircling enemy at a respectful distance by bursts from their Owen sub-machine gun. At 1715, the Meteors had to leave. The Sea Furies had been ordered to leave at this time, the limit of their endurance, but the pilots decided to hang on for a few more minutes.



At 1725 the helicopter, which had been making a good 20 knots more than the acceptable maximum for the type, arrived. At 1830, the helicopter, still with its escort of Sea Furies, some of them rather short of fuel, landed with the last of the light at Kimpo airfield, to conclude a very fine evening's work.

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* resumed her operations, again on the West coast, on 5th November. Her aircraft hit the usual targets for the following nine days, during which period she flew 440 sorties, passing her 1,000th on 12th November, after just six weeks in the theatre.

No report on Commonwealth naval air operations in Korea would be complete without reference to H.M.S. *Unicorn*, the replenishment carrier. Although her task is unspectacular, the operating carrier could not operate without her help. Since the start of the war she has ferried about 200 naval aircraft to the forward area, and taken back for repair about 70 unserviceable ones. This has meant a large amount of work on each aircraft in order to prepare it for flight or preserve it for shipment. The ship has provided deck landing practice for replacement pilots and, when replacements were required in a hurry, she has flown off aircraft direct to the operating carrier. H.M.S. *Unicorn* was able to help the air forces by ferrying to Japan the new Meteors with which the R.A.A.F. 77 Fighter Squadron was equipped. During her tour she has fulfilled many purposes other than those for which she was intended, including acting as fleet cargo carrier and army troopship.

#### EAST COAST OPERATIONS

The East coast is normally considered to be the prerogative of the U.S. Navy, in the same way as the West coast is thought of as the Commonwealth sphere. However, there is no hard-and-fast rule about this and there is nearly always at least one Commonwealth ship on the East coast, apart from concentrations for special operations. Throughout the period of this report, too, the 41st R.M. Independent Commando has been operating under U.S. command on this coast.

The work on the East coast is similar to that on the West, but considerable and increasing enemy opposition during July caused concentration on counter-battery work rather than on the more fruitful interdiction targets.

H.M.S. *Ceylon* left the East coast on 25th June, after a special mission during which she joined the bombardment forces at Wonsan and Songjin for short periods. H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* was relieved by H.M.C.S. *Huron* on 26th June and expended considerable ammunition with profitable results until she was relieved in her turn by H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* on 7th July. During this patrol H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* fired 1,000 4-inch shells in her 15 days' patrol, mostly at road and rail communications.

On 22nd July, H.M.S. *Mount's Bay* took over from H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay*. Next day H.M.S. *Kenya*, wearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, visited Wonsan for two days in response to a request for a cruiser to back up the destroyers, temporarily a bit thin on the ground. H.M.S. *Kenya* was relieved by H.M.S. *Ceylon*, but on 27th July both she and H.M.S. *Mount's Bay* had to be withdrawn for the Han River operation. This operation required the use of all Commonwealth ships on the West coast until 16th August when H.M.S. *Consort* joined the Wonsan element. She had no undue excitements, but carried out some satisfactory bombardments and was, in her turn, relieved by H.M.S. *Cossack* on 25th August. On entering harbour H.M.S. *Cossack* was straddled by an enemy battery which was suitably dealt with, and after 48 hours at Wonsan the *Cossack* was sent North to take command of the

force off Songjin, where a profitable time was had until relieved by H.M.S. *Charity* on 3rd September. H.M.S. *Charity* continued the good work and on 9th September was fired on, but not hit, by a shore battery. H.M.A.S. *Anzac* took over on 13th September and remained on these duties until 26th September.

The 41st R.M. Commando carried out a number of reconnaissances and landed shore parties on several islands in the Bay of Wonsan. On the night 28th/29th September, a raid was made in the vicinity of Chaho (near Hungnam) and was supported by H.M.S. *Belfast*. Another raid was made further North on the night 4th/5th October.

H.M.S. *Belfast* spent from 26th to 30th September on this coast, visiting Wonsan, Songjin and Chongjin and carrying out bombardments at each. There was no Commonwealth ship on the East coast from 30th September until the concentration there for the special operation referred to under air operations, on 10th and 11th October. In addition to H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, H.M. Ships *Belfast*, *Concord*, and *Comus*, and H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* took part in this operation.

The next Commonwealth representative on this coast was H.M.S. *Concord*, who arrived at Wonsan on 21st October and on the same day proceeded to Hungnam, where she stayed until 24th October. The enemy batteries here lived up to their reputation for liveliness. H.M.S. *Concord* was successively straddled at 15,000 yards and near-missed at 12,000 yards. The latter battery later put a shell 40 yards on her port quarter at 13,000 yards when she was stopped in position to engage a shore target. The order "full ahead together" was given and the next splash was in the swirl of the propellers as the ship gathered away. After this excitement she proceeded to Songjin, which proved a much quieter station. She was relieved on 31st October by H.Neth. M.S. *Galen* who, in turn, was relieved by H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* on 8th November.

## A NEW DEFINITION OF WAR AND ITS APPLICATION TO AIR POWER

By CAPTAIN S. VINES, R.A.

MAJOR HARGREAVES'S article in the JOURNAL for November, 1951, "War—Professional or Amateur?" was surely of great value not only for its own high qualities but in that it provoked thought far beyond the scope of the article itself. It is with gratitude for enjoyable reading and deference for a most erudite writer that one ventures to suggest another conclusion to the article. In the arguments which follow, another conclusion is in fact suggested. This conclusion leads to a new definition for war. The remainder of this article is concerned with the application of this definition, in particular with its effect on our future use of air power.

Major Hargreaves's arguments can be briefly summarized as follows. He shows with a wealth of fascinating illustration how war in the past was limited to a contest between professionals. The rest of the populations of the disputing countries carried on their normal peace-time intercourse. The professionals themselves were limited by laws of chivalry and such edicts of the Church as the Synod of Elne in 1027 which forbade fighting over the week-end. These methods he contrasts with "the imbecility of total war" which he traces back to the French Revolution. So far, so good. But then he draws the conclusions that: (a) in the next war the first battle will be the last and the last battle the first; and (b) to be sure of winning that battle we must become invincible. Few people would disagree with the second conclusion in itself, though there would be many interpretations of "invincible."

It is the first conclusion which, it is considered, is open to question. Will the next war in fact take the form of one shattering blow?

The idea that science would one day give the power to any country to settle a war in one paralysing shock attack was prevalent after the recent war. Serious doubts as to the theory have since been raised.<sup>1</sup> It is really the old problem of getting the Infantry on to the objective when the barrage has lifted. However great the destruction caused, if the attacker is unable to take advantage of the momentary disorganization, the defender will recover. The principle is fully applicable to inter-continental war, where the problem of taking advantage of the destruction is so vast as to be insoluble. Let us assume that we shatter all the principal cities of our opponent in one atomic assault. What then? The notion of airborne fleets flying to occupy these cities is one so far removed from military realities that even H. G. Wells would not have countenanced it. It is far more likely that total war on an inter-continental scale would be lengthy, and enormously destructive. It would be a particularly agonizing and lingering form of mass suicide.

Let us, then, accept that the first battle in any future war will not be the last and that the theory of the one paralysing assault can be discarded. What is the alternative? Does the past, as shown in Major Hargreaves's article, lead to any other way of avoiding this mass suicide? It may be profitable, therefore, to return to his arguments. He has shown how eminently sensible were our ancestors when they limited war. The pattern of the arguments is similar to that in Liddell Hart's *The Revolution in Warfare*, pages 34-75. Our ancestors recognized that war as an outlet for man's inherent pugnacity was inevitable. They recognized that war had its uses—it did provide one means of settling some disputes. They recognized that war was

<sup>1</sup> See Professor Blackett's *Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*, pages 72-73, and F. O. Miksche's *War between Continents*, pages 166-179.

destructive and wasteful. They therefore set sensible limits to it. They were not moralists or idealists, with notions of outlawing war. They were realists. Here Liddell Hart's point, made on page 73 of *The Revolution in Warfare* is relevant. It was invariably the aggressor who wanted to limit war, for the simple reason that he went to war for profit. He had nothing to gain by creating devastation. It was the outraged defender who retaliated with all the means at his disposal. This in its turn provoked retaliation from the aggressor. There are many instances in our own history where we, as the outraged defender, were prepared to, and did undertake any measure that would hurt the nation with which we were at war. Nelson's bombardment of Copenhagen in 1801 was a ruthless assault on a small neutral. The total blockade of 1915-1918 was certainly a questionable act of war, as Professor H. A. Smith points out on page 618 of the November, 1951, JOURNAL. Finally, the strategic bombing of Germany from 1940-1945 is possibly the supreme example of the desire to hurt one's enemy triumphing over all other considerations. We shall return to this subject later.

What emerges from Major Hargreaves's arguments is that if our ancestors appreciated that it was desirable to limit the destructiveness of war, how much more desirable is it to-day. There is some evidence that the bombing of British cities by the Germans in the last war was partly carried out in reprisal for British raids on German cities. If in future our opponents are the aggressors (as they must be) and if they follow the example of previous aggressors who have gone to war for profit, the power to limit war may lie in our own hands by refraining from acts calculated to bring such reprisals.

We are thus approaching a new definition of the aim of war. Our present accepted definition of war is:—

“The object of war is to enforce the national policy *as economically as possible.*”

The qualification “as economically as possible” is new. It shows how modern thought is progressing since Clausewitz's long accepted and unqualified statement that:—“War is a continuation of diplomacy by other means.” But it is surely necessary to go much further. “As economically as possible” means with as little expenditure of our own manpower and resources as possible. It is viewed from the purely national aspect. We now have to consider the resources of the world. We have to live in the same world as our enemies in war and if we destroy them utterly the burden eventually falls on us. This is one world. When we carry out duties in aid of the civil power we apply the principle of “minimum force.” The time has come to apply that principle to total war.

If this is so, we must have a new definition for war. This might be:—

“The object of war is to enforce the national policy with the application of the minimum force necessary and as economically as possible.”

This is not a simple definition. The two provisos may well conflict. For example it might be economical in lives to use atomic bombs. On the other hand, it might store up such an aftermath of post-war trouble that it would conflict with the principle of minimum force. The decision depends on circumstances and is obviously delicate and complex. Modern war is not simple and we can no longer have a simple definition of it.

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We will now pursue the application of the “minimum force” principle to modern war and see the effect on our doctrines and organization.

If we take the field of tactics, we soon find it impossible to lay down any dividing



line. Wars are still decided on the field of battle. Destruction here, however great, is localized. Humanity in the twentieth century can recuperate from it. Further, civilians are largely excluded from the scene. The destruction caused is directly part of the battle and the side which causes it can take direct advantage of it. The use of a tactical atom bomb might well come within this category. In tactics, then, the minimum force principle will not generally apply.

When we turn to strategic weapons, we find the full application of the new principle. The strategic weapon of to-day is the heavy bomber. It matters little whether it carries HE bombs or atom bombs, or even biological or chemical weapons. It is a method of waging war designed to defeat the enemy nation by itself and to have only indirect influence on the land battle. We will now examine briefly this matter of strategic bombing.

The lecture by Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley in the JOURNAL for May, 1948, and the discussion which followed it, produced facts and figures upon which some estimate of the results achieved by the strategic bombing campaign of 1940-45 can be formed. The aim of the campaign (as defined at the Casablanca Conference in January, 1943) was :—

"The destruction of the German military, industrial, and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."<sup>2</sup>

It is clear that the intention was to defeat Germany if possible by strategic bombing alone. And the bombers were to do their best to destroy Germany utterly. There are no qualifications, no thoughts of the aftermath of war, no question of a minimum force principle. We can estimate the results by a simple comparison of cost with achievements.

COST					
<i>Destroyed</i>	22,000 aeroplanes at £50,000	...	...	...	£1,100,000,000
<i>Killed</i>	79,281 air crew at £10,000	...	...	...	£800,000,000
	(cost of training 1 air crew man, <i>vide</i> Harris, <i>Bomber Offensive</i> )				
					£1,900,000,000
Say that losses in men and machines were	10 per cent. of actual production full				
	cost of strategic bomber offensive then				
	was	...	...	...	£19,000,000,000

(NOTE : This figure does not take into account major overheads,  
or the cost of the U.S. offensive.)

#### ACHIEVEMENTS

(The figures are from the *U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey* quoted by Blackett, page 194 *et seq.*, and include the results of the U.S. offensive.)

- (a) Destruction of 70 per cent. of 61 major cities in Germany.
- (b) Reduction of synthetic oil production between the Spring of 1944 and April, 1945, to 5 per cent.
- (c) Crippling of the German rail transport system over the same period.

<sup>2</sup> *U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey I*, page 3.

(d) The collapse of the German economy in April, 1945, resulting partly from (c) above—but see also below.

(e) Destruction of 8 per cent. of the total U boats destroyed (Air Chief Marshal Bottomley, *JOURNAL*, May, 1948).

#### FAILURES

(a) The morale of the German people did not break.

(b) Total German war production actually rose until the end of 1944, when it was 285 per cent. of 1940.

(c) The collapse of the German economy came when the advance of the land armies had already decided the fate of the war.

It seems certain that the major cause of the collapse was not the bombing but the unendurable strain of sustaining the Russian front.

#### CONCLUSION

Comparing effort with results, we have to face the fact that the campaign was the costliest failure in the history of British arms.

#### IMPLICATIONS

There is much food for thought here. We will consider the major military and political implications before drawing further conclusions. The full military effects of the bombing were never apparent. The attacks on oil plants would have affected the German armies if the war had lasted a few more months: but they came too late and were largely wasted effort. The attacks on transport achieved impressive results, but again they did not prevent the Ardennes offensive of December, 1944, or the stubborn and bitter resistance of the Germans in February—March, 1945, which led to the necessity to mount major attacks in the Reichswald and Rhine crossing operations. The figure of 8 per cent. U boats destroyed is low. The reason is most probably that the bombing of strongly protected submarine pens requires too high a degree of accuracy for strategic bombing.

Mr. Churchill said, in his address to the U.S. Congress on May 19th, 1943:—

“Opinion is divided as to whether the use of air power by itself could bring about the collapse of Germany or Italy. The experiment is well worth trying, so long as other measures are not excluded.”<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Churchill was, as always, expressing the will of the Country. The experiment was tried, and it failed. We have the advantage of being able to be wise after the event. But it is better to be wise thus, than not to learn the lesson at all.

Apologists for the bombing offensive say either that it was a means of destroying the German Air Force or that it was, from 1942 to 1944, our only means of offensive action against the enemy homeland. Of the first argument, it must be said that sending expensive bombers deep into enemy country to drop ineffective bombs is a strange and roundabout way to destroy an enemy air force. At the time of the Dieppe raid our fighters destroyed over a hundred German fighters. Surely this type of operation was the way to draw the Luftwaffe into battle at a time and place of our own choosing. As for the second argument, it is the typical emotional reply of the outraged defender. What use is offensive action if it achieves nothing?

It is also necessary to note the part played by the Strategic Air Forces in the softening of Europe for the invasion of Normandy. They played a great part. But

<sup>3</sup> *Onwards to Victory*. War Speeches, Winston S. Churchill, 1943, page 94.

it was a role for which they were not designed. It did not fall within the intention of the Casablanca directive. Surely forces designed for the job would have done it better. That implies medium or fighter bombers, operating as part of Tactical Air Forces. Finally, we must consider the effect of area bombing. Hamburg is a good example. In July and August, 1943, the great fire raids caused 60,000 deaths and the total destruction of 30 per cent. and partial destruction of 44 per cent. of the city. It was laid into rubble—as it still remains to-day—but in five months its production was 80 per cent. of what it had been before the raids. It was easier to destroy buildings than the machines in them or the morale of the workers.

Surely this is a classic example of the futility of fire without movement—of not “following up the barrage.” We cannot forbear to remark on what might have happened if this wasted effort had gone into transport aircraft. The Arnhem operation and Patton’s plight when he outran his supplies in September, 1944, are two examples.

We must now turn to political considerations. We destroyed the German economy and 70 per cent. of the buildings in 61 major German cities. For many years young Germans will still be born in ruins, who may grow up with bitterness and revenge in their hearts. We shall still be educating them in democracy. Future Foreign Secretaries will shake their heads over an impossible burden, and all those who wish us ill will rub their hands at the opportunity to make trouble for us and the way of life we represent.

#### THE FUTURE

So much for the past. How have factors altered since 1945? The day of the jet bomber with a strategic or tactical atom bomb is near. The defence, with guided missiles, jet fighters, and greatly improved A.A. guns, is stronger. As regards accuracy, improved bombing aids are probably cancelled out by greater heights and speeds at which bomb aiming must be done. Finally, the expense of all the weapons, from the atom bomb and the jet bomber to the guided missile, has increased to the extent that economic factors are assuming prohibitive proportions.

It would appear that the thousand-bomber fleets will never fill the skies with their thunder again. The defence will stop them; they will be impossibly expensive; and with the advent of the atom bomb they will not be necessary. The picture of small numbers of jet atomic bombers at very high altitudes is probably a realistic idea of what is possible.

What does the past teach us about the way in which we should use these forces? We have seen the failure of the policy aimed at destroying cities. We have seen some success achieved in destroying oil plants and transportation. Germany was vulnerable in the matter of synthetic oil plants. But why go deep into the enemy’s country with all the inherent difficulties such action entails, when the same object can be achieved by the technique known as isolating the battlefield? This has the advantages of a shorter flight which is more economical and easier to control. It causes maximum wasted effort to the enemy. It has an immediate effect on the battle, and it localizes the destruction. Deep flights over hostile territory inevitably lead to random destruction from jettisoned bombs, crashes, or inaccuracies in navigation or bomb aiming.

It would always be necessary to hold under one’s hand a force which could retaliate if the enemy resorted to area attacks. A comparatively small number of jet atomic bombers would be adequate for this task. We always kept a reserve of war gases available in case Hitler initiated their use; in the same way, we require a reserve of strategic jet bombers.

Apart from this the main tasks for our air forces should be :—

- (a) the defence of the United Kingdom,
- (b) the defence of our sea communications with the Royal Navy,
- (c) support for the Army, including the gaining of superiority over the enemy air force in the field, offensive and transport support.

The first two tasks are designed to ensure our firm base. The third is the offensive task, designed to apply air power where wars are won—on the field of battle. These tasks observe the principle of minimum force in that they are directly related to the two essentials—the firm base and the tactical battle on land.

Nothing which has been stated and argued here is new. It has all been said before, in many places and by many people, authoritative and otherwise. But it needs to be said again and repeated until it is accepted.

Popular clamour will arise in the next war, if it comes, for the destruction of the enemy capital by atom bombs. Democratic governments are susceptible to popular clamour. If they yield to it, it is certain that the Dark Ages will once again return to the world.

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## DIARY OF THE WAR IN KOREA<sup>1</sup>

*16th January.*—The Allies acknowledged that on the night of 10th January, U.N. aircraft were over an area in North Korea where the enemy had stated that a prisoner of war camp had been bombed. They accused the enemy of locating the camp in a target area and of failing to disclose the position by adequate marking.

*17th January.*—There was no progress at Panmunjom. The enemy accused the Allies of dropping a bomb near Kaesong and investigators were shown a crater.

*18th January.*—No event of importance took place.

*19th and 20th January.*—It was agreed at Panmunjom that a military staff committee should be established to devise safeguards against attacks on prisoner of war camps.

*21st January.*—There was no progress at Panmunjom.

*22nd January.*—There was no progress at Panmunjom. Peking radio asserted that Allied aircraft violated Panmunjom and Kaesong areas twice on 22nd January.

*23rd January.*—At Panmunjom, the U.N. delegates admitted that a bomb instead of a wing tank was dropped by mistake in the Kaesong area on 17th January. Enemy staff officers provided maps purporting to indicate positions of prisoner of war camps. The U.S. 45th Division was reported to have replaced their 1st Cavalry Division.

*24th January.*—Peking broadcast charges stating that U.S. aircraft were over Manchuria on 19th, 20th and 21st January.

U.S. tanks and infantry attacked a hill position in the Chorwon area.

*25th January.*—At Panmunjom, the U.N. delegates suggested methods for dealing with the deadlock caused by the enemy refusal to agree not to build military airfields during an armistice. Ten MIGs were destroyed and others damaged by U.S. Sabre jets.

*26th and 27th January.*—The enemy delegates accepted the Allied proposal of 25th that the sub-committee on truce supervision should adjourn, and that discussion of supervision terms should be taken over by staff officers. Subsequently, the U.N. delegates to the truce meetings presented the enemy with the full Allied terms for an armistice: they proposed a meeting of General Ridgway with the North Korean and Chinese commanders, and the signing at this meeting of a truce agreement. The deadlock on exchange of prisoners of war continued.

*28th January.*—At Panmunjom, the U.N. delegates handed to the enemy representatives a 14-point memorandum concerning exchange of prisoners of war, which they said was a complete solution of this problem. The enemy agreed to study the plan.

U.N. aircraft bombed enemy troop and supply concentrations and an airfield in North-West Korea. Warships bombarded enemy positions on the East coast and covered a rocket attack by surface craft near Chinnampo.

*29th January.*—Some progress at Panmunjom was reported in connection with arrangements for truce supervision, but there was none regarding exchange of prisoners.

*30th January.*—The enemy agreed to a U.N. rotation of 25,000 troops a month during an armistice, and said that the Chinese would join in administering a demilitarized zone. They refused to accept a U.N. proposal that an international committee of the Red Cross should administer exchanges of prisoners, but agreed in principle to giving priority to exchange of sick and wounded prisoners and to exchanging data on burial places of prisoners who had died.

*31st January and 1st February.*—At Panmunjom, there were discussions regarding ports of entry for neutral observers, which countries should provide these observers, the monthly rotation of Allied troops during an armistice, and who should decide where displaced Koreans should live.

During January, 31 enemy jet fighters were shot down, but in the same period 52 U.N. aircraft were lost; 44 of these being brought down by ground fire.

<sup>1</sup> A sketch-map of Korea faces page 258.

*2nd and 3rd February.*—The enemy accepted the U.N. plan to hasten matters by discussing the final item of the agenda—recommendations to Governments. They offered a nine-point programme regarding exchange of prisoners, agreed to withdraw their demand to be allowed to occupy five islands South of the 38th parallel, and also agreed that coastal waters should be defined. As against the U.N. suggestion that naval vessels be allowed to within three miles of the shore, the enemy suggested a 12 mile limit.

*4th February.*—Slight progress was made at Panmunjom with regard to exchange of prisoners. The U.S. 40th National Guard Division was reported to have been in action.

*5th February.*—The enemy agreed to consider U.N. proposals to establish additional prisoner exchange camps and for joint Red Cross teams to visit prisoner of war camps after an armistice was signed. U.S. airmen destroyed two enemy supply and ammunition depots within 50 miles of Panmunjom.

*6th and 7th February.*—Discussions continued at Panmunjom, the Allies making slight concessions regarding the exchange of displaced South Koreans for the number of prisoners they hold in excess of those held by the enemy, and in connection with neutral teams being allowed to interview civilians to determine whether they want to live in North or South Korea. The enemy agreed that the rotation figure of 25,000 troops a month should include only rotation troops and their replacements—not all troops on rest or on temporary duty in Japan.

*8th February.*—The U.N. delegates informed the enemy that they were ready to answer the latter's recent proposals for a high-level conference within three months of the signing of an armistice to discuss the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and other matters connected with peace in Korea and throughout the Far East. A plenary session of the conference was arranged for 10th February. Discussions regarding troop rotation and ports of entry for neutral teams were unproductive.

*9th and 10th February.*—The U.N. delegates suggested three amendments to the enemy proposals under "recommendations to Governments." First, that the South Korean Republic should have a place in any conference; secondly, that "non-Korean" should be substituted for "foreign" in the description of troops to be withdrawn from Korea; and thirdly, that "other questions related to the peace in Korea" should be replaced by "other Korean questions related to peace." The enemy agreed to include the South Korean Republic in any conference but said that the other proposals were unsatisfactory. In discussions regarding ports of entry for neutral observers, the Allies reduced their demand from 12 on each side to eight.

Air activity increased and 825 sorties were flown by the Allies.

*11th February.*—At Panmunjom, Vice-Admiral Joy asked the enemy delegates how the Chinese could claim a seat at the peace conference if they maintained that the Chinese troops fighting in Korea were "volunteers." He also said that the Allies would refuse to take further action on the final item on the truce agenda if the enemy insisted on broadening the agenda for the proposed peace conference to include other Asian problems. In staff discussions the U.N. agreed that both sides should agree on the same time limit for the return of prisoners.

Ground action was confined to probing attacks and patrol encounters. In the air, one enemy MIG was shot down and four were damaged.

*12th February.*—The enemy delegates asked for a recess of the plenary truce conference saying that they would submit revised proposals on the last item of the agenda—"recommendations to Governments."

The enemy sustained a number of casualties in local probing attacks.

*13th February.*—The U.N. negotiators in the truce talks accepted the enemy proposal that exchange of prisoners should be completed within 60 days after the signing of an armistice; they also said that, if the enemy agreed to the rotating of 40,000 troops a month in addition to those on leave, they would drop their demands that troops should

not be moved during a truce in a way to constitute threat of attack and that weekly reports should be made on the location of all major military units. The Allied representatives also offered to compromise on the number of ports of entry.

A local enemy attack was easily repulsed in the eastern sector. Allied bombers cut enemy railways in 35 places and attacked road transport in North-West Korea.

**14th February.**—The negotiators at Panmunjom decided to call a full plenary session of the armistice delegation for 16th February, to enable the enemy to present new proposals for an armistice conference.

**15th February.**—No event of importance took place.

**16th and 17th February.**—The U.N. delegation accepted, with only minor reservations, the formula proposed by the enemy on a post-armistice conference, i.e. that a political conference should be held within three months of an armistice to discuss "withdrawal of all foreign forces . . . the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." At the truce supervision meeting the enemy proposed Poland, Czechoslovakia and Russia as neutral nations to provide inspection teams. The Allied members accepted the first two but not Russia.

Three enemy MIGs were destroyed, one probably destroyed, and another damaged.

**18th February.**—The enemy officers at the truce supervision meeting objected to the Allied refusal to accept Russia as one of the neutrals to provide inspection teams.

**19th February.**—At a plenary session, the Korean negotiators agreed on a joint request for a political conference of belligerent Governments within 90 days of a truce being signed, to discuss the "withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." Three MIGs were shot down by Sabre jets.

**20th February.**—No progress was made at Panmunjom.

**21st February.**—At Panmunjom, arguments continued regarding the enemy proposal that Russia should be one of the neutral countries to provide inspection teams.

**22nd February.**—South Korean Marines repelled a prolonged attack by an enemy amphibious force against an island 16 miles from Songjin on the North-East coast of Korea. Aircraft from the U.S. aircraft carrier *Essex* in the Songjin area sank an enemy supply boat and 25 sampans, and damaged 25 other sampans.

**23rd and 24th February.**—No event of importance was reported.

**25th February.**—U.N. negotiators at Panmunjom offered to withdraw their nomination of Norway as a member of the neutral commission to supervise a truce if the enemy delegates withdrew their nomination of Russia. Movement of enemy artillery to forward positions in the West-central front was reported.

**26th February.**—The enemy delegates refused to consider the U.N. proposal to have four neutral nations instead of six to supervise a truce. Deadlock continued on the number of ports of entry each side should be allowed during an armistice, the Allies demanding six and the enemy five.

**27th February.**—Broadcast charges by the enemy that the Allies were waging germ warfare in Korea were met by a declaration from General Ridgway's headquarters that at no time had this been done, and that the enemy were making these allegations to distract attention from the fact that their obstinacy at Panmunjom was further postponing an armistice, and to conceal their own inadequacies in coping with seasonal epidemics. The U.N. and enemy staff officers, being unable to agree on terms for the repatriation of prisoners, decided to return the dispute to the main body of negotiators.

**28th and 29th February.**—Allied staff officers said that the U.N. would never agree to let Russia act as one of the neutral observers of a Korean truce.

An Allied tank force attacked the Chinese, East and South of Kumsong. Another tank force, supported by artillery, drove through Kumsong and shelled enemy trenches North of the town.

*1st March.*—There was no progress at Panmunjom.

*2nd March.*—The U.N. command, in a statement read at Panmunjom, said that it noted with grave concern the enemy violation of agreements under which all prisoners of war were to be accounted for, and that only nations acceptable by both sides were to be nominated for providing neutral supervisors of a truce.

An Allied force raided enemy positions in the Chorwon area.

*3rd March.*—At Panmunjom, the enemy delegation admitted the right of the U.N. to veto the nomination of Russia as a member of the neutral commission to supervise a truce, but added that such a veto should be upheld by valid reasons.

Fighting in the Chorwon area was reduced to light patrol activity. There were several air encounters over North Korea between Sabre jets and MIGs.

*4th March.*—No progress was made at Panmunjom.

*5th March.*—Five MIGs were destroyed by U.S. Sabre jets over North-West Korea.

*6th March.*—No event of importance was reported.

*7th March.*—Five light attacks in the eastern sector were repulsed by U.S. Marines.

*8th and 9th March.*—At Panmunjom, U.N. representatives repudiated as an insult an enemy accusation that the Allies mistreated prisoners.

*10th March.*—No progress was made at Panmunjom. Seven MIGs were shot down by U.S. Sabre jets. Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers bombed a 15-mile stretch of railway some 75 miles South of the Yalu river.

*11th and 12th March.*—No changes in the situation were reported.

*13th March.*—The deadlock at Panmunjom continued. An enemy attack in the eastern sector was stopped by U.S. and Turkish troops.

*14th March.*—No changes were reported.

*15th and 16th March.*—At Panmunjom, the enemy tentatively accepted a U.N. proposal containing the following points: (a) the U.N. command would agree to reduce the ports of entry for each side from six to five; (b) the enemy would drop demands for inspection of secret military equipment; (c) the enemy would agree that the words "in Korea" be inserted in the pertinent paragraphs thus strictly limiting an armistice to the Korean peninsula; (d) the Allies would drop a request that neither side should mass military forces to pose a threat; (e) reports on location of major military units would not be required. Sabre jets shot down three MIGs and probably destroyed two more.

*17th March.*—The U.N. representatives at Panmunjom requested that Seoul and Pyongyang should both be opened to the neutral armistice supervising commission; they also named four other points of entry on each side which should be open for observance of military traffic.

*18th March.*—No progress was made at Panmunjom where arguments about ports of entry and exchange of prisoners continued.

It was reported that Allied warships off the North Korean coast had been engaged for 100 days in a struggle for control of a number of strategic islands, and that several Allied ships had been hit by fire from shore guns.

*19th March.*—The negotiators at Panmunjom were reported to be approaching agreement on ports of entry for truce inspection teams.

*20th March.*—The U.N. and enemy negotiators agreed on 10 ports of entry in Korea for neutral inspection teams. In South Korea the ports of entry chosen were Pusan, Kangnung, Taegu, Kunsan and Inchon. Those chosen in North Korea were Sinuiju, Manpojin (North-West of Kanggye) on the Yalu river, Sinanju, Chongjin and Hungnam.

Sabre jets destroyed five MIG-15s and damaged five others over North-West Korea.

*21st March.*—No event of importance was reported.









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**22nd and 23rd March.**—Peking radio broadcast accusations that U.S. forces had been using germ warfare in Korea and that prisoners had been used in bacteriological experiments. At Panmunjom, enemy negotiators agreed to slightly larger zones for neutral observers guarding against a build-up of troops during an armistice; they also agreed that less formal discussions on exchange of prisoners would be advantageous.

**24th March.**—Referring to the enemy allegations that the U.N. were conducting bacteriological warfare in Korea, a U.N. official broadcast from Tokyo stated that the enemy do not hesitate to fabricate falsehoods with the express purpose of deceiving the people and justifying some illegal action which they contemplate.

U.S. Sabre jets were reported to have shot down three MIGs and to have damaged nine others over North Korea.

**25th March.**—The negotiators discussing exchange of prisoners began holding secret sessions, in the hope that informality might lead to some agreement. At the meeting of staff officers on truce supervision, the enemy representatives continued to insist that Russia should be one of the neutral countries to provide inspectors.

**26th, 27th, 28th and 29th March.**—No change in the situation was reported.

**30th March.**—The enemy twice drove an Allied raiding party off a height in the western sector. Nine U.N. aircraft were lost during the week ending 29th March.

**31st March.**—No event of importance was reported.

**1st April.**—U.S. Sabre jet aircraft shot down ten enemy MIG fighters, probably destroyed three others, and damaged ten more, just South of the Yalu river.

**2nd April.**—An attack by Chinese troops, which succeeded in breaking into the Allied lines four miles from Panmunjom, was repulsed with severe losses to the enemy.

**3rd April.**—Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet and other senior officers flew to Munsan for conferences with the Allied armistice delegates.

U.S. Sabre jets destroyed or damaged eight enemy fighters.

**4th April.**—The negotiators at Panmunjom agreed to postpone indefinitely further discussions on an exchange of prisoners.

At Munsan, General Ridgway said after a conference that he thought progress had been made at the peace talks, including those on the prisoner of war issue.

**5th and 6th April.**—U.S. Sabre jets shot down four MIG-15s, probably destroyed two others, and damaged seven.

U.N. headquarters in Tokyo reported that epidemics of disease were sweeping China and North Korea, due to insufficient supplies of proper food, absence of an efficient medical system, and lowering of the resistance of the civil population "after another year of privation and semi-starvation."

**7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th April.**—No event of importance was reported.

**12th April.**—The Fifth Air Force reported that 10 Allied aircraft were lost over enemy territory during the week, but none of them in air combat.

**13th April.**—At Panmunjom, the enemy asked for a resumption of staff officers' meetings on the exchange of prisoners. U.S. Sabre jets shot down six MIG-15s over North-West Korea.

**14th April.**—There was no progress at Panmunjom. General Van Fleet in a statement reviewing his year of command said that during the lull in the fighting the enemy had built up supplies sufficient to enable them to launch a major offensive that could last for 10 days or two weeks. Such an offensive could and would be met no matter where it was launched.

Allied tanks, firing from a position South-West of Kumsong, inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy.

**15th April.**—In the western sector Allied infantry regained a hill which had been taken by the enemy two hours earlier. The U.S. battleship *Iowa* shelled enemy shore batteries at Wonsan which had been firing on Allied minesweepers.

## THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION<sup>1</sup>

By A. K. CHESTERTON, M.C.

### EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY

THE declarations of mutual support in the event of attack, made by the British Government and the Governments of the six European Defence Community countries, have the effect of extending Britain's guarantee under the Brussels Treaty to cover Western Germany and Italy. They do not add much to the understanding implicit in the Atlantic Pact, and in the realities of the alignment of Powers, but if they help to heal the two appalling wounds inflicted upon Anglo-German relations in the present century, they will rank among the most beneficent documents of our time. Unfortunately, the healing process within the proposed Defence Community is certain to prove much more difficult, as was emphasized almost before the public had been given time to read the mutual guarantees. In the words of the Paris correspondent of *The Times*, "The members of the Defence Community want some form of assurance from Britain and the United States against the threat which the secession of one member would involve for the others. . . . This guarantee would be intended particularly to protect France, Italy, and the Benelux countries against secession on the part of Germany."

It is not difficult to conceive of a happier approach to the new European alliance than to begin with provisions against its breaking down. What kind of assurance Great Britain or the United States could usefully give is not clear. The dropping of military or economic aid could be arranged, but if the secession were brought about by a quarrel within the Defence Community, on an issue which did not invalidate the principles of Western Defence, such sanctions would benefit only the potential enemy. Stronger action might even provoke the secessionist Power to change sides. The best guarantee against secession is surely for each partner to the Alliance to assume that the others are actuated by honourable motives, and for friction to be lessened by an unequivocal recognition of the rights of national sovereignty. An alliance in which the partners lack mutual confidence, or in which any combination of them is trying to hamstring another, cannot come to good.

### TRIESTE

Rioting by the effervescent population of Trieste, together with mammoth demonstrations in Rome and Belgrade, has cast a lurid light on the seemingly intractable problem of Trieste. In all likelihood, the question is one which the responsible leadership neither of Italy nor of Yugoslavia would raise on its own volition, although as soon as the subject is broached both Governments feel obliged to stake their maximum claims, and either instigate or respond to popular clamour. Much of the recent trouble seems to have been caused by Italian Communists, whose complete lack of principle was shown by the swift reversal of their policy the moment Marshal Tito fell foul of the Kremlin. Before that time, the Soviet Union had supported the Yugoslav claim to the entire Free Territory of Trieste, and the Italian Stalinists, puppets like their kind in every country, danced to that tune. Soon after the split occurred, Moscow decreed that the Yugoslav claim was no longer valid, which enabled the Italian puppets to convert themselves into "patriots" and lead the campaign for an Italian Trieste.

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<sup>1</sup> As deduced from reports up to 21st April.

Here was an obvious opportunity for the Soviet policy-makers to cause mischief in the non-Communist camp and for a few days they managed to stir the rival mobs, not only against each other, but to some extent against Great Britain and the United States. There was an emotional protest in Belgrade against the London conference on Trieste, while in Trieste itself Italian riots were organized against the Occupying Powers. Although pious hopes have been expressed for an Italian-Yugoslav accord, the problem of the Free Territory's future is not likely to be settled by conciliation. Trieste will remain one of the world's danger-spots, but serious trouble will be avoided as long as both contestants recognize that Russia alone would be the beneficiary were the issue to be pressed too far. Meanwhile, the British and American troops in the city carry out their thankless task with exemplary patience and discipline.

### ANTI-COLONIAL POLICIES

President Truman's announcement of American support for "national aspirations" in Asia and Africa led some commentators to believe that the United States will continue to uphold the contradictory Rooseveltian policies of maintaining a system of Western alliances and at the same time adopting a less sympathetic policy towards the position of the Allies in their overseas territories and spheres of interest. This attitude, together with the Soviet Union's more direct propaganda against "colonialism" has created a climate of opinion which is one of the main factors militating against the success of British and French efforts to discharge the special responsibilities of these nations for the preservation of order over wide areas. It certainly does nothing to strengthen the totality of Western Defence, because allies weakened at the periphery are allies weakened in their innermost citadels.

That Washington has begun to recognize that an ambidextrous policy of this kind is contrary to United States interests is suggested by the increasing flow of equipment to Indo-China, and by the decision of the United States Government to abstain from voting when the Tunisian issue came before the Security Council. The truth is that Asian and African "nationalism" is an artificially stimulated phenomenon, enjoying little or no support among peoples who have no national traditions and whose main concern is to live at peace under a good, paternal administration. Wherever European leadership has abdicated, or been whittled down, the quality of government has catastrophically deteriorated. How far Egypt, as one instance, has been surrendered to chaos with the progressive withdrawal of British tutelage is revealed by the fact that almost the whole country after dark lies wide open to brigandage. What should be more consistently realized at the White House, therefore, is that weak and inefficient regimes, as in Egypt, Burma and Indonesia, and subversive movements, as in Indo-China, Malaya and Tunisia, immeasurably diminish the power of the West as a whole to wage any kind of war, cold, hot or luke-warm, against an enemy determined to overthrow Western values of good government and ordered freedom.

### THE MIDDLE EAST

#### EGYPT

By the time these notes are published, British intentions about the resolving of the dispute with Egypt may have become clear. At the time of writing there is a general belief, naturally not discouraged by the Egyptians, that the British Government has agreed in principle to the establishment of a new dispensation in the Canal Zone, but in whose favour has not yet been made known.

When British evacuation from Suez was first seriously considered, the idea was that her troops would be replaced by an international garrison. Disagreements in high places about the nature of the proposed Middle Eastern Command have resulted in the soft-pedalling of this theme, while nothing more has been heard of the plan, attributed to King Ibn Saud, for the Arab countries to be entrusted with the task. Meanwhile, the impending dispatch to the Middle East of Australian and New Zealand air units, shows that there is no disposition to allow a power-vacuum, like that in Southern Asia, to develop in the Eastern Mediterranean. Whether they are to form part of a Commonwealth commitment, or whether they have been earmarked for service in the upholding of an international responsibility, is not known and may not even have been decided.

#### SUDANESE ISSUES

Difficult as it is to foresee the outline of a settlement with Egypt and the Canal dispute, the shape of an accord on the Sudanese question is even more baffling to predict. Hilaly Pasha announced that Egypt would not budge an inch on either issue, with the result that commentators now assume that the onus is on Great Britain to find a formula for a Sudan settlement acceptable to Cairo. The diplomatic correspondent of *The Times* summed up the general expectation when he wrote: "The problem has been to find a way of acknowledging the claim of King Farouk to the title of King of the Sudan, without arousing in the Sudanese the suspicion that the promise of consultation had been overlooked and their right to self-determination prejudiced." Such a task, one would have thought, was more fitting to a contortionist than to a Foreign Minister, and one can only hope that the correspondent is mistaken in supposing that Mr. Eden has been saddled with it. What really is distressing, in every clash of interest, is the inevitability with which everybody looks to London to make concessions: it is almost as distressing, indeed, as the regularity with which concessions have been made.

Another assumption that would seem to be much too general is that Britain should not only withdraw from the scenes of her labours, but should expressly renounce their fruits. Here again the diplomatic correspondent of *The Times* provides an example, by describing as "unfounded" the Egyptian suspicion that Britain intends to retain a measure of control in the Sudan after the Sudanese have exercised the powers of self-determination granted to them. Britain has performed such prodigious services for the Sudan that she has earned, if not an usufruct, at least the right to a very special position there. The Sudanese, if they are wise, will be quick to concede this position; otherwise nothing can prevent their country's becoming once again an Egyptian satrapy.

#### THE FAR EASTERN WARS

##### KOREA

There is one factor common to the wars being conducted in Korea, Indo-China and Malaya. It is that the enemy does not have to win battles to exert his greatest menace: all that is necessary is that he shall continue to exist. General Van Fleet has said that the Communist strength in Korea has been built up during the lull in the heavy fighting to a position where it permits of a large offensive to be mounted against the United Nations line. Such an offensive, unless it can be decisive, is obviously more potent as a threat than as a fact. It is even possible, from the point of view of Communist world strategy, that the threat is preferable to a Korean



victory. The United Nations, for their part, have nothing to gain from a stalemate, or from any military operations that do not end in the complete annihilation of such enemy forces as are deployed in Korea. As conditions for that complete victory do not exist in the present circumstances, their lot is far from being a happy one. No doubt the endless procrastination which has attended every phase of the truce talks is tolerated as the lesser evil.

#### INDO-CHINA

These considerations apply, though perhaps not in the same degree, to operations in Indo-China. Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny did much to restore French fortunes in that area, and there has been no recession of the tide since his death. As long as Viet-Minh is prepared to further Communism's global strategy, however, its task will continue to be the relatively light one of maintaining a striking power, without the need to use it for the achievement of decisive victories. The rebels have only to keep their war "ticking over" to drain French energies and make a general pacification impossible.

#### MALAYA

Malaya faces the same problem, but the lack of a common frontier with Communist countries should make it easier to cope with. General Sir Gerald Templer's first actions have had much the same tonic effect as those of the late Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny when he arrived in Indo-China. The outcry in Britain which met his imposition of collective punishments testified more to the softness of heart of the protesters than it did to their mental acumen. It was based on a total misapprehension of the Eastern mentality, which always respects strength and despises weakness. It is impossible to attach too much importance to the fact that Communist rebellion in Malaya is a local Chinese manifestation. Yet the Chinese community as a whole has played a derisory part in the campaign to subdue it. The bringing-home of a sense of its responsibility is long overdue. If it cannot be achieved by measures such as *ad hoc* curfews imposed in areas where outrages occur, the solution will require collective punishments on a much wider and more drastic scale. Otherwise terrorism and brigandage will continue into the indefinite future. That is why General Templer deserves the support of everybody who wishes to see the end of bloodshed in Malaya.

## CORRESPONDENCE

(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)

### MORALE AND THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

SIR,—In an article which I wrote on morale published in the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL during 1950<sup>1</sup>, I emphasized, amongst other things, that morale fed on tradition.

The foundation stone of the Regimental System is tradition. There have been recent examples in Korea of personnel attached to regiments other than their own behaving with outstanding gallantry. This is further evidence that the Regimental System, which alone has stood the test of time, is the only one on which to build morale.

There must be regiments founded on Territorial tradition. Persons from other areas may enlist in these regiments, or reinforcements may be necessarily drafted to them from other regiments. Such things do not impair regimental traditional morale which rapidly spreads to all who have enlisted in the regiment or are attached to it.

J. G. SHILLINGTON,

Lieut.-Colonel.

14th January, 1952.

### COMMUNISM AND COLD WAR POLICIES

SIR,—Commander S. Le H. Lombard-Hobson's article in the November issue of the JOURNAL<sup>2</sup> is both interesting and instructive.

I should, however, like to point out that the Marxist slogan, "From each according to his ability; to each according to his need" was amended long ago, and now goes, "From each according to his ability; to each according to his work" which is very different. (*National Income of the U.S.S.R.* by I. Sautin, page 20. Published in Moscow, 1939.)

A. G. FULLER.

10th February, 1952.

### MAIN FLEET TO SINGAPORE

SIR,—May I make a few comments on your review of my book, *Main Fleet to Singapore*.<sup>3</sup> Among other things you say:

"It is probably still much too early yet to attempt a lucid history of this unhappy period, and it must fall to some later historian to piece together the many decisions that were taken and to weigh them in the balance of strategic necessity. The State Papers which will give the full story have as yet another 30 or more years to run before they will become available for study, and to attempt to write real history before they become public is to make bricks without all the straw that is available."

Your remark about the State Papers giving the "full story" is fallacious. The full story is never obtainable, neither in 50 nor yet in 5,000 years. Nelson has been dead 147 years; yet there are many things about his operations that remain conjectural. Nor is there any magic in State Papers. They are but certain records and opinions of men of 50 or more years before that have been delayed in publication. Another way of

<sup>1</sup> May, 1950, page 254.

<sup>2</sup> November, 1951, page 620.

<sup>3</sup> See JOURNAL for February, 1952, page 139.

obtaining such information is to ask the same men soon after the event. This, as my preface shows, is what I did; and I am afraid I regard it as absurd for you to suggest that what they told me was not "real" history. In some ways, it was more "real" than the State Papers you view with so much respect. When these latter eventually become available, it is almost certain that those who wrote them are among the angels. Therefore, in cases of ambiguous or obscure writing, the historian is left in permanent doubt about what the writers meant to convey. The contemporary author, on the other hand, can discuss the whole matter with the people concerned by word of mouth and thus discover exactly what was in their minds; which I now know from experience is often materially different from what they put on paper. Naturally, full access to State Papers is of great value. But it is obviously possible to learn quite enough for the formation of a reasonably reliable judgment before they appear. Whether I have succeeded in doing so is not for me to say. But you produce no evidence that I have not.

You say that my assessment of the Singapore affair is "provisional." Of course it is. Every historical assessment is provisional, and will remain so till the Day of Judgment. Historians are still arguing, three hundred years after the event, whether Charles I was a martyr or a criminal. As I have previously said, the collection of *all* the evidence about historical events is an unattainable ideal; and even the limited amount that is ever available is invariably to some extent conflicting and contradictory. Hence every historical judgment, no matter when or by whom written, is bound to be provisional, personal, biased, and selective.

But the most astonishing aspect of your review, implicit in the passage I have quoted and in others, is your very plain suggestion that no books about warlike operations should be written till 50 years afterwards. Had your principle been followed in the past, we should now just be beginning to know something about the Boer War, but nothing about the two World Wars. The advocacy by you of such a situation for the future seems to me the queerest possible way for the Institution to live up to its proclaimed object of "the promotion of the science *and literature* of the three Services."

RUSSELL GRENFELL.

4th March, 1952.

SIR,—One of the main drawbacks to relying on the memory of persons after an event has taken place is that human memory is fallible and almost inevitably influenced by the event itself. It stands to reason that the written word, i.e. *the decisions taken before the event in the light of the information then available*, must give a truer perspective of policy and strategy than a possibly imperfect, and inevitably coloured, memory *after* the event.

There was no suggestion in my review, actual or implied, that history should not be written before the lapse of 50 years. What I did imply was that the *final* word—so far as fact is concerned—cannot be written until all the evidence is available. But that cannot be construed as implying that an "interim" account is neither valuable nor desirable. If Captain Grenfell will re-read the final paragraph of the review, he will notice that his book is commended as being of interest to the student of Far Eastern affairs.

There might be less controversy over the actions of Nelson and King Charles I, which Captain Grenfell cites, had there then been the compulsory deposit of State Papers at the Public Record Office, had it existed. Unfortunately, compulsory deposit came considerably later, and so we are denied much of the knowledge which State Papers of the period could have divulged.

YOUR REVIEWER.

19th March, 1952.

## OBEDIENCE TO LAWFUL COMMANDS

SIR,—Recent and current political trends have drawn attention to the extent of the soldier's responsibility for obedience to unlawful commands. It is not, however, a subject on which British feeling has been previously insensitive to his difficulties.

Disobedience was, in fact, one of the offences for which the death penalty in peace was first permitted—under the Mutiny Act of 1717 (3 Geo. 1 c 2). The offence was there designated as refusal to obey the "military orders of a superior officer." This caused such controversy—as appearing to make the soldier punishable for disobedience to an unlawful command—that the wording was altered in the 1718 Act to refusal "to obey any lawful command." (4 Geo. 1 c 4).

There was a case in early Stuart days where the Secretary of State declared illegal a Quartermaster's order to two soldiers to beat a civilian, but it is a tribute to either British common sense or good fortune, that the courts of the United Kingdom have never been called upon to decide a soldier's liability for obedience to a military command.

Until the current controversy arose, it was generally accepted as probable that they would, if called upon to decide, follow the decision handed down by the Cape of Good Hope Supreme Court in *Regina v. Smith* (1900), although this was in no sense, of course, binding. It was, in brief, that it was not criminal for a soldier to obey an order that was not *plainly* illegal.

All the above concerned, as was natural, only domestic law, and the question of international law did not arise.

R. E. SCOULLER,  
*Captain, Royal Signals.*

8th March, 1952.

## THE EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES

SIR,—In the report of the discussion following Colonel Hackett's lecture on the Employment of Special Forces,\* it was stated that the idea of the R.A.F. Regiment taking over S.A.S. units had been considered. I should like to advance a few more points in favour of this suggestion.

If the R.A.F. Regiment were to take over this type of unit an air commander would be able to control the destruction of his enemy's aircraft on the ground as well as in the air, aircraft could be "homed" on to their targets and reports of the damage inflicted could be sent back by R.A.F. ground observation teams working far behind "enemy lines."

In addition, these special R.A.F. Regiment units, trained to reach their target by any method, could be parachuted to seize tactically vital airfields and thereafter to defend the same airfield during the operation of flying units. This would avoid the handing over of ground seized by the Army to the R.A.F. and although it would mean to a certain extent the formation of a Royal Air Force "Private Army" it would avoid the disadvantages of "Private Armies" within normal Army formations.

The tactical handling of special units in many ways resembles the tactical handling of armoured cars. It should be remembered that the R.N.A.S. were the first to employ armoured cars and that the R.A.F. have continued to employ them with marked success in Iraq and elsewhere. The present armoured car squadrons of the R.A.F. Regiment would provide a valuable base on which to build units of the S.A.S. type.

The R.A.F. Regiment at present suffers a disadvantage as a combatant force. It has no offensive role yet requires to maintain a high offensive spirit. The formation of a few special units with a purely offensive role could remove this disadvantage and do much for recruiting.

I. A. CLARKE,  
*Flight Lieutenant, R.A.F. Regiment.*

22nd March, 1952.

\* See JOURNAL for February, 1952, page 26.



## A PRIVATE SOLDIER IN THE CENTRAL INDIA CAMPAIGN

SIR,—In *A Private Soldier in the Central India Campaign*,<sup>3</sup> Colonel Oatts lightly, but none the less surely, compares the prowess of the soldier of those days with that of his modern counterpart in Malaya. As is usual the comparison is to the detriment of the soldier of to-day.

I venture to suggest that, were the soldier in Malaya to-day up against an enemy who stayed and fought, who ran off into the jungle only after he had been soundly beaten, the story of the last four years would at least be a shorter one.

Colonel Oatts writes: "The subsequent pursuit lasted three hours and ended only when the enemy had been completely dispersed and their survivors in twos and threes had taken refuge in the jungle." In a sense the National Service man is taking on the battle at the point where Private Watts and his glorious company decided it had ended. It is the most difficult part of the battle, requiring perhaps not the careless bravery of Private Watts but certainly infinite patience and steady nerves. These have not been lacking.

C. J. LYNCH,  
Major, The Devonshire Regiment.

5th April, 1952.

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<sup>3</sup> See JOURNAL for February, 1952, page 69.

## GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

### NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION.—With the aim of adapting the Organization to the needs arising from the development of its activities from the planning to the operational stage, it was decided at the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, which ended on 25th February :

(1) that the North Atlantic Council, while continuing to hold periodic Ministerial meetings, would henceforth function in permanent session through the appointment of permanent representatives ;

(2) that a Secretary-General would be appointed to head a unified international secretariat designed to assist the Council in the fulfilment of its increasing responsibilities ;

(3) that all civilian activities of the N.A.T.O. would be concentrated in the geographical area where are situated other international agencies whose work is closely related to the Organization and with which close administrative connection is essential to efficiency ;

(4) that Paris would be the permanent headquarters of the Organization ; and

(5) that when these changes had become effective, the North Atlantic Council would assume the functions hitherto performed by the Council of Deputies, the Defence Production Board, and the Financial and Economic Board.

It was announced on 12th March that General Lord Ismay had accepted an invitation from the Council to become Secretary-General. A resolution appointing General Lord Ismay Vice-Chairman of the Council and concurrently Secretary-General of the N.A.T.O. was unanimously approved by the Council Deputies at a meeting on the same day.

The headquarters of the Organization moved to Paris during April.

THE ATLANTIC COMMAND.—The North Atlantic Council of Deputies, on behalf of the North Atlantic Council, issued a statement on 30th January announcing :

(1) that Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, C.-in-C. of the United States Atlantic Fleet, had been appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic ;

(2) that the naval, land, and air forces making up this Command in war-time would be contributed by the several North Atlantic Treaty Powers ;

(3) that it had been agreed that the Deputy Supreme Commander, Atlantic, should be a British naval officer ;

(4) that the Command would be exercised through an integrated international staff drawn from the countries contributing to the North Atlantic Ocean Command ; and

(5) that the latter Command and General Eisenhower's Command in Europe were mutually supporting Commands whose activities would be co-ordinated by the Standing Group.

At a Press conference in Washington on 31st January, Admiral McCormick said that his overall Command would be divided into two sub-commands, one for the Western Atlantic under himself, and the other for the Eastern Atlantic under a British C.-in-C.

Simultaneously the British Admiralty announced :

(1) that Vice-Admiral Sir William Andrewes, C.-in-C. America and West Indies Station, would be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, retaining his present Command ;

(2) that the C.-in-C., Eastern Atlantic, under the N.A.T.O. would be the C.-in-C. Home Fleet (at present Admiral Sir George Creasy), who would have his headquarters ashore in time of war ; and

(3) that the C.-in-C. Home Station (not a N.A.T.O. appointment) would be the C.-in-C. Portsmouth (at present Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Power).

On 10th April, the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, announced the names of his subordinate Commanders, of which the following are additional to those previously mentioned :—Commander, North-East Atlantic Sub-Area : Vice-Admiral Sir Maurice J. Mansergh (C.-in-C., Plymouth). Commander, Northern European Sub-Area : Rear-Admiral J. H. F. Crombie (Flag Officer, Scotland). Air Commander North-East Atlantic : Air Vice-Marshal T. C. Traill (A.O.C. No. 19 Group). Air Commander North Sea : Air Vice-Marshal H. T. Lydford (A.O.C. No. 18 Group). The two British Naval Sub-Area Commanders will be under the C.-in-C., Eastern Atlantic, and will each work in close concert with the corresponding Air Commander ; they will also be responsible to the British C.-in-C., Home Station, for those parts of their Sub-Areas which lie within the British Home Station and are adjacent to the N.A.T.O. Commands.

**THE CHANNEL COMMAND.**—The London headquarters of the N.A.T.O. announced on 21st February that an Allied naval and air command had been set up for the English Channel and the southern part of the North Sea under the name of the Channel Command ; that Admiral (now Admiral of the Fleet) Sir Arthur Power, C.-in-C., Portsmouth, and C.-in-C., Home Station (designate), had been appointed the first Allied C.-in-C., Channel Command ; and that Air Marshal Sir Alick Stevens, A.O.C.-in-C., R.A.F. Coastal Command, and C.-in-C., Air, Eastern Atlantic (designate), had been appointed Allied Air C.-in-C., Channel Command. The statement added that the Chiefs of Naval Staff of the adjacent countries (Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium) would form a Channel Committee, acting as a local agency of the Standing Group of the N.A.T.O. for the immediate solution of mutual problems.

A joint statement by the British Admiralty and Air Ministry, amplifying the N.A.T.O. announcement, said that representatives of the naval staffs of the four Powers were in permanent session in London under the chairmanship of the First Sea Lord or his representative ; that Admiral (now Admiral of the Fleet) Sir Arthur Power, in conjunction with Air Marshal Sir Alick Stevens, would be the co-ordinating authority for all naval and maritime air operations within the Channel Command area ; and that their duties would be to exercise maritime control of the area, protect the sea lines of communication, and afford naval and maritime air support to operations conducted by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, as necessary.

**GREECE AND TURKEY.**—The United States State Department announced on 15th February that all members of the N.A.T.O. had informed the United States Government of their acceptance of Greece and Turkey as full members of the North Atlantic Pact, and that the two Governments would become full members of the Organization as soon as their Parliaments had ratified the Treaty. This action was taken by the Greek Chamber of Deputies and the Turkish *Kamulay* (Grand National Assembly) on 18th February, the necessary legislation being passed by the Greek and Turkish Parliaments.

At the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council it was decided :

(1) that Greek and Turkish ground and air forces assigned to the N.A.T.O. would operate under the overall command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, through the C.-in-C., Southern Europe ;

(2) that Greek and Turkish naval forces would remain for the present under their National Chiefs of Staff, operating in close co-ordination with all other N.A.T.O. naval forces in the Mediterranean ; and

(3) that the Standing Group would continue the study of command of naval forces in the Mediterranean area and their co-ordination with land and air forces, and report to the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

**TACTICAL EXERCISE.**—A tactical exercise without troops, known as "Command Post Exercise One," and attended by senior officers under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and by national representatives of the N.A.T.O. country.

defence forces, opened in Paris on 7th April. Preceded by staff conferences on 1st, 2nd and 3rd April, the exercise was designed to study staff procedures and resolve certain problems that might be encountered in the defence of Western Europe. The exercise ended on 11th April.

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1952-53

The Government's Defence Estimates for 1952-53, providing for a gross expenditure of £1,462,200,000, of which, however, about £85,000,000 would be found from American aid, were published as a White Paper on 21st February. The net amount of £1,377,200,000 to be borne by the United Kingdom, although nearly £246,000,000 more than the estimated actual expenditure in 1951-52, was about £123,000,000 less than the original estimate for 1952-53 (£1,500,000,000) contained in the three-year rearmament programme announced in 1950, notwithstanding price increases since then of about 10 per cent. The White Paper stressed that because of difficulties in obtaining the necessary labour, materials, and machine-tools, and owing to the deterioration in Britain's economic position and the competing demands of defence production and of production for export, the full rearmament programme would now inevitably "take more than three years to achieve."

Detailed estimates of gross defence expenditure for 1952-53, with the probable actual expenditure in the year ending 31st March, 1952, shown for comparison, were as follows:

	1952-53	1951-52
Admiralty ... ..	£357,300,000	£278,500,000
War Office ... ..	£521,500,000	£428,800,000
Air Ministry ... ..	£467,600,000	£330,500,000
Ministry of Supply ... ..	£98,500,000	£81,500,000
Ministry of Defence ... ..	£17,300,000	£12,200,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	£1,462,200,000	£1,131,500,000

The main items of expenditure in the net defence budget were specified as follows (in round figures):—

Production and Research ... ..	£652,000,000
(compared with about £450,000,000 in 1951-52)	
Forces' Pay ... ..	£254,000,000
Supplies (including petrol, food, fuel and light)	£149,000,000
Works Projects ... ..	£162,000,000
Civilians' Pay ... ..	£133,000,000

It was explained that the estimate for the Ministry of Defence included £12,000,000 as the U.K. contribution towards the cost of constructing and developing various military works (e.g., airfields, communications, and headquarters) known as "infrastructure" and required, mainly on the Continent, for the common defence of Western Europe.

The estimated numbers of men and women in the Forces at 1st April, 1952, and 1st April, 1953, with the actual number at 1st April, 1951, given for comparison, were shown as follows:—

	1st April, 1952	1st April, 1953	1st April, 1951
Regulars ... ..	518,700	554,500	467,200
National Service ... ..	314,700	319,000	319,600
Women ... ..	23,700	26,900	22,400
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total ... ..	857,100	900,400	809,200



The figure of 518,700 shown as the estimated strength of the Regular Forces at 1st April, 1952, was made up as follows: Royal Navy, 135,400; Army, 209,800; Royal Air Force, 173,500.

The number of men estimated to be made available from National Service call-ups in 1952-53 was given as 237,000, to be shared as follows: Royal Navy, 7,800; Army, 156,000; Royal Air Force, 73,200.

#### MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Field-Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis took over the post of Minister of Defence from Mr. Churchill on 1st March.

#### RATIFICATION OF JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

Great Britain's instrument of ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty was deposited with the United States State Department on 3rd January, this being the first ratification of the Treaty by an Allied Power.

#### HOME GUARD

On 8th April, the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Head, stated in the House of Commons that enrolment of members of the Home Guard would commence on 28th April.

### DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

#### CANADA

**JAPANESE PEACE TREATY.**—The Canadian House of Commons, before adjourning for the Easter recess, unanimously approved the Japanese Peace Treaty. The Treaty had already been approved by the Senate.

**CANADA-UNITED STATES MILITARY CO-OPERATION COMMITTEE.**—A meeting of this Committee took place at the Petawawa Military Camp, Petawawa, Ontario, early in February to discuss problems of mutual interest connected with the defence of the North America Continent. The Committee is composed of planners from the three Services of both nations and a joint secretariat, and it acts as an advisory body for the Chiefs of Staff of Canada and the United States. The last meeting was in Washington in October, 1951.

**EXERCISE "SUN DOG THREE."**—This joint exercise of Army and Air Force units took place in the Labrador-Ungava Bay area from 4th to 14th February. Carried out under the direction of Major-General E. C. Plow, G.O.C., Eastern Command, the exercise afforded training in airborne assault operations under cold weather conditions. Blustering snow, high cold winds, and sub-zero temperatures made things difficult, but provided excellent conditions for the purpose of the exercise.

#### AUSTRALIA

**DEFENCE PROGRAMME.**—The Minister for Defence, Mr. P. A. M. McBride, in a statement in the House of Representatives on 21st February, said that while the previous Government's five-year programme had in general provided a sound basis for the organization of the post-war defence force, major additions were necessary to provide a satisfactory basis of national preparedness. The Government had accordingly decided to adopt a three-year defence programme extending from 1st July, 1950, to 30th June, 1953. This provided for the completion of the objectives of the five-year programme, plus the increased and additional objectives of the present Government. Funds allocated under the defence programme so far totalled £A559,000,000. However, on present estimates, if all proposals not already approved were ultimately adopted by the Government, the total cost would be about £A885,000,000. The overall ceiling for personnel strengths of the defence forces, including part-time and National Service personnel, now exceeded 190,000 compared with the total of just over 100,000 under the five year programme.

**RATIFICATION OF JAPANESE PEACE TREATY.**—The Australian Government's Bill authorizing ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty was passed by the House of Representatives on 28th February.

**RATIFICATION OF TRIPARTITE SECURITY TREATY.**—The Bill to ratify the Tripartite Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States was passed by the House of Representatives on 4th March.

**TEST OF ATOMIC WEAPON.**—It was announced from 10, Downing Street, on 17th February that, during 1952, the British Government intended to test an atomic weapon produced in the United Kingdom; that, in close co-operation with the Australian Government, the test would take place in Australia; and that it would be conducted in conditions which would ensure that there would be no danger whatever from radioactivity to the health of the people or animals. A similar announcement was made by Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, on 18th February, in Canberra.

**URANIUM DEPOSITS.**—The discovery at Rum Jungle, in the Northern Territory about 70 miles from the port of Darwin, of important high-grade uranium deposits was announced on 23rd February by Dr. A. E. Davidson, chief geologist of the British Atomic Energy Commission, after returning from a survey of the area. Earlier, on 10th January, it had been announced at Canberra by Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister, that uranium deposits at Radium Hill, South Australia, would be developed immediately.

## FOREIGN

### EGYPT

#### QUIETER CONDITIONS

As a result of changes of Government in Egypt and the various measures taken, the tension in that country has gradually relaxed. In the Suez Canal Zone, conditions improved during February and March, despite occasional terrorist activities; many restrictions were removed by the British military authorities, and the Egyptian Police displayed a markedly more co-operative attitude.

Mr. Raghunath Rao's report to the Governing Body of the I.L.O. on his investigation into the Egyptian Government's allegations of the use of forced labour by the British military authorities in the Canal Zone, stated that the Egyptian charges had not been substantiated.

On 23rd March, the Egyptian Government decided to ask King Farouk to dissolve Parliament and to order new elections. A Royal proclamation was accordingly issued. A Royal decree was also issued on 24th March extending martial law for an indefinite period, though the Minister of Information said that it would be relaxed during the electoral campaign.

### GREECE

#### WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH MILITARY AND R.A.F. MISSIONS

On 13th January, Mr. Venizelos, the Greek Foreign Minister, announced that for reasons of economy the Government had decided not to renew the contracts of the British Military Mission (which in March completed seven years' work in Greece) and of the R.A.F. Mission, when they expired on 30th June. He said that the British Naval Mission would remain.

### JAPAN

**DEFENCE EXPENDITURE.**—On 18th January, the Japanese Government approved a Budget for the fiscal year 1952-53 totalling the equivalent of \$2,368,611,000 of which \$505,055,000 was for security measures.

**DISTRIBUTION OF WAR LOOT.**—The U.S. State Department announced on 7th March that a directive had been sent to General Ridgway, the Supreme Allied Commander in Japan, authorizing him to distribute the proceeds of the sale of loot seized by the Japanese forces during the recent war, amounting to \$3,500,000 (£1,250,000), between nine countries in the following proportions: Nationalist China, 20 per cent.; Great Britain, Burma, Holland and the Philippines, each 12 per cent.; Australia, France, India and Pakistan, each 8 per cent.

The fund was accumulated from the sale of property, found in Japan after the end of the war, adjudged to have been looted from Allied territories and impossible to identify by country of origin. The division of the fund in the above-mentioned proportions was ordered arbitrarily by the U.S. Government, as the occupying Power in Japan, after the Allied countries had failed to agree on their shares.

### KOREA

For a diary of the war in Korea see page 255.

### NETHERLANDS

#### DEFENCE PRODUCTION

It was announced in The Hague on 31st January that the bilateral agreement between the Netherlands and the United States on American economic and military aid had been amended to provide for the use by Holland of 600,000,000 guilders of counterpart funds up to 1954 for additional defence production. The statement added that this amount, which would be additional to the 1,500,000,000 guilders annually provided for defence in the Budget, included 230,000,000 guilders, the use of which had already been authorized by Parliament, including 175,000,000 guilders which were being spent on the production of military vehicles.

One half of the remaining 370,000,000 guilders was expected to be spent in 1951-52, and one of the projects to be financed was the construction of a number of minesweepers; a still larger number of these vessels would, however, be built to the order of the United States under the "off-shore procurements" scheme, and would subsequently be made available to the Netherlands as U.S. military aid.

### UNITED STATES

**THE BUDGET, 1952-53.**—On 21st January, President Truman submitted to Congress the U.S. Budget for the fiscal year 1952 (i.e., 1st July, 1952, to 30th June, 1953), in which expenditure was estimated at \$85,444,000,000 and receipts at \$70,998,000,000 (on the basis of present taxation), leaving a net deficit of \$14,446,000,000. Of the total expenditure \$51,163,000,000 (60 per cent.) was for defence, and \$10,844,000,000 (13 per cent.) for international security and foreign relations.

In an accompanying message to Congress, President Truman said that "significant progress" had been made in rebuilding U.S. defences since the outbreak of the Korean war; the number of army divisions had been increased from 10 to 18, more than 160 warships had been returned to active service from the "mothball fleet," over 40 wings had been added to the Air Force, the production of military equipment and the ability to mobilize for any emergency had been greatly expanded, and at the same time America's overseas Allies had been provided with the "critical margin of aid" necessary to help them grow stronger.

The present Budget, he added, laid the groundwork for further progress by providing for additional increases in the strength of the armed forces, further deliveries of arms to America's Allies, the continued requirements of the atomic energy programme, and a further development of U.S. economic strength. By the end of the 1953 fiscal year the

peak production rates should have been reached or passed for all the major military items except some of the newer-model aircraft and some weapons not yet in production. If new international tensions did not develop, and if no further aggressions occurred, it should be possible to reduce the budget expenditures after the fiscal year 1954, by which time most of the currently planned military expansion would have been completed.

**RATIFICATION OF TREATIES.**—On 15th April, the President, acting with the advice and consent of the Senate, ratified the Japanese Peace Treaty, the Tripartite Security Treaty between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, and the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan.

### YUGOSLAVIA

#### ECONOMIC AID

It was announced in Belgrade on 29th February that Yugoslavia would receive an additional and final grant of \$45,000,000 under the tripartite agreement between Great Britain, the United States, and France, of which the United States would contribute \$29,250,000 (from appropriations under the Mutual Security Act), Great Britain the equivalent in sterling of \$10,350,000, and France the equivalent in francs of \$5,400,000. The grant brought the total amount allocated to Yugoslavia by the Western Powers during the current fiscal year, which expires in June, to \$120,000,000.

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#### ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE MEMORIAL

The Royal Naval Reserve, which was formed in 1862 to supplement the Royal Navy in War by the voluntary service of officers and men of the Merchant Navy and Fishing Fleet, is for the first time in its history to have a Memorial to its members who have fallen in the cause of freedom on the sea.

Over 8,000 gave their lives in the two World Wars and the value of their service may be judged from the records which include 15 V.C.s, 172 D.S.O.s, 1,236 D.S.C.s, and 987 D.S.M.s, and 4,000 received mention, commendation, or appreciation for their service.

The Memorial will take the form of endowed bedrooms in the Victory Club near the Marble Arch, which offers to all Ex-Service men and women, irrespective of rank, all the amenities of a West End club, including restaurant, reading room, ball and billiards rooms, and 200 bedrooms at very moderate charges. Many bedrooms have already been endowed by Regiments, Corps, Ships, Squadrons, etc., and it is hoped to endow several to the R.N.R. in the new wing about to be built.

The Memorial is due to the inspiration of senior officers of the R.N.R. and there can be little doubt that no more worthwhile tribute could be paid to their fallen comrades.

Contributions, however small, will be welcomed. They should be sent to the Hon. Treasurer, R.N.R. Fund, The Victory (Ex-Services) Club, 75-79, Seymour Street, Marble Arch, London, W.2.



## NAVY NOTES

### HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN'S MESSAGE TO HER NAVIES

The following gracious message from Her Majesty the Queen was received by the Secretary of the Admiralty on 12th February :—

"On my accession to the Throne, I wish to send a message of gratitude to the Royal Navy and all my other Naval Forces for the distinguished services which they rendered during the reign of my beloved Father. He received his early training in the Royal Navy and maintained throughout his life a close personal interest in the ships and men of the Naval Services. As the wife of a serving Officer, I too have a specially intimate link with the Royal Navy. I have seen both at home and overseas how its great traditions, tested and proved in two World Wars, are constantly maintained by all who serve under the White Ensign. I shall endeavour to keep in touch with the activities and welfare of all ranks and ratings of my Naval Forces throughout the Commonwealth.

"Grateful for their services in the past, proud of their present efficiency and confident that they will uphold their high standards, I send to them all this expression of the trust which I and my peoples throughout the Commonwealth repose in them.

"ELIZABETH R."

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

INVESTITURE.—The Queen held a special investiture on 2nd April at which she decorated the officers and men of the Royal Navy most closely connected with the funeral of His late Majesty King George VI. The 12 naval officers and 284 ratings concerned were the members of the gun carriage crews from the Nore Command and from H.M.S. *Excellent*, Gunnery School, Portsmouth, who drew the coffin through London and Windsor, respectively.

AIDES-DE-CAMP.—It was announced in the *London Gazette* on 1st April that H.M. The Queen had approved the reappointment of naval officers as Aides-de-Camp, Chaplains, Honorary Chaplains, Honorary Surgeons, Physicians and Dental Surgeons, and Honorary Nursing Sister who held similar appointments under His late Majesty King George VI.

The Queen has approved the appointment of Admiral Sir Rhoderick R. McGrigor, G.C.B., D.S.O., to be First and Principal Naval Aide-de-Camp to Her Majesty in succession to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur J. Power, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O., with effect from 24th April, 1952.

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#### BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

The Queen has been pleased, by Letters Patent under the Great Seal, bearing date the 8th day of February, 1952, to appoint the following to be Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom :—

Right Hon. James P. L. Thomas.

Admiral Sir Rhoderick R. McGrigor, G.C.B., D.S.O.

Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander C. G. Madden, K.C.B., C.B.E.

Vice-Admiral Sir Michael M. Denny, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Rear-Admiral Sydney M. Raw, C.B., C.B.E.

Vice-Admiral Edmund W. Anstice, C.B.

Vice-Admiral Guy Grantham, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Rear-Admiral Edward M. Evans-Lombe, C.B.

Commander Allan H. P. Noble, D.S.O., D.S.C.

Kenelm S. D. Wingfield Digby, Esq.

Sir John Gerald Lang, K.C.B.

## FLAG APPOINTMENTS

**EAST INDIES.**—Vice-Admiral W. R. Slayter, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., is to be Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey N. Oliver, K.C.B., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in early August, 1952.

**SOUTH ATLANTIC.**—Vice-Admiral P. B. R. W. William-Powlett, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., is to be Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, in succession to Admiral Sir Herbert A. Packer, K.C.B., C.B.E., the appointment to take effect in September, 1952.

**GIBRALTAR.**—Rear-Admiral St. J. A. Micklethwait, C.B., D.S.O., is to be Flag Officer Gibraltar and Admiral Superintendent, H.M. Dockyard, Gibraltar, in succession to Vice-Admiral the Lord Ashbourne, C.B., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in May, 1952.

**RESERVES.**—Rear-Admiral J. A. S. Eccles, C.B., C.B.E., is to be Admiral Commanding Reserves, in succession to Vice-Admiral W. R. Slayter, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., the appointment to take effect in June, 1952.

**VICE-CONTROLLER.**—Rear-Admiral G. V. Gladstone is to be Vice-Controller and Director of Naval Equipment, in succession to Rear-Admiral J. Hughes-Hallett, C.B., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in June, 1952.

**NAVAL SECRETARY.**—Captain R. G. Onslow, D.S.O., is to be Naval Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty, in succession to Rear-Admiral W. W. Davis, C.B., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in May, 1952.

**NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.**—It was announced on 2nd April that Rear-Admiral R. M. Dick, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.C., was to be Standing Group Liaison Officer to the North Atlantic Council, the appointment to take effect on 12th April, 1952.

**TRAINING SQUADRON.**—Captain B. I. Robertshaw, C.B.E., was appointed to be Commodore, Training Squadron, temporarily, with the rank of Commodore, 1st Class, in succession to Rear-Admiral R. M. Dick, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.C., with effect from 12th April, 1952.

**CHAPLAIN OF THE FLEET.**—The Rev. F. N. Chamberlain, O.B.E., A.K.C., is to be Chaplain of the Fleet, in succession to the Ven. Archdeacon L. Coulshaw, C.B., M.C., F.K.C., Q.H.Ch., the appointment to take effect on 15th May, 1952.

## RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

The following were announced with effect from 15th January, 1952 :—

Vice-Admiral Sir Richard V. Symonds-Taylor, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.C., to be placed on the Retired List.

Rear-Admiral the Lord Ashbourne, C.B., D.S.O., to be promoted Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet.

The following were announced with effect from 26th January, 1952 :—

Admiral Sir W. Edward Parry, K.C.B., to be placed on the Retired List in the rank of Admiral.

Acting Admiral the Hon. Sir Cyril E. Douglas-Pennant, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.S.C., to be promoted Admiral in H.M. Fleet and reappointed as Admiral, British Joint Services Mission, Washington.

Rear-Admiral R. A. B. Edwards, C.B., C.B.E., to be promoted Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet and reappointed as Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Mediterranean Station.

Vice-Admiral Sir Charles H. L. Woodhouse, K.C.B. (retired) to be promoted Admiral on the Retired List.

The following were announced with effect from 15th March, 1952 :—

Admiral Sir Charles S. Daniel, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., to be placed on the Retired List in the rank of Admiral.

Vice-Admiral Sir Herbert A. Packer, K.C.B., C.B.E., to be promoted Admiral in H.M. Fleet.

Rear-Admiral E. M. Evans-Lombe, C.B., to be promoted Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet.

The following promotions on the Retired List were also announced to date 15th March :—

Vice-Admiral Sir E. Desmond McCarthy, K.C.B., D.S.O. (retired), to be promoted Admiral on the Retired List.

Vice-Admiral G. B. Middleton, C.B., C.B.E. (retired), to be promoted Admiral on the Retired List.

Vice-Admiral Sir Angus E. M. B. Cunninghame-Graham, K.B.E., C.B. (retired), to be promoted Admiral on the Retired List.

The following were announced with effect from 22nd April, 1952 :—

Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O., to be promoted Admiral of the Fleet.

Vice-Admiral Sir Michael M. Denny, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., to be promoted Admiral in H.M. Fleet.

Rear-Admiral J. A. S. Eccles, C.B., C.B.E., to be promoted Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet.

Rear-Admiral R. K. Dickson, C.B., D.S.O., to be placed on the Retired List in the rank of Rear-Admiral.

The following promotions from Captain (E) to Rear-Admiral (E) were announced on 11th February, 1952 :—

Captain (E) C. Littlewood, O.B.E., R.N.

Captain (E) L. E. Rebbeck, A.D.C., R.N.

Captain (E) I. G. Maclean, O.B.E., R.N.

The following was announced on 20th February :—

Captain (S) A. W. Laybourne, C.B.E., R.N., to be promoted to Rear-Admiral (S) to date 31st March, 1952, and appointed to *Drake*, additional, as Command Supply Officer, Plymouth, to date 31st March, 1952.

#### THE NAVY ESTIMATES

The Navy Estimates, 1952-53, were presented to Parliament on 25th February, with an explanatory statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. J. P. L. Thomas (Cmd. 8476, 6d. net). They provide for a net expenditure of £357,000,000, or £78,750,000 more than the sum voted last year, but it is estimated that the total to be found by the British taxpayer will be reduced by about £25,000,000 as a result of economic aid granted by the United States Government. A supplementary estimate for 1951-52 presented to Parliament at the same time shows that expenditure for that year is likely to exceed the gross provision made by £3,000,000, although this sum can be more than met by additional receipts accruing during the year. The increased expenditure was due to the addition of a substantial number of vessels for minesweeping and seaward defence duties and a number of coastal craft to the original construction programme.

The First Lord in his statement says that for 1952-53 additional provision is needed for the expanding rearmament programme and for the maintenance of the Fleet at a higher level of preparedness, and account has to be taken of higher prices and increases in the pay of civilian staff. Vote A provides for a maximum strength of 153,000, including 5,475 for the Women's Royal Naval Service and 225 for the Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service. It also includes men and women on release leave, not expected to exceed 2,200 at any time during the year, and 3,300 ratings entered for local service on foreign stations. It will be necessary to recall some 3,500 additional Royal Fleet Reservists as well as some officer reservists during the year, and also to continue to retain time-expired ratings and certain officers.

The total provision of approximately £188,000,000 net, compared with some £132,000,000 net in 1951-52, is made for production and research. Although the tempo of the rearmament programme has quickened, the build up of production has fallen short of what was planned. There has been a shortage of raw materials, particularly steel. Particular attention is being given to the need to build up anti-submarine and mine-sweeping forces and to the expansion of naval aviation.

The First Lord, Mr. Thomas, introduced the Navy Estimates in the House of Commons on 6th March.

#### EXERCISES AND CRUISES

**HOME FLEET.**—Ships of the Home Fleet arrived at Gibraltar towards the end of January and were based there for nearly two months during their Spring Cruise. In late February and early March, the Fleet took part in exercises with the Mediterranean Fleet, and afterwards the two fleets proceeded to Malta, where they remained for a week during a visit of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor. H.M.S. *Vanguard*, on the abandonment of the proposed cruise to South Africa with the late King, went to Gibraltar at the end of February for training and exercises, returning with the Home Fleet. H.M.S. *Apollo*, fast minelayer, visited Ferrol, Spain, between 24th and 28th January during the Spring Cruise.

**MINESWEEPERS AND SUBMARINES.**—The second series of N.A.T.O. minesweeping exercises in 1952 took place in the first week of March, similar to that held off Harwich in January. It took place in the area off the Firth of Forth and was known as "Bandeau II." Dutch minesweepers took part, and the exercise was directed by the Flag Officer, Scotland. Between 24th and 30th March, a further N.A.T.O. minesweeping exercise took place near Flushing under the command of Rear-Admiral C. W. Slot, R.Neth.N. It was announced on 15th February that the submarines *Alaric* and *Taciturn*, of the Third Squadron based at Rothesay, would carry out a cruise in Arctic waters during the Spring, proceeding well into the Arctic circle for exercises and the study of weather conditions in the vicinity of ice. Towards the end of March, the fishery protection frigate *Truelove* took part with Norwegian forces in an exercise to test the defences of Harstad, Northern Norway.

**MEDITERRANEAN.**—The principal event in the Mediterranean during the first quarter of 1952 was Exercise "Grand Slam," which took place between 26th February and 5th March. This was the most extensive peace-time exercise ever held in the Mediterranean, and British, United States, French, and Italian forces took part, under the direction of Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S.N., C.-in-C., Allied Forces, Southern Europe. Salient features were a bombardment exercise in the Tyrrhenian Sea, in which warships of all four nations took part; a far-ranging anti-submarine exercise; an operation in which French warships were refuelled at sea by United States tankers; and an air attack on targets off the East coast of Italy by British, French, and American carrier-borne aircraft and land-based Italian fighters. Between 30 and 40 British warships participated, the senior British officer at sea being Vice-Admiral R. A. B. Edwards, in the cruiser *Glasgow*.

On 21st January, ships of the Mediterranean Fleet paid the first formal visit to Libya since the country became an independent Sovereign State. Rear-Admiral R. A. B. Edwards, in the *Glasgow*, with the *Cleopatra*, arrived at Benghazi, and Rear-Admiral F. R. Parham, in the *Manxman*, with the *Chequers* and *Chivalrous*, at Tripoli.

Four ships of the 4th Destroyer Squadron, *Agincourt*, *Julland*, *Aisne*, and *Corunna*, temporarily transferred from the Home Fleet to the Mediterranean in November last, returned home in March. All four assisted in maintaining the flow of shipping through the Suez Canal during the recent disturbances.

**EAST INDIES.**—On 22nd March, off Ceylon, ships of the Royal Navy, Royal Pakistan Navy, Royal Ceylon Navy, and the Indian Navy assembled for Exercise "Jet," which lasted until 4th April. The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey



Oliver, was in command of the combined forces in the cruiser *Kenya*. The exercise afforded an opportunity to use the new joint allied signal books, which came into force in these fleets on 1st March.

AMERICA AND WEST INDIES.—H.M.S. *Sheffield*, flagship of the Commander-in-Chief left Bermuda in January for her Spring Cruise, in the course of which she visited United States, Venezuelan, and Cuban ports. The frigate *Sparrow* left in company with the *Sheffield*. The frigate *Snipe* returned to Devonport on 15th January from service on the station.

The frigate *Burghead Bay* was ordered from Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, to Hope Bay, Grahamland, when a party landing stores from the British survey ship *John Biscoe* was stopped by armed Argentinians on 1st February. The Governor of the Falklands, Sir Miles Clifford, took passage in the *Burghead Bay*. Following a protest, the Argentine Government informed the British Government that its commander at Hope Bay acted in error in forcing a landing party to withdraw, and an assurance was given that the commander's instructions had been rectified.

#### PERSONNEL

ENTRY OF CADETS.—Speaking on the Navy Estimates in the House of Commons on 6th March, the First Lord said that the Admiralty had been considering ways and means of either securing at once an appreciably higher yield from the existing competitions of entry for cadets via Dartmouth at 16 or the special entry at 18, or of adopting some additional source of entry. He had been in touch with the Minister of Education and they were setting up a working party to tackle this problem from the stage which his formal inquiries had reached.

INSTRUCTOR BRANCH.—Applications are invited from university graduates and qualified teachers under 36 years of age for Short Service Commissions of three, four, or five years in the Instructor Branch, Royal Navy. Details and application forms may be obtained from the Director (P); Naval Education Service, Admiralty, London, S.W.1.

MINE WATCHING SERVICE.—Up to the end of March, about 2,200 applications had been received for enrolment into the Royal Naval Mine Watching Service. Satisfactory progress in recruiting men and women to plot the positions of mines dropped by enemy aircraft in time of war is being made in many parts of the Country, although the figures for certain areas, including the coast of Scotland and South Wales, are below expectations.

#### MATERIEL

INCREASED COST.—In a debate on defence in the House of Commons on 5th March the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, said that the volume of new construction was less in tonnage than in 1914 and much less than in 1939. But whereas a ton of new construction for, say, destroyers cost, in 1914, £150 and, in 1939, £325, the present new construction, with all the improvements and apparatus vital to modern efficiency and with all the decline in the purchasing power of money, cost £700 a ton. The whole maintenance and organization of the Royal Navy had also become vastly more complex and expensive.

H.M.S. *EAGLE*.—The new aircraft carrier *Eagle* was finally accepted into the Royal Navy on 1st March. She is the first ship in the Navy to have an automatic telephone exchange, with 500 lines. Her two hangars are served by high speed lifts and her two catapults for launching aircraft are of a more powerful type than any the Royal Navy has used. The arrestor gear is also of an improved type. A comprehensive system of flight deck lighting will make possible the operation of jet aircraft by night as well as by day.

DESTROYERS.—H.M.S. *Daring*, first of her class of destroyers, was accepted into service at the beginning of February, and H.M.S. *Diamond*, second of the class, at the end of that month. The *Daring* was allocated to the Mediterranean Fleet as the first vessel in a new Second Destroyer Squadron; the *Diamond* to the Home Fleet as first

vessel in a new Seventh Destroyer Squadron. The extreme length is 390 feet (366 feet between perpendiculars), with a beam of 43 feet and a maximum draught of 12 feet 6 inches. The armament includes 12 guns, six of 4.5-inch calibre, and two pentad torpedo tubes.

**CONVERSION.**—H.M.S. *Rochet*, formerly a destroyer of the "Rotherham" class, in February completed an extensive conversion and is now classified as a frigate. She is the second modern frigate to join the Fleet and is identical with H.M.S. *Relentless*, the prototype.

#### NAVAL AVIATION

**H.M.S. GLORY.**—During a patrol off the West Coast of Korea in mid-March, the light fleet carrier *Glory* was called upon for an extra effort to help to defend important islands, and her 14th Carrier Air Group in one day flew 105 sorties, each of normal duration. This was a record for this class of ship and brought forth congratulatory signals from American and British Commanders and from the Fifth Sea Lord.

**CARRIER CHANGES.**—H.M.S. *Theseus* joined the Mediterranean Fleet on 31st January to take over from H.M.S. *Ocean*, which sailed from Malta on 5th April to relieve the *Glory* in the Far East. The last-named was to rejoin the Mediterranean Fleet about the end of May, when the *Theseus* will return to the Home Fleet.

**BOYD TROPHY.**—The Boyd Trophy, awarded annually for the most meritorious feat of naval aviation during the preceding year, has been awarded for 1951 to No. 814 Squadron (Lieutenant-Commander A. C. Lindsay, D.S.C., R.N.) for its outstanding contribution to night flying during the previous 18 months from H.M.S. *Vengeance* and from ashore.

#### ROYAL MARINES

**APPOINTMENTS.**—The appointment of Major-General H. T. Tollemache, C.B., C.B.E., as Commandant General to date May, 1952, has been cancelled because of ill-health. Major-General J. C. Westall, C.B.E., will be promoted Lieutenant-General and will succeed General Sir Leslie C. Hollis, K.C.B., K.B.E., as Commandant General on 20th May, 1952.

Major-General C. R. Hardy, C.B.E., D.S.O., will succeed Lieutenant-General J. C. Westall, C.B.E., as Chief of Staff to the Commandant General, R.M.

Major-General C. F. Phillips, D.S.O., O.B.E., was appointed to succeed Major-General H. T. Tollemache, C.B., C.B.E., as M.G.R.M., Portsmouth Group, on 15th May, 1952.

Brigadier J. L. Moulton, D.S.O., O.B.E., was appointed to succeed Brigadier C. F. Phillips, D.S.O., O.B.E., as Commander, 3rd Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, on 9th May, 1952.

**PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENTS.**—Major-General H. T. Tollemache, C.B., C.B.E., to Retired List (29th May, 1952); Major-General J. C. Westall, C.B.E., to be Lieutenant-General (20th May, 1952); Colonel (Local Major-General) C. R. Hardy, C.B.E., D.S.O., to be Major-General (20th May, 1952); Colonel (Local Major-General) C. F. Phillips, D.S.O., O.B.E., to be Major-General (29th May, 1952); Colonel J. L. Moulton, D.S.O., O.B.E., to be Acting Brigadier (9th May, 1952).

**3RD COMMANDO BRIGADE.**—The 3rd Commando Brigade is moving from Malaya to Malta between April and June, 1952. The Brigade will then have served for two years under operational conditions in Malaya. During most of its Malayan service, the Brigade, in conjunction with the Police, has been responsible for the security of the State of Perak, and has had ample opportunities to engage Communist bandits. Up to April it has accounted for 170 bandits killed and 49 captured for a loss of four officers and 15 other ranks killed. In recognition of many operational successes, 18 decorations and 25 Mentions in Despatches have been awarded to ranks of the Brigade.

**41 COMMANDO.**—The 41st Independent Commando, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel F. N. Grant, arrived home from Korea in the *Empire Orwell* on 21st February. The unit disembarked at Southampton, where it was met by the Commandant General. It was formed at Plymouth in August, 1950, and flown to Japan, where it was equipped by the United States forces.

**WALCHEREN TRIBUTE.**—A standard emblazoned with the arms of Walcheren Island and presented by the people of the island as a token of their appreciation of the part played by Royal Marine Commandos in its liberation in November, 1944, was dedicated and placed in St. Andrew's Church, Eastney Barracks, Portsmouth, on 3rd February.

## DOMINION AND COMMONWEALTH NAVIES

### AUSTRALIA

**LOAN OF H.M.S. VENGEANCE.**—Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister, announced on 21st March that the United Kingdom Government had agreed to lend to the Royal Australian Navy the light fleet carrier *Vengeance*, pending the arrival of the second carrier for the R.A.N., the *Melbourne*. About 500 R.A.N. officers and ratings will leave Australia in September or October to bring the *Vengeance* to Australia early in 1953. Captain H. M. Burrell, R.A.N., at present Assistant Defence Representative in London, will command the ship.

**COASTAL VESSELS.**—The Australian Government has approved the construction of 14 small coastal defence vessels. They include three boom working vessels, four coastal minesweepers, four seaward defence boats, a self-propelled oil fuel lighter, and two deperming lighters which would be used with degaussing ranges to counteract the effect of magnetic mines.

**PERSONNEL INCREASE.**—The Navy Minister, Mr. McMahon, announced on 10th February that the Cabinet Defence Preparations Committee had approved an increase in the permanent strength of the Royal Australian Navy from 15,000 to 17,000 officers and men. He said that in 1950 it was thought 15,000 would be a sound basis, but naval aviation and other commitments now made the increase to 17,000 essential. The Cabinet Committee had also decided on the establishment of a women's naval reserve.

**HELICOPTERS.**—A number of Bristol "Sycamore" (Type 181) helicopters have been ordered for the Royal Australian Navy for air-sea rescue, photographic reconnaissance, and general communications duties. The aircraft will embody special features, including a winch for rescue work, a lengthened undercarriage for specialist duties, and quick action hydraulic brakes to facilitate deck landings.

### CANADA

#### H.M.C.S. QUEBEC

On 14th January, at Esquimalt, the former Royal Navy cruiser *Uganda*, which was transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy on Trafalgar Day, 1944, was formally renamed H.M.C.S. *Quebec* and commissioned as a training ship for new entry seamen. Madame Fauteux, wife of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of Quebec, unveiled the new name plate on the port side of the ship.

### SOUTH AFRICA

#### "H.M.S.A.S." ABOLISHED

On 18th March, Mr. Erasmus, Minister of Defence, in reply to a question in the House of Assembly, Cape Town, said that the letters "S.A.S." (South African Ship) had displaced "H.M.S.A.S." on cap ribbons worn with South African naval uniforms. This was decided last year, when new uniforms were designed.

## FOREIGN NAVIES

## BELGIUM

**ADMIRAL McCORMICK'S VISIT.**—Admiral McCormick, U.S.N., the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, who left Brussels on 13th March after a two-day visit, said that the Belgian Navy was adequate for the tasks assigned. The two-year period of service was sufficient to ensure efficiency; a shorter period would not permit adequate training.

**INSPECTION.**—Admiral Sir Arthur Power, Commander-in-Chief, Channel Command, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on 18th March inspected units of the Belgian Navy at Ostend. He said that the defence of the port of Antwerp and of the River Scheldt would be organized by all possible means. The Belgian Navy would soon be strengthened by new minesweepers to be delivered by Britain.

## FRANCE

## LOAN OF SUBMARINES

The submarine *Spiteful*, the second of four to be lent to the French Navy for four years, was handed over at the submarine base at Gosport, H.M.S. *Dolphin*, on 25th January and renamed as the French ship *Sirene*. The third, H.M.S. *Satyr*, was handed over at Gosport on 11th February and renamed *Saphir*.

## NORWAY

## TRAINING CRUISE

The frigate *Narvik* left Horton on 13th February on a training cruise until 23rd March. Her programme included visits to Plymouth, Lisbon, Gibraltar, Toulon, and Rotterdam.

## SWEDEN

## VISIT FOR ROYAL FUNERAL

The Swedish cruiser *Gota Lejon* visited Chatham in connection with the death and funeral of the late King, the only foreign warship to do so. Of the 200 officers and men of foreign navies who watched the funeral procession, more than half of them were from the *Gota Lejon*. She is the largest and most modern ship in the Swedish Navy and flies the flag of Rear-Admiral S. H. Ericson, Commander-in-Chief, Swedish Home Fleet.

## UNITED STATES

**EASTERN ATLANTIC COMMAND.**—Vice-Admiral Jerauld Wright, U.S.N., formally assumed the post of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic, at a ceremony in London on 3rd April in succession to Rear-Admiral Walter F. Boone, U.S.N. He also became Deputy Commander-in-Chief to Admiral Robert B. Carney, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

**NEW CONSTRUCTION.**—Speaking in Washington in January, Mr. Dan Kimball, Secretary of the Navy, said that plans had been made to build one aircraft carrier of about 60,000 tons every year for the next ten years. One of these, the *Forrestal*, is already being built, and the new budget will provide for the start of the second. It is hoped that before the programme is complete developments will have made it possible for the later ones to be powered by atomic energy. On 21st January, Congress was asked to authorize the construction of a second atomic-powered submarine,



## ARMY NOTES

### HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN'S MESSAGE TO HER ARMIES

The following gracious message from Her Majesty The Queen was received by the Secretary of State for War on 12th February :—

" I wish, on succeeding to the Throne, to address a message to all ranks of my Armies, thanking them for the notable services which they rendered to my Beloved Father during his reign and assuring them of my confidence in their loyalty and efficiency.

" My own service in the Auxiliary Territorial Service and my personal association with individual regiments of United Kingdom and other Commonwealth Forces have given me some experience of the varied and onerous tasks which they are called upon to discharge. Devotion to duty, a good-humoured acceptance of hardship when necessary, and an undefeatable endurance in adversity are characteristics of the military forces which have brought us victory in war and security in peace. I know that I can rely upon them to respond to any call upon their allegiance with the same competence and enthusiasm with which they served my Father. I shall always take a close personal interest in all that concerns their welfare and efficiency.

" ELIZABETH R."

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

The Queen held a special investiture at Buckingham Palace on 2nd April and decorated the officers and men of the Army most closely connected with the funeral of His late Majesty King George VI.

The Queen inspected the Grenadier Guards in the Quadrangle of Windsor Castle on 21st April—Her Majesty's birthday.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to assume the Colonelcy-in-Chief of the following Regiments and Corps :—The Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards (The Blues), Corps of Royal Engineers, Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Scots Guards, Irish Guards, and Welsh Guards.

Her Majesty has also been graciously pleased to assume the appointment of Captain-General of the Royal Regiment of Artillery and of the Honourable Artillery Company.

The Queen has approved the following appointments :—

TO BE AIDES-DE-CAMP TO THE QUEEN.—Brigadier B. P. Hughes, C.B.E., late Royal Artillery (6th February, 1952) ; Brigadier C. I. V. Jones, C.B.E., late Royal Artillery (6th February, 1952).

TO BE COLONELS COMMANDANT.—Of the 10th Royal Hussars, Lieut.-Colonel (Honorary Brigadier) C. B. Harvey, D.S.O. (retired) (14th March, 1952), vice Lieut.-General Sir Charles H. Gairdner, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.B.E., resigned ; of The Royal Artillery, Major-Generals C. M. Archibald, M.C. (retired) (3rd February, 1952), vice Major-General (Honorary Lieut.-General) H. G. Martin, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. (retired), tenure expired.

TO BE COLONELS OF REGIMENTS.—Of The 7th Queen's Own Hussars, Brigadier R. Younger, D.S.O., M.C. (6th January, 1952), vice Lieut.-Colonel T. A. Thornton, C.V.O. (retired), tenure expired ; of the Grenadier Guards, General Sir George D. Jeffreys, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.M.G. (retired) (8th April, 1952) ; of The Dorset Regiment, Major-General G. N. Wood, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (1st March, 1952), vice Colonel (Honorary Brigadier) C. H. Woodhouse, O.B.E., M.C. (retired), resigned ; of The Middlesex Regiment, Major-General (Honorary Lieut.-General) G. C. Bucknall, C.B., M.C. (retired) (22nd April, 1952), vice Lieut.-Colonel (Brevet Colonel) M. Browne, M.C. (retired), tenure expired.

## HIS LATE MAJESTY KING GEORGE VI

APPOINTED AIDES-DE-CAMP TO THE LATE KING.—Colonel R. Thompson O.B.E., A.M.I.E.E., Royal Engineers (S.R.) (22nd January, 1952); Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Calveley, O.B.E., Royal Signals (S.R.) (22nd January, 1952).

## APPOINTMENTS

WAR OFFICE.—Major-General R. H. Bower, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Director of Military Training and Director of Land/Air Warfare (24th August, 1951).

Major-General J. Y. Whitfield, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed Inspector of Recruiting (1st March, 1952).

Colonel E. H. Hall, O.B.E., M.B., appointed Deputy Director-General Army Medical Services, with the temporary rank of Major-General (1st April, 1952).

Major-General A. D. Campbell, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., M.A., appointed Vice Adjutant General (April, 1952).

Lieut.-General Sir Colin B. Callander, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., appointed Director-General of Military Training (May, 1952).

Colonel H. S. Gillespie, M.B.E., R.R.C., Q.A.R.A.N.C., appointed Matron-in-Chief and Director of Army Nursing Services (July, 1952).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Brigadier G. E. MacAlevey, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., appointed a Deputy Director of Medical Services, with the temporary rank of Major-General (13th December, 1951).

Major-General F. W. Festing, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed temporary G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Command, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (6th February, 1952).

Major-General S. N. Shoosmith, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed Commander, East Anglian District (16th April, 1952).

Lieut.-General Sir George Erskine, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Command, and not of Northern Command as previously stated (May, 1952).

Major-General J. D. Woodall, C.B., O.B.E., M.C., appointed G.O.C. Northern Ireland District (July, 1952).

Lieut.-General Sir Richard N. Gale, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., Southern Command (August, 1952).

S.H.A.P.E.—Major-General G. C. Evans, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Assistant Chief of Staff (Organization and Training) (March, 1952).

GERMANY.—Brigadier S. Lamplugh, C.B.E., appointed Commander (Major-General), Rhine Area, with the temporary rank of Major-General (1st March, 1952).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) H. H. C. Sugden, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Chief Engineer, B.A.O.R., with the temporary rank of Major-General (August, 1952).

FAR EAST LAND FORCES.—Colonel (temporary Brigadier) E. K. G. Sixsmith, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Far East Land Forces, with the temporary rank of Major-General (April, 1952).

Major-General L. E. C. M. Perowne, C.B.E., A.M.I.E.E., appointed Commander, South Malaya District, and Major-General, Brigade of Gurkhas (May, 1952).

WASHINGTON.—Major-General W. H. Stratton, C.B., C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Commander, British Army Staff, and Military Member, British Joint Services Mission, Washington (18th January, 1952). Substituted for the notification in the November, 1951, JOURNAL.

**SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT.**—General Sir Gerald W. R. Templer, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., to be specially employed, ceasing to be remunerated from Army Funds (5th February, 1952).

#### PROMOTIONS

*Lieut.-General.*—Major-General to be Lieut.-General:—Sir Terence S. Airey, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.B.E. (22nd January, 1952).

Major-Generals to be temporary Lieut.-Generals:—F. W. Festing, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (6th February, 1952); F. Harris, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., M.B., Q.H.S. (1st April, 1952).

*Major-Generals.*—Temporary Major-Generals, Brigadiers, or Colonels to be Major-Generals:—L. E. C. M. Perowne, C.B.E., A.M.I.E.E. (11th January, 1952); G. C. Humphreys, C.B.E. (22nd January, 1952).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals:—G. E. MacAlevey, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (13th December, 1951); S. Lamplugh, C.B.E. (1st March, 1952); E. H. Hall, O.B.E., M.B. (1st April, 1952); W. H. D. Ritchie, C.B.E. (11th April, 1952).

#### RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired:—Major-General N. V. Watson, C.B., O.B.E. (20th March, 1952); Major-General J. L. P. Haines, C.B.E. (26th March, 1952); Major-General G. N. Wood, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (9th May, 1952).

#### ARMY ESTIMATES, 1952-53

The gross expenditure provided for in the Army Estimates for 1952-53 was £585,970,000, reduced by estimated appropriations-in-aid of over £64,000,000 to a net figure of £521,500,000 which will be revised in the light of the Army's share in the economic aid from the United States.

The main headings of Army expenditure in 1952-53 (taking the net figures after deductions of itemized appropriations-in-aid) will be:—

Pay, etc., of the Army	£110,000,000
Stores (an increase of £81,660,000)	£134,000,000
Pay of Civilians	£45,610,000
Supplies, etc. (an increase of £5,860,000)	£42,000,000
Works, building and lands	£28,000,000
Movements (an increase of £6,530,000)	£22,770,000
Non-effective services (a decrease of £1,280,000)	£18,000,000
Reserve Forces, Territorial Army, Home Guard and Cadet Forces (an increase of £4,560,000)	£13,640,000

Vote A provides for the Army in 1952-53 a maximum strength of 555,000, an increase of 28,000 over 1951-52. Of the total strength in 1952-53 there will be 336,500 in garrisons in Europe, including the United Kingdom, and 202,500 in garrisons outside Europe. There will also be 6,000 on temporary release leave, and the Vote includes an extra 10,000 to cover possible temporary excesses over the numbers as estimated above.

The heavier spending on stores is accounted for by the development of rearmament, while the increased expenditure on movements and supplies is attributed to rising prices and the fact that more troops than before are serving abroad.

The increase in the Vote for the Reserve Forces, etc., is accounted for by the formation of the Home Guard, estimated to cost £1,000,000 in the coming year, and by the growth of the Supplementary Reserve and the Territorial Army, mainly through National Service men joining on completing their two years of full-time service.

The memorandum on the estimates by the Secretary of State for War published on 26th February stressed that because of the critical position of the national finances the expected increase in the output of military equipment for 1951-52 had not been realized. Production of the Centurion tank was, however, increasing and during 1952-53 new weapons and equipment would begin to reach the troops. Particular attention had been given in 1951-52 to the modernizing of war-time weapons and equipment, especially to anti-aircraft weapons; to the rebuilding of army vehicles (nearly 50,000 having been rebuilt); and to the standardization of equipment and spare parts between the three Services and also between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Powers and Commonwealth countries.

The memorandum states that National Service men and Short Service men are now taking Regular engagements at about three times the rate they did in 1950. The total enlistments in 1951 from all sources on normal engagements are shown as having been 25,330, compared with 22,125 in 1950; and since the introduction of the new rates of pay the number of Regular soldiers extending their service to complete 12 years has been multiplied by five, and the number re-engaging to complete 22 years has risen by 40 per cent. Among further measures to encourage recruiting, it was proposed to amend the Army Act to allow men to enlist for a career engagement of 22 years from the start of their service, with the right to leave the Army at three yearly intervals.

#### THE KING'S TROOP, R.H.A.

The War Office announced on 14th March that at Her Majesty's special wish The King's Troop of the Royal Horse Artillery should retain, throughout her reign, its present title as a permanent record of His late Majesty's interest in the Troop.

#### THE QUEEN'S COMPANY, 1ST BATTALION, GRENADIER GUARDS

The War Office has announced that, at the express wish of Her Majesty, The King's Company, 1st Battalion, Grenadier Guards, has been redesignated "The Queen's Company."

#### SECOND BATTALIONS FOR SEVEN REGIMENTS

On 31st January, the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Head, announced in the House of Commons that each of the following regiments would have a second battalion:—The Green Howards, The Lancashire Fusiliers, The Royal Welch Fusiliers, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, The Black Watch, The Sherwood Foresters, and The Durham Light Infantry. These battalions are now in the process of formation.

#### ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, SANDHURST

In order to reduce the lapse of time between the dates of sitting the Civil Service Commissioners examination for entry to the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and entry to Sandhurst, it has been decided that the period of other rank training shall be reduced from 17 weeks to 11 weeks. This will come into operation in respect of candidates for the February, 1952, examination who, in consequence, will be able to enter Sandhurst in September, 1952, instead of in March, 1953, if they wish to do so.

As it has only been possible to give very short notice of this change of policy parents or guardians may choose whether their sons enter Sandhurst in September, 1952, or, as originally planned, in March, 1953. Parents who wish to send their sons to the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in September are asked to communicate with War Office, A.G.1 (Offrs) C, immediately they hear the results of the written part of the Civil Service Commissioners examination. Arrangements will then be made to send these boys to the Regular Commissions Board early. The dates on which boys will be required to enter the Army for their other rank training will be, for the September entry approximately 19th June, and for the March entry approximately 4th December.



## PEACE CODE OF PROMOTION

The War Office announced on 19th March that a peace code of promotion for other ranks would be introduced with effect from 1st April, 1952. No ranks granted to warrant officers and n.c.o.s since the outbreak of the war in 1939 have been permanent. The War Office promised some two years ago that they would, as soon as possible, re-introduce permanent promotion. Specifically, last October, by which time all warrant officers and n.c.o.s knew the permanent rank which they would receive, the Army was told that these permanent ranks would be introduced on the 1st April, 1952. Paid acting rank would also be granted to any man doing a job higher than his permanent rank.

The main effect of the measure will be to give security in their rank to the majority of regular warrant officers and n.c.o.s. The permanent ranks granted to a small proportion of warrant officers and n.c.o.s will be lower than the ranks they are at present holding, but if they are doing a job which carries a higher rank they will, as has been indicated, receive paid acting rank.

## FORMATION OF BOYS' BATTALION

The War Office announced on 29th February the formation of an infantry regimental boys' battalion of the Regular Army. It is distinct from the Cadet Forces, which are not part of the armed forces of the Crown. Its aim is to produce soldiers of high calibre who will later become Regular warrant officers and n.c.o.s. of the Infantry of the Line.

Four hundred and fifty boys between the ages of 15 and 17½ will eventually be under training in the battalion which formed at Tuxford Camp, Nottinghamshire, on 15th April. The battalion is organized as a normal military unit, but special attention is being given to educational instruction and the encouragement of sports and hobbies. Military training, coupled with carefully graduated educational courses, is designed to fit the boys for positions of responsibility and leadership.

A boy of school leaving age may join the battalion at any recruiting office or regimental depot by enlisting in the Regular Army and nominating the regiment of his choice. His terms of service are that he will serve with the Colours up to the age of 18, and thereafter for eight years with the Colours and four on the Reserve, or for 12 years with the Colours. On arrival in the battalion a boy will spend his first month in the elementary training platoon so that he can become accustomed to army life. His educational and military training will then take him up to the age of 17½, when he joins his Regular regiment.

During his training a boy will have 10 weeks' leave and three free travel warrants every year. His pay will rise from 2s. 6d. a day on enlistment to 4s. a day after his second year. It is hoped to arrange special days for parents to visit the camp so that they may see for themselves conditions under which the boys live. Parents will be encouraged to write to the commanding officer about their son's welfare or future.

## WOMEN'S ROYAL ARMY CORPS

H.M. THE QUEEN.—An Army Order issued on 7th April stated that the Secretary of State for War had it in command from The Queen to convey to all ranks of the Women's Royal Army Corps that Her Majesty regretted that circumstances have made it necessary on her Accession to the Throne for her to relinquish the rank of Honorary Brigadier which she held, and thus sever the direct link which she retained with the Corps. Her Majesty will continue to watch with pride and interest the future of the Corps in which she served during the War.

STAFF COLLEGE.—The names of 24 W.R.A.C. officers (12 per course) selected to attend the third and fourth courses at the W.R.A.C. Staff College, commencing respectively on 17th July, 1952, and 15th January, 1953, were announced by the War Office on 4th April.

## STAFF APPOINTMENTS IN THE TERRITORIAL ARMY

The War Office announced on 22nd March that Territorial staff officers are urgently needed to meet the rapid expansion of Territorial Army Field Force Headquarters. Ex-officers and members of the Reserve of Officers who have had staff experience are invited to volunteer for service in second or third grade staff appointments. Selected applicants, who must be under the age of 42 and physically fit, will be commissioned in the Territorial Army in their old regiments or corps. The initial tour of duty of three years may, in certain circumstances, be extended with the consent of the volunteer.

The appointments provide an opportunity for keen volunteers to assume considerable responsibility for the effective peace-time training of the growing formation headquarters. Much will depend upon their enthusiasm, and readiness to meet the ever-increasing calls likely to arise beyond their minimum training obligation of 15 days at camp and 30 one-hour training periods. In certain cases attendance at camp may be reduced to eight days, provided that the balance is made up at week-end camps or in hourly training periods.

For complete days of training, officers will be eligible for full army pay and, for periods of hourly attendance, a training expense allowance is payable. Details of conditions of service and application forms may be obtained from Command H.Qs., T.A. Formation H.Qs., or from County Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations.

## WAR OFFICE WAR MEMORIAL

On 24th January, the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Head, unveiled at the War Office a Memorial to 400 members of the civilian staff of the War Department who lost their lives in the late War. The service of dedication was performed by the Chaplain General to the Forces, the Rev. Canon V. J. Pike.

## MISCELLANEOUS

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR VISITS B.A.O.R.—The Secretary of State for War, Mr. Head, visited B.A.O.R. between 15th and 21st April. The object of his visit was to see the troops and to discuss some of their problems with the Commander-in-Chief.

TOUR OF THE C.I.G.S.—Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, left London by air on 2nd April for New York on a fortnight's tour of the United States, where he gave a series of lectures at United States military establishments.

PRIVILEGE FOR THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS.—A request from the Coldstream Guards to be allowed the privilege of marching through the City of London with drums beating, Colours flying, and bayonets fixed has been granted by the Lord Mayor and Aldermen.

RETURN OF 1ST BATTALION, ROYAL FUSILIERS.—After 30 years of continuous service overseas the 1st Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, returned to this Country on 2nd April.

## DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

## CANADA

APPOINTMENTS.—Brigadier J. M. Rockingham, C.B.E., D.S.O., from Commander, 25th Infantry Brigade Group in Korea, has been appointed Director-General of Military Training.

Brigadier M. P. Bogert, D.S.O., O.B.E., has been appointed Commander, 25th Infantry Brigade Group.

OFFICER TRAINING OF UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATES.—Seventy-four university undergraduates, drawn from third year students about to undergo the third practical phase of their Canadian Officers' Training Corps training, are being sent to Europe this Summer to train with the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group.

**NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE.**—Five officers of the directing staff and 24 students from the National Defence College, Kingston, arrived in London on 1st April on a European-Middle East tour. After two weeks in London, one group, after spending another week visiting industrial centres in Britain, left for a tour of western European countries; the other group is touring the Middle East. The whole party returns to Canada on 28th May.

**RESERVISTS SUMMER TRAINING.**—More than 12,000 Reservists are expected to take part in Summer training at army camps all over Canada. In 1951, the number of officers and men who attended these camps was 11,839.

### AUSTRALIA

**TRAINING OF ARMY PILOTS.**—It has been announced by the Minister for the Army, Mr. Joseph Francis, that the Army will train its own pilots for reconnaissance, communications, and air medical evacuation work. The pilots, who will be volunteer junior officers and n.c.o.s of suitable standard drawn from all arms and services of the Regular Army and Citizen Military Forces and cadets from Duntroon, will eventually provide a pool from which the Army can man R.A.A.F. light aircraft units with its own pilots having intimate knowledge of the Army's tactical requirements. The new scheme will be in addition to, and an extension of, the present training in flying of artillery observation officers at the R.A.A.F. Station at Canberra.

**WOMEN FOR AUSTRALIAN ARMY.**—The Minister for the Army has announced that 3,000 women will be admitted to a new Citizen Military Force component of the Women's Royal Australian Army Corps and 900 to a citizen branch of the Women's Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps.

**THE CENTURION TANK.**—Centurion tanks are being issued to the Royal Australian Armoured Corps. The advent of this tank in Australia, with its heavy weight and large size, creates formidable problems of movement by road, rail, and sea.

### NEW ZEALAND

#### NEW CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF

The New Zealand Minister of Defence announced on 29th February that Brigadier W. G. Gentry had been appointed Chief of the New Zealand General Staff as from 1st April, 1952, in succession to Major-General K. L. Stewart.

### PAKISTAN

#### PRESENTATION TO THE SCHOOL OF INFANTRY, WARMINSTER

The Regimental Crests of the Infantry Regiments of the Pakistan Army were presented to the School of Infantry, Warminster, by Major-General M. Hayaud Din, on behalf of the Pakistan Army, at a brief but impressive ceremony which took place at Warminster on 12th March, 1952. The Crests which have been presented to mark the comradeship that exists between the Pakistan and the British Armies, are to find their place alongside the Crests of the British Infantry Regiments already displayed in the main lecture hall of the School.

### FOREIGN

#### UNITED STATES

##### TOUR OF SENIOR OFFICERS IN CANADA

Eighteen senior United States Army officers arrived in Canada on 30th March for a seven-day tour of central Canadian military and industrial installations. The purpose of the tour, the second of its kind, was to show these officers practices and procedures of the Canadian Army and to give them an overall picture of Canada's productive capacity and industrial potential.

## AIR NOTES

### HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN'S MESSAGE TO HER AIR FORCES

The following gracious message from Her Majesty the Queen was received by the Secretary of State for Air on 12th February :—

"On my accession to the Throne, I wish to assure my Air Forces at home and overseas of my gratitude for their services to my beloved Father and of my confidence in their loyalty and efficiency. My Father won his wings as a young man and watched with pride the rapid development of the Royal Air Force and its sister forces throughout the Commonwealth. I was glad to be able to present his Colour to the Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom last year, and I value highly my own association with the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

"In a short time, the Air Forces of the Commonwealth, by their skill and courage, have earned a reputation and established traditions of which they may well be proud. Their heroic exploits in the second World War will never be forgotten. Now in far-flung stations over the world, they play a constant, and always hazardous, part in protecting the security of our territories and communications.

"I assure them of my personal solicitude for their welfare and I trust that they will continue to display that pride of service and unswerving allegiance to the Crown which they have ever shown.

"ELIZABETH R."

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

TO BE BATH KING OF ARMS.—Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.

#### HIS LATE MAJESTY KING GEORGE VI

APPOINTED ADDITIONAL AIDE-DE-CAMP TO THE LATE KING.—Air Commodore Finlay Crerar, C.B.E., Royal Auxiliary Air Force (8th January, 1952).

APPOINTED HONORARY PHYSICIANS TO THE LATE KING.—Air Commodore F. E. Lipscombe, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., D.P.H., D.T.M. & H. (18th January, 1952); Air Commodore R. H. Stanbridge, O.B.E., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., D.P.M., D.I.H. (26th January, 1952).

#### APPOINTMENTS

AIR MINISTRY.—Air Vice-Marshal R. L. Ragg, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C., appointed Director-General of Personnel (II) (February, 1952).

Air Vice-Marshal Sir Harry Broadhurst, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C., appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations) (May, 1952).

Air Vice-Marshal F. J. Fressanges, C.B., appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence) (May, 1952).

HOME COMMAND.—Air Marshal Sir Ronald Ivelaw-Chapman, K.B.E., C.B., D.F.C., A.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (31st March, 1952).

SECOND TACTICAL AIR FORCE. Air Commodore J. H. Edwardes-Jones, C.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C., A.D.C., appointed Senior Air Staff Officer with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (1st March, 1952).

FLYING TRAINING COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal A. Hesketh, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., appointed Air Officer in charge of Administration (April, 1952).



Air Vice-Marshal F. W. Long, C.B., appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 23 Group (March, 1952).

COASTAL COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal T. C. Traill, C.B., O.B.E., D.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 19 Group (February, 1952).

MIDDLE EAST AIR FORCE.—Air Vice-Marshal G. R. C. Spencer, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Senior Air Staff Officer (March, 1952).

Air Commodore H. W. Heslop, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.R.Ae.S., appointed Senior Technical Staff Officer, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (March, 1952).

BRITISH FORCES, ADEN.—Air Vice-Marshal D. Macfadyen, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Air Officer Commanding (March, 1952).

#### PROMOTIONS

*To be acting Air Vice-Marshals.*—Air Commodore H. P. Fraser, C.B.E., A.F.C. (9th January, 1952); Air Commodore L. Dalton-Morris, C.B.E. (1st March, 1952); Air Commodore J. H. Edwardes-Jones, C.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C., A.D.C. (1st March, 1952).

#### RETIREMENTS

Air Marshal Sir Aubrey B. Ellwood, K.C.B., D.S.C., is placed on the Retired List (29th January, 1952).

Air Marshal Sir Charles R. Steele, K.C.B., D.F.C., is placed on the Retired List on account of medical unfitness for Air Force service (26th February, 1952).

Air Vice-Marshal F. F. Inglis, C.B., C.B.E., is placed on the Retired List at his own request (29th March, 1952).

#### AIR ESTIMATES

The net expenditure provided for the Royal Air Force for 1952-53 amounts to £467,640,000, which shows an increase of £138,890,000 on the corresponding figure for the 1951-52 Estimates. It provides for a maximum of 315,000 officers, airmen, and airwomen compared with 270,000 for the previous year.

In the memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates Lord De L'Isle and Dudley made the following points: the programme for the coming financial year provides for an increase in the front line strength, considerably larger than in 1951-52, and preparations for further expansion. The most urgent requirements of the R.A.F. will have first call on the national resources.

Nearly all the day interceptor squadrons in Fighter Command have the latest marks of Meteor aircraft; the Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons all have jet aircraft and the re-equipment of night fighter squadrons with jet aircraft is almost complete. The first Canberra squadrons have been formed in Bomber Command and more will follow in 1952. The medium bomber force will be made up of Washingtons and Lincolns until such later types as the Valiant come into service. More squadrons of Washingtons have been formed. In Coastal Command new squadrons are being formed with Shackletons and also with Neptunes which are being supplied by the U.S.A.

The largest expansion is taking place in the Second Tactical Air Force, which will include squadrons of Venoms.

The strength of the United States Air Force in this Country has been increased by the addition of fighter squadrons, and fighter squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force are also stationed here and are training with Fighter Command. During the past year the R.A.F. squadrons have had more training than ever before in peace.

#### OPERATIONS

R.A.F. SUNDERLANDS IN THE KOREAN WAR.—Royal Air Force Sunderland flying-boats operating from a base at Iwakuni, in Japan, have now flown about a thousand missions

in support of the United Nations effort in the Korean war. The length of each mission is between 10 and 12 hours, and their tasks range from the rescue of "ditched" aircrews, searches for enemy minefields, and patrol of United Nations convoy routes, to routine weather reconnaissance and V.I.P. ferrying flights.

**HELICOPTERS IN MALAYA.**—Two Royal Air Force helicopters were used recently to evacuate native estate workers and their families, and some sick and wounded members of the Security Forces from the Belum Valley, Perak. In forty-minute flights the helicopters accomplished a journey which would otherwise have taken ten days hard going on the ground.

**ANTI-SHIFTA OPERATIONS IN ERITREA.**—For the past two years the Royal Air Force has successfully assisted the Infantry and the Eritrean Police Field Force in freeing the country of wide-spread banditry.

**FOOD DROPPED TO VILLAGES IN JOHORE.**—A Royal Air Force Dakota of the Far East Transport Wing recently parachuted more than a ton of food to floodbound villagers at Mawai in South Johore. Other R.A.F. aircraft also assisted by dropping mail to isolated communities and by dropping officers to take charge of marooned military convoys.

#### FLIGHTS

**FLIGHTS FROM ROYAL AIR FORCE FLYING COLLEGE.**—Students completing their year's training course at Manby, accompanied by members of the staff, recently carried out a series of flights to Canada, Alaska, New Zealand, Australia, the United States, and Japan and back. While in Japan some of the students were given the opportunity of observing air operations in Korea.

**TRAINING FLIGHT TO CANADA AND BACK.**—Four Lincoln aircraft of R.A.F. Central Navigation and Control School, Shawbury, carried out a 10,000-mile training flight to Canada and back at the end of February.

**RECORD CANBERRA FLIGHT.**—A Canberra jet aircraft, piloted by Squadron Leader L. C. E. De Vigne and navigated by Flight Lieutenant P. A. Hunt, on 18th February flew from London Airport to Castel Benito, Tripoli, in the record time of 2 hrs. 43 mins. 48.4 secs. The distance flown was 1,451.42 miles and the speed 538.13 m.p.h.

#### EXERCISES

##### EXERCISE IN CANAL ZONE

A three days' exercise took place at the end of February in the Canal Zone under the direction of Air Vice-Marshal D. F. W. Atcherley, A.O.C., No. 205 Group. The exercise was designed to practise bomber and fighter formations, and to give experience to pilots, aircrew radar control, and reporting staffs.

#### TRAINING

**SECRETARY OF STATE TAKES PARADE.**—The Secretary of State for Air, Lord De L'Isle and Dudley, V.C., took the graduation parade of flight cadets at the R.A.F. College, Cranwell, on 9th April. The general duties cadets had received their wing badges the day before from Air Marshal Sir Alick Stevens, A.O.C.-in-C., Coastal Command.

**FLYING TRAINING EXPANSION.**—A major expansion of the Royal Air Force flying training organization is now taking place in order to produce about 3,000 fully trained aircrew in the coming year. It includes the opening of eleven new flying schools; and new instructional aircraft are to be delivered to Flying Training Command to train aircrews for the expanding operational commands of the R.A.F.

**AIRBORNE TRAINING IN CANAL ZONE.**—Since the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group moved from Cyprus to the Suez Canal Zone, a fully equipped Airborne Training Centre has been created on the shores of the Great Bitter Lake to undertake

the continuation training of the Brigade's troops. Training is conducted under the direction of R.A.F. officers and n.c.o.'s who have been detached from No. 1 Parachute Training School, and who work in close co-operation with the Brigade officers.

#### RESERVES

**CALL UP OF RESERVISTS.**—4,700 Class G Reservists of the Control and Reporting Organization will be called up in eight training periods between 31st May and 20th September. They will be mainly ex-radar operators and radar and wireless fitters. About 800 ex-officers with a knowledge of these and similar subjects will also be called up for training during this period.

**NEW AGE LIMIT FOR ROYAL AUXILIARY AIR FORCE AND ROYAL AIR FORCE VOLUNTEER RESERVE.**—Officers and airmen can now serve in the ground branches of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve up to the age of 60. As a consequence of this decision men up to the age of 55 with previous service, or 50 without previous service, can now volunteer for service in these reserves.

**A.T.C. AND COMBINED CADET FORCE.**—During 1951, 689 cadets were given overseas flights to the United States, Canada, the Far East, North Africa, and to Germany. There were 351 flying scholarship awards and 1,221 cadets qualified to fly gliders. The total number of cadets rose by over 1,000.

During the year, 9,355 ex-A.T.C. and C.C.F. boys joined the R.A.F., either as Regulars or as National Service men. Of these, 8,298 were accepted for ground duties and 1,057 became aircrew.

**FLYING BADGE FOR A.T.C. CADETS.**—A.T.C. cadets who qualify for their private pilot's licence under the Air Ministry flying scholarships scheme are to receive a specially designed flying badge.

#### ORGANIZATION

##### NEW GROUP FORMED IN FIGHTER COMMAND

A new Group—No. 81—has been formed to direct training activities in Fighter Command. No. 81 Group, which has temporary headquarters at R.A.F. Station, Watnall, will be responsible for the fighter Operational Conversion Units, for the training of staff for the Control and Reporting system, and for some other training activities formerly controlled by the operational fighter groups. Royal Auxiliary Air Force Units will remain under the control of the operational groups.

#### MATERIEL

##### NEW LONG-RANGE BOMBER FORCE

In the House of Lords on 3rd April, Lord De L'Isle and Dudley, Secretary of State for Air, said that the four-engined jet bomber, the Valiant, which would soon be flying, would form the foundation of Britain's re-equipped long-range bomber force.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

**C.A.S. CONFERENCE.**—The Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, held a conference at Old Sarum between 24th and 28th March. It was attended by senior officers of S.H.A.P.E., Allied Air Forces Central Europe, Commonwealth Air Forces, the United States Air Force, members of the Air Council, Commanders-in-Chief and other senior officers of the Royal Air Force, officers and officials of the Air Ministry, Ministries of Defence and Supply, the Royal Navy, and the Army.

**MISSION TO THE ROYAL AIR FORCE.**—A large scale mission to the Royal Air Force began its opening phase on 1st March, and will last until 9th November. Head of the Mission is the Chaplain-in-Chief of the R.A.F., the Rev. Canon L. Wright. Over 300 members of the clergy, including 25 bishops of the Church of England, are taking part.

**VISIT BY DIRECTOR OF W.R.A.F. TO CANAL ZONE.**—During the first week in March, Air Commandant N. M. Salmon visited units in the Canal Zone at which members of the Women's Royal Air Force are stationed.

**TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF R.A.F. REGIMENT.**—On 1st February, the Royal Air Force Regiment celebrated its tenth anniversary.

**R.A.F. MOUNTAIN RESCUE UNITS' EXERCISE.**—Officers and airmen from R.A.F. Mountain Rescue Units in Great Britain took part in a 14-day meet in the Cairngorms in February to obtain experience of severe weather and snow conditions. Their training included ski-ing.

**MANAGEMENT COURSES.**—Courses in senior trade management have now been started.

**TROPICAL FLYING CONDITIONS INVESTIGATED.**—During the past three years No. 1301 Meteorological Flight, based at Negombo, in Ceylon, has covered nearly half a million square miles of the Indian Ocean, investigating monsoon and tropical weather conditions.

**VISIT OF SWEDISH AIR CADETS TO R.A.F. COLLEGE.**—A party of 20 cadets of the Swedish Royal Air Force visited the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, for a week during April.

**LLOYDS CUP.**—The Lloyds Cup for rifle shooting was won last year by No. 1 (Armoured Car) Squadron, now serving with the Second Tactical Air Force in Germany.

**SEAGER CUP.**—The Seager Cup, awarded annually by the British Gliding Association for the best two-seater gliding flight of the year, has been awarded to Flight Lieutenant Charman Thomas for his out and return flight last July of 4½ hours, during which he flew a distance of 64 miles.

## DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

### CANADA

**PRESENTATION OF WINGS TO FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER.**—On 14th February, Air Marshal Curtis, Chief of the Air Staff, presented Earl Alexander with R.C.A.F. pilot's wings at a ceremony at Government House to note the many hours that the former Governor-General flew with the R.C.A.F. and as a mark of the esteem in which he is held by all Service personnel.

**OPENING OF NEW FLYING TRAINING SCHOOLS.**—Two new flying training schools have been opened this year—one at R.C.A.F. Station, Macdonald, Manitoba, to move to Portage La Prairie later in the year; and another at Calgary to move to Moose Jaw in the Autumn.

**CREATION OF A GROUND DEFENCE BRANCH.**—A new Branch has now been formed, which will be responsible for the organization, planning, and training of all aspects of defence within the R.C.A.F.

### AUSTRALIA

**GOVERNORS ACCEPT R.A.A.F. RANK.**—The Governors of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia have accepted appointments as honorary air commodores of Citizen Air Force squadrons.

**ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE PROGRAMME.**—In a statement in the House of Representatives on 21st February, Mr. P. A. M. McBride, the Minister for Defence, said that the approved plan for the Royal Australian Air Force in peace provided for a force of 17 squadrons, including Citizen Air Force squadrons; and that the Active Reserve had been established with an approved ceiling of 10,000. He also said that the planned total strength of the R.A.A.F. (other than the General Reserve) was 33,637, including



16,794 permanent Air Force, 1,843 Citizen Air Force, the Active Reserve of 10,000, and, in addition, 5,000 National Service men who would be undergoing training at the end of 1953.

**RECORD FLYING TIME TO AUSTRALIA.**—A jet Canberra aircraft flying from England to Australia carried out the journey in 20 hours 20 minutes flying time. This is a record. The trip was made in four stages.

**SABRE JETS FOR R.A.A.F.**—The new Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal J. D. Hardman, said in Adelaide that the Royal Australian Air Force would be receiving British Sabre jet fighters powered by British Rolls Royce Avon jet engines next year.

**R.A.A.F. FIGHTER WING FOR MIDDLE EAST.**—After discussion with the United Kingdom Government, the Australian Government has decided to send a Fighter Wing to the Middle East in about July to join the R.A.F. in that area. It will be No. 78 Fighter Wing, equipped with Vampire jet fighters.

**R.A.A.F. METEORS IN KOREA.**—Pilots of No. 77 Squadron, R.A.A.F., operating in Korea, have flown more than 4,000 sorties against the Communists since they have been equipped with Meteor 8 jet aircraft.

## FOREIGN

### EGYPT

#### WITHDRAWAL OF TRAINEES

All Egyptian personnel who have been training in the U.K. have been withdrawn to Egypt and no further training is envisaged while the present situation lasts. The withdrawal was initiated by the Egyptian Government.

### FINLAND

#### ORDER FOR ADVANCED TRAINERS

The Finnish Government has placed an order with the State Aircraft Factory at Tampere (Tammerfors) for 30 Vihuri advanced trainers for the Finnish Air Force. It is hoped that the first two will be delivered this year and the rest next year. The Vihuri is a Finnish-built and designed single-engined advanced trainer, powered by a Bristol Mercury engine, built under licence. The Finnish Air Force is very short of new aircraft.

### INDONESIA

#### TRAINING IN CIVIL AVIATION

On 9th January, the first contingent of 18 Indonesians arrived in the United Kingdom to begin a two-and-a-half year training course at A.S.T. Hamble.

Those who are successful will return as fully qualified commercial pilots with approximately 300 hours flying. These young men probably represent the best aircrew potential that Indonesia has and will form the hard core of the purely Indonesian Civil Aviation of the future.

### NORWAY

#### RANK DISTINCTIONS

The R.N.A.F. authorities have asked whether the R.A.F. had any objections to their Air Force officers using rank distinctions similar to R.A.F. officers, but with the Norwegian Crown above. The reply was that the R.A.F. had no objection.

## PORTUGAL

## PROPOSED AMALGAMATION OF ARMY AIR FORCE AND NAVAL AIR SERVICE

Proposals for the amalgamation of the Portuguese Army Air Force and Naval Air Service into an Independent Air Force are now under discussion in the National Assembly, but no decision has yet been made with regard to its size and shape. It appears definite that the post of Under-Secretary of State for Air (created in 1950, but never filled) will now be filled, and he will be directly responsible to the Minister of Defence for the administration of the Air Force.

An interesting feature of the proposals is an ambitious plan to expand the Air Force to cover the Overseas Provinces and to this end it is proposed to form five regional commands as follows:—(a) Metropolitan Territory, including Madeira and the Azores; (b) Cape Verde and Portuguese Guinea; (c) Angola, S. Jopo Baptista de Ajuda, and the Islands of S. Tome and Principe; (d) Mozambique; (e) Goa, Macau, and Timor.

Owing to financial restrictions it is unlikely that any definite steps will be taken to augment this plan for some considerable time. It is intended, however, to go ahead with the appointment of regional commanders.

## RUSSIA

AVIATION DAY, 1951.—To the Western World, one of the most interesting events at the Soviet Aviation Day display held at Moscow in July, 1951, was that in which the parade of a large formation of TU.4s (Soviet copy of the American B-29 four-engined bomber which is now in service with the Royal Air Force as the Washington) was led by one larger bomber which appeared to be a scaled-up version of the TU.4. The appearance of this aircraft, presumably a prototype, is a further indication of Soviet development towards a large inter-continental bomber.

Other aircraft which took part in the display were the well-known MIG-15 jet fighter, two new flying-boats designed by Beriev, a new helicopter similar to the Bristol 171, Yak.12 communications high-wing monoplanes, Yak.18 low-wing monoplane trainers, and a number of twin jet light bombers.

PRE-MILITARY AIR TRAINING.—In 1948, the All-Union Voluntary Association for the promotion of Aviation—DOSAV—was formed. Its President, Guards Lieutenant-General of the Air Force, N. P. Kamanin, described the aims of the Society as "the production of well-trained pilots and technicians, wireless operators, experts in armament, in air navigation, installations, radio location and so forth who would, in joining the Air Force, know their job well."

From its inception, DOSAV embarked on a vast recruiting campaign which is believed to have resulted in the formation of Aero clubs in all the large cities and towns of Russia and, probably, thousands of "circles" in collective farms, factories, and educational establishments.

DOSAV's best pupils compete on equal terms with the uniformed service in "sports" aircraft, gliding, and parachuting contests and several world records have been established.

In September, 1951, DOSAV was merged with its army and naval counterparts to form one All-Union Voluntary Association for co-operation with the Army, the Air Force, and the Fleet—DOSAAF. It is believed that one of the main reasons for the amalgamation was the necessity for centralization of command. It will certainly permit of a more flexible control of personnel and a wider choice when selecting candidates for those branches of military activity requiring pupils of the highest standard. It is, thus, likely that the Air branch of DOSAAF will derive great benefit from the amalgamation.

The Aero clubs and circles undoubtedly enable the Soviet Air Force to carry out a careful pre-selection of its future personnel and provide a vast pool of semi-trained air and ground crew. Their activities are of major importance to the S.A.F. and it is likely that they will continue to be its main source of recruitment.

**SALE OF ROLLS ROYCE ENGINES.**—In 1947, as the result of an Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, 30 Rolls Royce Derwent V and 25 Nene I engines were supplied to Russia, it being considered at the time that the possible disadvantages to security were outweighed by the political and economic advantages to be gained.

Sufficient information was supplied to enable installation drawings to be made and a small number of Russian engineers underwent the Rolls Royce maintenance engineers' course. At no time, however, were any production drawings or production data supplied, nor were those taking the course admitted to the production or development departments.

In July, 1948, at the Tushino air display, there appeared for the first time a new swept wing jet fighter which was later to become known as the MIG-15. From the first it was suspected that this new aircraft was powered by a turbo-jet of the Rolls Royce type and the logical assumption that the Russians would choose the higher-powered Nene was later confirmed by the aircraft's reported performance.

In May, 1949, no fewer than 45 MIG-15s were seen together with 30 other aircraft of a similar type, obviously built to the same original specification. This event was of great significance for it meant that, if the assumption on the power plant were correct, the Russians, in two years, had prepared production drawings, completed the necessary tooling-up, overcome the inevitable snags, and were producing these engines from at least one factory.

Later in 1949 the MIG-15 appeared in Germany and in 1950 was being used operationally by the Communist Forces in Korea. Positive identification of the engine became possible and it was learned that, in addition to copying the Nene, the Russians had also developed it to give a greater thrust than 5,000 lb., thereby demonstrating their capabilities in gas turbine design and production.

To appreciate the significance of this exploitation of the Nene by the Russians, it is necessary to study the jet engine position in Russia in 1946. From the Germans they had obtained quantities of JUMO 004B and B.M.W. 003C axial flow engines of approximately 2,000 lb. thrust. The larger German engines, such as the JUMO 012 and the B.M.W. 018 had not reached the production stage and the immediate requirement was for a proven engine of greater thrust to enable the Soviet Air Force to be re-equipped with modern jet aircraft. The Nene met this requirement admirably and, as events have proved, the Russians were not slow to seize this golden opportunity. Meanwhile, it may be assumed that development work on the larger German axial flow units has been proceeding and that these engines will be used to power future Russian aircraft.

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## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

### GENERAL

**The Struggle for Europe.** By Chester Wilmot. (Collins.) 25s.

Mr. Chester Wilmot proved himself, during the war, to be a distinguished and objective broadcaster with an acute appreciation of military strategy and tactics. Now he proves himself to be an equally distinguished historian with an equally acute appreciation of the military aspects of the last war and of the peace which followed it.

This is indeed a brilliant analysis of the later stages of the struggle, set in its true political background. Mr. Wilmot, fortunately for us, has no axe to grind and no reputation that needs bolstering up. And so he can afford to be entirely objective and to analyse the campaign, not from the point of view of any individual commander, but with his eye across the whole continent as the battles raged. It is this detached and critical view which makes his book so valuable a contribution to the history of the war.

He had an unique and unparalleled opportunity to observe. Wherever he went he was welcomed and in consequence he saw all sides and from all angles. After the war, he continued his researches, as much from the German side as from the Allied, and so built up the comprehensive picture which he now presents in his book.

Here, then, is something which we can accept at its face value, a military history written from the angle of complete objectivity. It is not entirely pretty reading and its revelations of inter-Allied quarrels and mutual frustration will not please the palates of those whose mission it is to cover the disagreements with a gloss of pseudo-unanimity. Mr. Wilmot is presenting facts, however unpalatable they may be, and some of the popular heroes of yesterday are sadly shorn of their glamour.

The book is interesting, too, for the lesson it teaches. Basically, it is that the United States, being the only nation powerful enough now to match the U.S.S.R., must be accepted in Europe no matter what mistakes in policy she will make. That she will make them is inevitable, for she is too remote and too young politically to understand or appreciate the fine balance of power on which Europe depends for a just peace. We in Europe have our part, too, to play, for we must accept those mistakes as graciously as possible and try, delicately and diplomatically, to guide the Americans into the path of what is politically desirable in Europe. It is a high price to pay, and a price that is still rising, but it is on our ability and willingness to pay it that the survival of Europe depends.

Mr. Wilmot's book, then, is a model of military history, set in its true factual and political background, and at the same time a most important signpost for the future. No reader can fail to appreciate its challenging message, none can afford to miss so authoritative a survey of the Campaign in Europe.

**The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. Volume IV. 1st October, 1780, to 24th February, 1781.** (Princeton University Press: London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press.) \$10.

This volume carries on the work so well begun already, and over 900 letters are published, dealing with Jefferson's Governorship of Virginia at a time when British pressure by land and sea was mounting to a climax. The recruitment and sustenance of the American field forces were very difficult and financial affairs were almost collapsing. Occasionally a letter or two will touch on speculative matters, but most of this correspondence deals with hard facts concerning boots, leather caps, shirts, gun-powder, the impressment of wagons or the raising of fresh drafts for the militia.

The strict chronological arrangement has been relaxed to allow five most interesting papers (actually written between 1781 and 1816) to be grouped, concerning Arnold's seizure of Richmond in January, 1781. The extraordinary hatred which Arnold aroused



is everywhere in evidence, no matter who writes about him. The general impression is that the Americans were almost exhausted, and it is difficult to realize that in fact they were within a few weeks of victory, as one studies these pathetic attempts to keep almost naked troops in the field. However, the strong character of Washington shows in every one of his letters, brimming with commonsense and determination; there is much correspondence with Baron Steuban, that indefatigable organizer; and the editors most properly draw special attention to some ill-spelt but indomitable letters from Daniel Morgan and Edward Stephens, fighting soldiers indeed. These were genuine revolutionaries, unconquerable men.

Certain despatches mention the arrival of the French Fleet and supplies, so that while we trace Cornwallis's apparently triumphal progress, and Nathanael Greene's masterly retreat, we can also see the surrender at Yorktown foreshadowed and inevitable. It is good to learn that preliminary indexes will be issued.

#### NAVAL

**History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. VII, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls, June, 1942-April, 1944.** By Samuel Eliot Morison. (Oxford University Press.) 42s.

This volume deals with two sharply contrasted campaigns. The Aleutian operations were conducted in one of the world's worst campaigning regions and at a time when the naval resources of the Americans were stretched to the limit. By November, 1943, however, when the assault on the Gilberts began, the Americans had rebuilt the battle fleet destroyed at Pearl Harbour and had eleven fast aircraft carriers fighting in the Pacific. So important were the operations of the carriers, that Professor Morison provides a special introduction describing the technique of operating carrier-borne aircraft. The volume closes with an account of the carrier air raid on Truk in February, 1944, which destroyed its usefulness as a naval base.

The Aleutian islands appear on the map as stepping stones for the invasion of Alaska. Though informed strategists knew this was not a practicable operation of war, the bombing by the Japanese in June, 1942, of Dutch Harbour, the U.S. base at the eastern end of the chain, coupled with the occupation of Kiska and Attu at the Western end, and followed at close remove by shelling of the West coast of the U.S.A. by submarines caused indignation in America. At that date, almost every warship in the Pacific was engaged in the vital South-West area, and there was no alternative but to try to eject the Japanese by bombing. In a region, however, where Summer is a season of persistent fogs and Winter sees the cloud ceiling down almost to sea level, air power alone proved unable to free the islands of the enemy. Recourse was consequently had to blockade. Some amphibious forces eventually became available; and in May, 1943, the by-passing of Kiska and landing on Attu, 175 miles nearer Japan, initiated the American strategy of "leap-frogging" which was adopted in the central Pacific and quickened greatly the speed of advance. Thenceforth the Americans assaulted only those Japanese island strongholds required as bases for further advances, the remainder were by-passed and permanently contained in a state of harmlessness by sea and air power.

The central Pacific campaign was simplified by the inability of the Japanese to employ their fleet in defence. In October, they had stripped their last remaining carrier squadron of its air groups to reinforce Rabaul. This consequently limited a fleet action to the area which shore-based air forces could cover. But the Gilberts-Marshalls air forces had also been drawn upon for the defence of Rabaul, and in the entire area there were no more than 46 aircraft. On the other hand, the American carriers were largely instrumental in enabling Admiral Spruance to do a neat, quick job in the Marshalls. Professor Morison explains the mistakes made at Tarawa, the initial operation in the Gilberts, which were due to lack of experience; but he maintains that since the Pacific Command drew immediate profit from the lessons of those bloodstained beaches, every one of the 3,000 sailors and marines who became casualties saved subsequently at least ten of his countrymen.

The author perpetuates a popular misconception in terming the Aleutians an "Arctic" campaign. Actually, the whole of the Aleutian islands lie between the latitudes of the Thames and Tyne, and even in the coldest month of the Winter the mean temperature is 30°F.

**The Diamond Rock.** By "Sea-Lion." (Hutchinson & Co.) 10s.

The defence of the Diamond Rock, off the South coast of Martinique, is a well enough known exploit of the Navy during the Napoleonic wars. In his new book, "Sea-Lion" has taken the episode as the central theme of a novel and woven round it an attractive story.

His tale is near enough to history in its essentials to be a reasonably accurate description of the garrisoning of the rock and of the denial of the Fours Channel to ships trying to break the blockade of Commodore Samuel Hood in 1804. It would be, perhaps, ungracious in a book of this type to cavil at the inaccuracies, which in any case are minor ones and obviously made deliberately to fit the story. They consist in the main in attributing the various actions to the wrong men and do not, in any case, affect the main historical fact of the occupation and defence of the rock.

For the rest, this is an exciting story, well written and well conceived. It has the authentic touch of the period and the adventure in itself is enough to hold the attention of the reader throughout. "Sea-Lion" is well known as a writer and this latest book from his pen, based as it is on an episode of history that lends itself admirably to treatment as an adventurous tale, should not lack for readers.

#### ARMY

**U.S. Army in World War II. European Theater of Operations Cross Channel Attack.** By Dr. Gordon A. Harrison. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington.) \$5.25.

Dr. Harrison's account of the origin and planning of Operation "Overlord" and of the resulting invasion of Normandy may disappoint British readers, for the author has been set the task of presenting only the American version of an Allied undertaking. His book will be more carefully studied when the British account of these same events is published.

He devotes the first seven chapters to the Anglo-American discussions on strategy in so far as they related to the North-West European theatre of operations and the resulting preparations when the final plan had been approved. The conflicting views of both parties are fairly presented, but the factors which prompted the British to disagree with some of the American concepts are not always fully given. The story makes it clear that if some of the British plans formulated in the years 1940/41 for the "return to Europe" lacked reality on account of the smallness of the forces considered, those suggested by the Americans in the succeeding years suffered from a failure to take into account the immense number and complexity of the mechanical aids required. It is indeed apparent that the Americans, realizing their vast resources in men and materials, would have preferred an earlier and more direct assault on Hitler's "Festung Europa" than that favoured by the British, who were determined if possible to delay this knock-out punch until, in their opinion, it could not fail. They realized that they could stage no second attempt.

The last three chapters tell the story of D-Day and the subsequent operations terminating in the capture of Cherbourg on the 1st July. The account is written in narrative form with the German reactions added in considerable detail, and the operations carried out by the British Second Army summarized to give a picture of the fighting on the whole front. It would seem a pity that, after so much painstaking research, no attempt has been made to draw any conclusions from the many actions described, for several will merit careful study by military students. Not the least of these is the account of the airborne assault by those two fine American formations, 82 and 101 Airborne Divisions. It is moreover to our advantage to be able to compare the plan for the landing on Omaha beach,

where the Americans proved that sheer gallantry was not enough, with those that were more successful on Utah beach and in the British sector.

Fifty-two photographs are included in the text and 25 maps are attached rather too weakly to the end cover. The former give a good picture of the country over which the Americans fought and the latter are clear and well drawn.

**The Story of the Green Howards, 1939-1945.** By Captain W. A. T. Synge. (Published by the Regiment.) 25s.

The services of the six battalions of Green Howards who served overseas are given in some detail in this volume of 428 pages; the activities of units remaining at home are also well recorded. In addition to a clear narrative, with ample marginal references, there is an excellent location chart for the period and a well-designed index. The 21 sketch maps are clear, though not well placed.

The 1st Battalion fought in Norway, Sicily, Italy, and finally in Germany, gaining fresh laurels, especially at Anzio. The 2nd Battalion, stationed in India, served in Waziristan, and took part in the final stages of the Burma Campaign, after having been drained of most of its Regular soldiers. The four Territorial Battalions belonged to the 50th Division, but tragedy overtook the 4th and 5th Battalions who were destroyed when the 150th Infantry Brigade made its magnificent stand in June, 1942. The 6th and 7th, in another brigade, fought their way out of the Gazala position with the rest of the Division to distinguish themselves later in many actions in North Africa, Sicily, and North-West Europe.

Green Howards may well be proud of their story and other readers cannot fail to be thrilled by the examples of heroism and devotion to duty recorded in this book. They may also take note of the county feeling and *esprit-de-corps* which are so apparent. The author rightly contends that the events chronicled need no comment. But he criticizes the system which sent reinforcements to the Regiment from anywhere but Yorkshire; moreover, his narrative shows that the proportion of riflemen in battalion establishments was far too small. There is much in this work which should provide thought by those responsible for infantry organization and the provision of reinforcements in war.

**The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in the Second World War, 1939-1945.** By Sir Frank Fox, O.B.E. (Gale & Polden.) 21s.

The scope of this history is wider than simply to give an account of the actions in which battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers fought in the late war, magnificent and inspiring though such a story would be. Maps on the endpapers show that the Regiment's 1st, 2nd, and 6th battalions between them took part in the fighting in almost every major theatre of war, and the author has taken full advantage of the opportunity which this ubiquity affords him by presenting what is in effect a complete story of the British war effort in the field.

His scheme is to devote a chapter to each campaign and to preface it with an account of the political and strategic considerations which led up to the events he describes. After this introduction, he proceeds to that detailed description of the exploits of the Regiment which is essential to this kind of history. He gives a careful account of the tactics employed in each action and almost every page contains a reference to some personal achievement of gallantry, leadership, or fortitude. The author does not hesitate to make his own very pertinent comments, to "point the moral," and make clear the lessons to be learned, and remembered.

Inniskillings, present and future, will find much military wisdom in this volume, and much to inspire them too in the way the successes of their Regiment are shown to form an integral fact of our final victory. H.R.H. The Duke of Gloucester, Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, has graciously written a foreword to this history. There is an introduction by the Colonel, Brigadier Moore, appendices, and an index. Maps and panoramas amply supplement the text, which is well illustrated by photographs.

**Infantry. An Account of the 1st Gloucestershire Regiment during the War 1914-1918.** By Brigadier-General A. W. Pagan, D.S.O., D.L. (Gale & Polden.) 42s.

This is the intimate story of the famous old 28th Foot, during the years 1915-1917, told by its commanding officer. The author, an enthusiastic infantryman, scorned sickly introspection and enjoyed the war—when he was with the Battalion. His final reflection is: "Service with a good infantry battalion in France was the highest thing attainable during the years 1914-1918." Besides recording events, the narrative gives a vivid picture of life in the "old front line" and in the back areas where every chance to do training was taken—the 28th believed in plenty of steady drill and weapon training. The Battalion served throughout in the 1st Division, and one chapter is devoted to the proposed landing of this formation on the Flemish coast behind the German line in 1917. The operation was not carried out, owing to the failure of Fifth Army, but very thorough preparations were made and the account is most illuminating.

The author occasionally digresses from his narrative to express views, sometimes critical, on events and men. On the other hand, he notes the effect of good billets, of fine weather, and of sporting events on the feelings of all ranks. The 28th Rugby XV was almost unbeaten in these years—the commanding officer was a regular player.

The work consists of a volume of 211 pages, with 15 sketch-maps in a separate case. These include location and trench maps to which reference is facilitated by notes in the margin of the text. The importance of maintaining the fighting spirit of a unit is constantly stressed by military writers. The inexperienced may learn from this witty, soberly written story *how* it can be done in war.

**A History of the 2nd Royal Lancers (Gardner's Horse) 1922-1947.** Compiled by Brigadier E. W. D. Vaughan, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (Published for the Regiment by Sifton Praed and Co. Ltd.)

This regimental history is divided into two parts. Part I, "The years between the wars," begins with an account of the amalgamation, on 1st March, 1922, of the old 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse) and the 4th Cavalry. The title "Royal" was granted on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of His Majesty King George V. It contains a careful chronicle of events as they occurred in the various stations in which the Regiment served during the period 1922-1939. The reader is given the impression of a versatile and happy regiment with an outstanding *esprit de corps*. In his foreword to this part, Major-General Turner refers to "men who have spent the best part of their lives in pursuit of one object only—to maintain, and if possible, increase the renown of their Regiment, Gardner's Horse—in war-time and in peace-time—in every form of training and in every test of field sports."

How successfully this object was attained, and how admirably the Regiment was thereby enabled to endure the worst trials of modern war and remain unshaken, is amply shown in Part II, "World War II to the Partition of India." After "high-pressure mechanization" in 1940, the Regiment went overseas to Egypt as part of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. It fought at El Mechile, against the heavily armoured Afrika Korps, where it lost so great a proportion of its strength that it had to be reconstituted in India, at Ferozepore, in the hot weather of June-August 1941. It was back in Egypt in September. Its next major action was the magnificent stand at Bir Hacheim where it again lost heavily. The Regiment then served in Palestine and Persia and, after a tour of frontier duty as an armoured car Regiment in Waziristan and Kohat, spent 1947 in Malaya.

This fine record of service is the more impressive for being simply told and letting the facts speak for themselves. Each part contains appropriate appendices, and Part II has, in addition, maps to illustrate war-time movements and sketches explanatory of the actions in which the Regiment was engaged.



## ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

(\* Books for Reference in the Library only)

### GENERAL

- THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT.** Volumes I and II. The Years of Preparation. Edited by Elting E. Morrison. Medium 8vo. 1,549 pages. (Harvard University Press, 1951.) 130s. Presented by the Publishers.
- THE ROOSEVELT LETTERS.** Being the Personal Correspondence of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Volume III. 1928-1945. Edited by Elliot Roosevelt. Demy 8vo. 540 pages. (Harrap, 1952.) 30s.
- EISENHOWER.** The man and the Symbol. By John Gunther. Large Post 8vo. 183 pages. (Hamish Hamilton, 1952.) 10s. 6d.
- THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON.** Volume IV. 1st October, 1780, to 24th February, 1781. Edited by Julian P. Boyd. Medium 8vo. 702 pages. (Princeton University Press, 1951.) \$10. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.** United Kingdom Civil Series. **THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE.** Volume I. By W. N. Medlicott. Medium 8vo. 732 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1952.) 35s.
- THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE.** By Chester Wilmot. Crown 8vo. 766 pages. (Collins, 1952.) 25s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- EAST VERSUS WEST.** By Lieut.-General Sir Giffard Martel. Demy 8vo. 220 pages. (Museum Press, 1952.) 12s. 6d.
- UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER.** By F. O. Miksche. Large Post 8vo. 468 pages. (Faber, 1952.) 25s.
- THE "DOUBLE TENTH" TRIAL.** Trial of Sumida Haruzo and Twenty Others. Edited by Colin Sleeman and S. C. Silkin. Demy 8vo. 324 pages. (William Hodge, 1951.) 18s.
- OUR MEN IN KOREA.** By Eric Linklater. Large Post 8vo. 79 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1952.) 5s.
- KOREAN REPORTER.** By René Cutforth. Large Post 8vo. 192 pages. (Allan Wingate, 1952.) 13s. 6d.
- AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950.** By George F. Kennan. Large Post 8vo. 145 pages. (Secker and Warburg, 1952.) 12s. 6d.
- THE BROKEN LINK.** By "Cornet." Demy 8vo. 189 pages. (Geoffrey Bles, 1951.) 12s. 6d.
- A RELUCTANT TRAVELLER IN RUSSIA.** By T. Wittlin. Large Post 8vo. 237 pages. (William Hodge, 1952.) 15s.
- VENTURE TO THE INTERIOR.** By Laurens Van Der Post. Crown 8vo. 240 pages. (Hogarth Press, 1952.) 12s. 6d.
- NO PICNIC ON MOUNT KENYA.** By F. Benuzzi. Large Post 8vo. 231 pages. (William Kimber, 1952.) 15s.
- ALL OVER THE PLACE.** By Compton Mackenzie. Crown 8vo. 292 pages. (Chatto and Windus, 1949.) 18s.
- REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION.** The House of Commons, the Cabinet, and the Civil Service. By H. L. Laski. Crown 8vo. 220 pages. (Manchester University Press, 1951.) 12s. 6d.
- THE CHRONICLES OF FLEETWOOD HOUSE.** By A. J. Shirren. Large Post 8vo. 200 pages. (Published privately, 1951.) 2s. 6d. Presented by the Author.

## NAVAL

- HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II. Volume VII. ALEUTIANS, GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS. June, 1942-April, 1944. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Medium 8vo. 369 pages. (Oxford University Press, 1952.) 42s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- \*LES FLOTTES DE COMBAT 1952. By Henri et J. Le Masson. Large Post 4to. 338 pages. (Société d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritimes et Coloniales, Paris, 1951.) 2,000 francs.
- LORD NELSON AND THE LOSS OF HIS ARM. A monograph. By Henry T. A. Bosanquet. 20 pages. Crown 4to. (Typescript.) Presented by the Author.
- FIVE NAVAL JOURNALS, 1789-1817. Edited by F. S. A. Thursfield. Medium 8vo. 400 pages. (Navy Records Society, Volume XCI, 1951.)
- THE DIAMOND ROCK. By "Sea Lion." Crown 8vo. 231 pages. (Hutchinson, 1952.) 10s. Presented by the Author. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)

## ARMY

- \*THE HISTORY OF THE 7TH MEDIUM REGIMENT, ROYAL ARTILLERY, DURING WORLD WAR II, 1939-45. Demy 8vo. 222 pages. (Historical Committee, R.A., 1951.) Presented by the Committee.
- \*THE STORY OF THE GREEN HOWARDS, 1939-1945. By Captain W. A. T. Synge. Large Post 8vo. 425 pages. (The Green Howards, Richmond, Yorks, 1952.) Presented by the Regiment. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- \*THE ROYAL INNISKILLING FUSILIERS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1945. By Sir Frank Fox. Medium 8vo. 204 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1951.) 21s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- \*INFANTRY. An Account of The 1st Gloucestershire Regiment during the War, 1914-1918. By Brigadier-General A. W. Pagan. Demy 8vo. 211 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1951.) 42s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE SECOND WORLD WAR. NORWAY, THE COMMANDOS, DIEPPE. By Christopher Buckley. Crown 8vo. 276 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1951.) 10s. 6d.
- UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS. CROSS CHANNEL ATTACK. By G. A. Harrison. Super Royal 8vo. 519 pages. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1951.) \$5.25. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- A SOLDIER'S STORY OF THE ALLIED CAMPAIGNS FROM TUNIS TO THE ELBE. By Omar N. Bradley. Medium 8vo. 618 pages. (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1951.) 25s.
- RECALLED TO SERVICE. The War Memoirs of a great French soldier telling the stories of his Missions in the Near East, France, Africa and his arrest by the Gestapo. By General Maxime Weygand. Medium 8vo. 454 pages. (Heinemann, 1952.) 30s.
- THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE WEST. By General Siegfried Westphal. Large Post 8vo. 222 pages. (Cassell, 1951.) 17s. 6d.
- PANZER LEADER. By General Heinz Guderian. Demy 8vo. 528 pages. (Michael Joseph, 1952.) 35s.
- A WAR OF SHADOWS. By W. Stanley Moss. Large Post 8vo. 240 pages. (T. V. Boardman and Co., 1952.) 12s. 6d.
- THE MILL ON THE PO. By Riccardo Bacchelli. Demy 8vo. 590 pages. (Hutchinson, 1952.) 15s.
- ALWAYS INTO BATTLE. Some Forgotten Army Sagas. By Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn. Crown 8vo. 214 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1952.) 10s. 6d.

**A HANDBOOK OF WEAPON TRAINING.** By Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Thornton. Crown 8vo. 322 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1952.) 15s. Presented by the Publishers.

This book makes no claim to be a complete textbook on weapon training, but is intended to give some practical ideas and suggestions on the organization and method of carrying out weapon training in all its branches. While primarily intended for Unit weapon training instructors and staffs, it should also be helpful to all interested in this form of training, including the Home Guard.

**BADGES ON BATTLEDRESS.** Post-War Formation Signs. By Lieut.-Colonel Howard N. Cole. Crown 8vo. 124 pages. (Gale and Polden, Second Edition, 1951.) 7s. 6d. Presented by the Author.

**HERALDRY IN WAR.** Formation Badges, 1939-45. By Lieut.-Colonel Howard N. Cole. Demy 8vo. 290 pages. (Gale and Polden, Third Edition, 1950.) 12s. 6d. Presented by the Author.

**GUIDE TO ARMY OFFICERS' PAY, ALLOWANCES AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS.** By Captain W. B. Wilton. Crown 8vo. 127 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1952.) 5s. Presented by the Author.

This book contains sections dealing with travelling allowances and expenses, bank accounts, investment, insurance, income tax and legal tax reliefs.

#### AIR

**MARINE AVIATION IN THE PHILIPPINES.** By Major Charles W. Boggs, Jr., U.S.M.C. Imperial 8vo. 166 pages. (Historical Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1951.) Presented by the Publishers.

**MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF THE U.S.S.R.** By Charles W. Cain and Denys J. Voaden. Foolsap 8vo. 71 pages. (Herbert Jenkins, 1952.) 3s. 6d.

**HELICOPTERS OF TO-MORROW.** The Rudiments of Rotating Wing Flight. By B. J. Hurren. Crown 8vo. 39 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1938.) 3s.

**MODERN EUROPEAN HELICOPTERS.** By A. H. Lukins. Crown 4to. (George Ronald, 1952.) 3s. 6d.

**THE HELICOPTER, or, Anything a Horse can do.** By H. F. Gregory. Demy 8vo. 271 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1938.) 18s.

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#### NOTE

**EASTERN EPIC. Volume I.** By Compton Mackenzie. We are asked by the publishers, Messrs. Chatto and Windus, to make the following statement :—

"In the light of further information which has since become available to the Author it appears that certain statements in Chapter 29 relating to the Commander of the 22nd (Indian) Infantry Brigade were written under some misapprehension of the true facts and do not accurately represent what took place. The necessary corrections will be incorporated in any further editions of Volume I."

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## ONE HUNDRED - AND - TWENTY - FIRST ANNIVERSARY MEETING

ON TUESDAY, 4TH MARCH, 1952, at 3 p.m.

ADMIRAL SIR HENRY MOORE, G.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., presiding

THE SECRETARY (LIEUT.-COLONEL P. S. M. WILKINSON) read the notice which had appeared in *The Times* of 18th February, 1952, convening the Meeting.

### ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1951

The Council have the honour to present their Annual Report for 1951.

#### COUNCIL

##### VICE-PRESIDENT

Admiral of the Fleet The Earl of Cork and Orrery, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., was elected for a further term as a Vice-President.

##### ELECTED MEMBERS

General Sir Gerald W. R. Templer, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., was elected a Member of the Council in the vacancy caused by the election of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., LL.D. as a Vice-President and later was elected Vice-Chairman of the Council in the place of General The Lord Ismay, P.C., G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O., M.C., resigned.

General The Lord Ismay, P.C., G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O., M.C., resigned from the Council on being appointed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

The following Members, having completed three years service, retire:—

##### Royal Marines—

General Sir Leslie C. Hollis, K.C.B., K.B.E., R.M.

##### Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve—

Captain Rex Janson, V.R.D., R.N.V.R.

##### Regular Army—

\*General Sir Ouvry L. Roberts, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O.

\*Major-General G. P. Walsh, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

##### Territorial Army—

\*Brigadier Sir George S. Harvie-Watt, Bt., T.D., A.D.C., Q.C., D.L., M.P.

\*Brigadier J. A. Longmore, C.B.E., T.D., D.L.

##### Royal Air Force—

\*Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Newall, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., C.B.E., A.M.

\*Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.

Of the above, those marked \* offer themselves for re-election, for which they are eligible.

#### REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS

Captain W. K. Edden, O.B.E., R.N., succeeded Captain R. G. Onslow, D.S.O., R.N., as Admiralty Representative on the Council.



## EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS

The following accepted the Council's invitation to become ex-officio Members of the Council on taking up their appointments :—

Air Vice-Marshal L. Darvall, C.B., M.C., Commandant of the Joint Services Staff College.

Captain R. A. Currie, D.S.C., R.N., Director of the Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich.

Major-General G. W. Lathbury, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E., Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley.

Air Vice-Marshal A. D. Gillmore, C.B.E., Commandant of the Royal Air Force Staff College.

## HONORARY MEMBERS

General Sir Pierre van Ryneveld, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., accepted the invitation of the Council to become an Honorary Member (South Africa).

General M. Ayub Khan accepted the invitation of the Council to become an Honorary Member (Pakistan).

## MEMBERSHIP

The total number of members on the roll at the end of 1951 was 6,310 compared with 6,263 in 1950. During the year 280 Members joined the Institution as compared with 345 in 1950. The following shows comparative figures for the past five years :—

Year	Joined		Total	Re- signed	Deceased		Struck off	Total
	Annual	Life			Annual	Life		
1951 ...	224	56	280	125	49	35	24	233
1950 ...	289	56	345	126	41	50	21	238
1949 ...	397	103	500	185	58	64	57	364
1948 ...	449	128	577	270	44	29	35	378
1947 ...	407	276	683	390	63	31	36	520

The details of Members joining during the year 1951 are as follows :—

Regular Army ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	134
Royal Air Force ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	69
Royal Navy ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	23
Pakistan Forces ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	15
Territorial Army ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	10
Dominion Forces... ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	8
Indian Forces ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8
W.R.A.C. ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5
Royal Marines ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3
Royal Naval Reserve ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2

280

## COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Revenue Account shows the financial benefit to the Institution arising from the co-operation of Members who covenant to pay their subscription. A Council resolution in October, 1951, approved that all second and subsequent annual covenants may be executed at the rate of £1 5s. 0d. while the standard rate remains at £1 10s. 0d.

At the end of 1951 there were 1,531 annual covenanted subscriptions compared with 1,528 in 1950; and 768 covenanted life subscriptions compared with 772 in 1950.

During 1951, 6 annual covenants were renewed on expiry and 11 life covenants completed the seven year period.

#### FINANCE

The excess of expenditure over income is £905 9s. 8d. compared with a surplus in 1950 of £115 16s. 11d.

Comparisons of the principal items of Receipts and Expenditure are shown below :—

#### RECEIPTS

	1951			1950		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Annual Subscriptions ... ..	5,915	10	6	5,850	7	6
Life Subscriptions (amount brought to credit) ... ..	2,073	4	0	1,961	17	0
Museum ... ..	3,176	13	0	2,527	4	0
Journal Sales ... ..	1,934	17	3	2,180	2	11
Journal Advertisements ... ..	479	2	3	399	18	8
Sales of Catalogues and Pamphlets ... ..	191	3	6	181	9	10
Life Subscriptions (brought to credit) represent £1 10s. 0d. from each Life Member whose payment has not yet been so expended. The balance, in each case, is held in the Life Subscription Fund. A further £1,000 of this Fund has been invested in 3 per cent. Savings Bonds.						

#### EXPENDITURE

	1951			1950		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Salaries ... ..	4,894	5	6	4,534	7	1
Wages and National Insurance ... ..	3,757	9	8	3,580	19	7
Journal Printing ... ..	4,203	17	10	3,583	17	2
Library—Purchase of Books ... ..	368	18	5	331	17	10
Binding ... ..	44	15	6	103	1	6
Fuel ... ..	206	3	2	190	17	2
Lighting and Electric Fires ... ..	451	5	8	496	1	6
General Repairs and Maintenance ... ..	2,213	11	1	1,815	4	7
Other Printing and Stationery ... ..	324	7	8	367	4	5
Museum Expenses ... ..	332	1	11	481	13	5

#### GENERAL REMARKS

The total cost of the redecoration of the interior of the Banqueting House, excluding the ceiling, was £3,000, of which a half was paid in 1950 and the remaining £1,500 has been met out of this year's income.

Other items of non-recurring expenditure which have been paid out of the year's revenue include :—

Special Exhibition in connection with the Festival of Britain, £767 4s. 11d.

Installation of lights for display cases in the Museum, £488 10s. 6d.  
Partial re-rigging of the new model of H.M.S. Victory, £120.

#### JOURNAL

The increased cost of printing during the year has been a matter of concern and has resulted in the necessity to raise the price of the JOURNAL from 7s. 6d. to 10s. for non-Members, with effect from 1st January, 1952.

As the issue of the JOURNAL to Members is covered by their annual subscription of 30s., they are not affected by any change of price made to non-

Members. It therefore follows that membership is a material advantage to those eligible.

The tightness of money and the early warning that the price of the JOURNAL would be raised for non-Members has resulted in a drop of £245 from £2,180 in revenue from this source.

THE JOURNAL has continued to benefit from the many valuable lectures which have been given at the Institution during the year. The number of interesting articles received from contributors has facilitated the maintenance of a high standard.

The balance of the contents of the JOURNAL between the three Services has received careful consideration by the Journal Committee and the Editorial staff. The fact that differences must exist between the Services in numbers of potential authors is obvious, but the action taken by the Journal Committee to bring to the notice of those concerned the necessity for a regular flow of contributions has had beneficial results, which it is hoped will continue.

The invaluable help given by Service Departments, Commandants of Staff Colleges, and by the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry Representatives on the Council in preparing the Lecture Programme, facilitating approval for articles written by serving officers, and advising the Editor in many matters, is gratefully acknowledged.

#### LIBRARY

During the year, 5,645 books were issued on loan to Members, and accessions amounted to 437. Comparative figures for 1950 were 6,058 and 461.

A list of books required by a Member can be registered in the Library and advice will be sent as soon as each book becomes available. Alternatively, a form will be supplied on request to enable a Member to compile his own list for registration.

The supply of information to the Dominions and U.S.A. continues to increase.

#### MUSEUM

H.M. Queen Mary visited the Museum in April and was received by the Chairman of the Council. In the same month the Rubens Ceiling was inspected by The Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee, C.H., M.P., Prime Minister, accompanied by Mrs. Attlee and the Rt. Hon. R. R. Stokes, M.P., Minister of Works.

The Banqueting Hall, which had been in the hands of the Ministry of Works during the winter, was re-opened to visitors on 1st May. The contents of display cases have been re-arranged to afford an all-round view of exhibits and a system of local illumination has been installed.

The collection of native weapons has been removed from the main staircase to the Hall which is now decorated with large oil paintings of Charles I and Inigo Jones, graciously lent by H.M. King George VI. The Royal Standard flown in H.M.S. Vanguard during the Royal Visit to South Africa in 1947 now hangs over the stairway.

A notable event was the replacement of the Rubens panels which had been cleaned and restored under the direction of the Ministry of Works. The Banqueting Hall has been entirely redecorated to tone with the ceiling and has been embellished by the installation of four large period candelabra.

A new notice giving information about the Banqueting Hall and Rubens Ceiling has been placed at the public entrance.

A Special Exhibition was organized in the lecture theatre during the Summer months concurrently with the South Bank Exhibition. The display was not designed to illustrate the last hundred years but the main feature consisted of two specially drawn wall-maps of the world showing by silhouette figures the distribution of H.M. Services in 1851 and 1951. The general theme of the exhibition was the portrayal by tableaux and single pieces of some lesser known scenes and incidents in the history of the Forces. This opportunity is taken to thank again the voluntary helpers for their assistance, especially the British Model Soldiers Society for the remarkable display of selected models from the members' collections.

In view of the heavy increase in the cost of maintenance the Council felt justified in raising the price of admittance for the public from 1s. 6d. to 2s., children at half price, from 1st May. No complaints have been received about the increased charge, nor has there been any indication that it has been the cause of fewer visitors.

During the year ended 31st December, 1951, 33,354 adults and 13,779 children paid for admission to the Museum, compared with 31,546 adults and 11,857 children in 1950. Free admission was given to 5,319 of the Services and to 2,227 members' guests, pupils in school parties, scouts and cadets, and foreign officers attached to H.M. Forces. It is not possible to attribute the increase entirely to one cause, but, judging from the numbers of foreign visitors, some of it was due to the Festival of Britain.

The work of taking stock and examining each exhibit has continued, and further assistance has been given to Regimental Museums by transferring surplus or duplicate items. Special steps have been taken to provide the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Museum with selections of exhibits commemorating the Cavalry, disbanded Irish Regiments and the pre-partition Regiments of the Indian Army. Other establishments to which exhibits have been transferred include the Imperial War Museum, the National Maritime Museum, the Rickmansworth Ethnological Museum and L'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre, Paris.

The Institution is indebted to generous donors for many interesting and valuable gifts to the Museum during the past year. Details of these have been published in the Secretary's Notes in the JOURNAL. On 1st November, General Cariappa, O.B.E., Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, presented on behalf of the Indian Army a handsome case of head-dress badges of pre-partition Regiments that now form part of the Indian Army. The presentation was received by Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, representing the Council and Members of the Institution.

Several of the Florence Nightingale exhibits were lent for a B.B.C. Television charity presentation under the patronage of The Countess Mountbatten at the Warner Theatre. Assistance was also given in the production of the film, "The Lady with the Lamp," and a full screen credit was given to the Institution. Both of these afforded good publicity, which was supplemented by a wide distribution of illustrated leaflets to Shipping and Aircraft Companies, Hotels, Travel Agents at home and abroad, and to other suitable centres. By the end of the year arrangements were complete for a broadcast on 8th January, 1952, from the Museum on both the Home and Overseas Services of the B.B.C.

A visitors research scheme was operated from 1st May to 31st October and showed the following results:—24 per cent. of the visiting public came specially to see the Rubens Ceiling; 20 per cent., the interior of the Banqueting House; and 56 per cent. the Exhibits. 49 per cent came because of historic interest; 16 per cent. on the advice of a previous visitor; 8 per cent. as the result of publicity; and 27 per cent. were casual passers-by.



## ONE HUNDRED-AND-TWENTY-FIRST ANNIVERSARY MEETING

311

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

We have audited the above Balance Sheet dated 31st December, 1951, and have obtained all the information and explanations we have required. In our opinion such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the Institution's affairs according to the best of our information and the explanations given to us and as shown by the books of the Institution.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.  
16th January, 1952.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,  
Chartered Accountants

**MAYHEW & CO.,**  
Chartered Accountants,  
*Auditors.*



## CHESNEY MEMORIAL MEDAL FUND

31st DECEMBER, 1951

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1950 :-				DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1950 ... ..			32 4 0
Balance at Bankers ... ..	37	17	7	BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1951 :-			
Investment at Market Price ... ..	276	10	0	Balance at Bankers ... ..	46	5	7
Dividends Received, Gross ... ..				Investment at Market Price :-			
				£280 3% Savings Bonds 1950-70 ... ..	244	6	0
							290 11 7
							£322 15 7

We have audited the above Statement of the Chesney Memorial Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1951, and certify the same to be correct.  
 ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.  
 16th January, 1952.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,  
 Chartered Accountants,  
 Auditors.

## TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE FUND

31st DECEMBER, 1951

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1950 :-				First Prize Essay ... ..	31	10	0
Balance at Bankers ... ..	168	5	6	Second Prize Essay ... ..	10	10	0
Investments at Market Prices ... ..	1,953	7	0	DEPRECIATIONS OF INVESTMENTS since 31st December, 1950 ... ..			42 0 0
Dividends Received, Gross ... ..				BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1951 :-			282 8 4
				Balance at Bankers ... ..	190	8	10
				Investment at Market Prices :-			
				£1,922 10s. 6d. British Transport 3% Guaranteed Stock 1978-88 ... ..	1,469	18	8
				£100 0s. 0d. 3½% War Stock ... ..	81	0	0
				£100 0s. 0d. 3% Defence Bonds ... ..	100	0	0
							1,861 7 6
							£2,185 15 10

We have audited the above Statement of the Trench Gascoigne Prize Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1951, and certify the same to be correct.  
 ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.  
 16th January, 1952.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,  
 Chartered Accountants,  
 Auditors.

## 31ST DECEMBER, 1951

We have audited the above Statement of the Brackenbury Memorial Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1951, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE,  
BARTON, MANCHESTER CO.,  
Chartered Accountants,  
16A January, 1952.

## 31st DECEMBER, 1951

We have audited the above Statement of the Eardley-Wilnot Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1981, and certify the same to be correct.

ALFRED A. H. BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.  
BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.  
Chartered Accountants,  
*Auditors.*  
16th January, 1982.



## CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

THE CHAIRMAN: Before I turn to the Annual Report I owe an apology to the members of the Institution that as Chairman I was unable to take the Chair at the Meeting last year because I was away in the United States. As those of you who were here will know, Lord Newall very kindly did so, and I am quite certain the Institution did not suffer from having him in the Chair instead of me. I am sorry that I was away.

Before dealing with the Annual Report in detail, I should like to make one or two comments. I suppose that the outstanding feature during the year as far as the Institution is concerned has been the restoration and replacement of the Rubens Ceiling. Without question, it has been a very definite attraction during the year. I am glad to record that Her Majesty Queen Mary honoured us by coming here to look at it; and, after doing so, she spent over an hour going round the Museum.

In spite of rising costs, we have had what I think I can describe as quite a satisfactory year. The membership, as you will see, has gone up, and the Museum takings have also gone up. In any institution of this sort to get rising membership and rising takings is very satisfactory indeed in these days. I know that, unfortunately, a very large number of institutions are finding the reverse.

Although the admission charges to the Museum have been raised from 1s. 6d. to 2s., that does not seem to have affected the numbers coming forward, and we have had no adverse comment about this increase. We do not know how much is due to the factor of the Festival Year or how many extra people that did bring, but without doubt it must have brought a certain number.

I should like, if I may, as retiring Chairman, to say how much I appreciate the valuable services that have been given by the various liaison officers in the three Services in Commands and Establishments and in all stations. They have been a very great help.

One other thing I am sure I should mention, and that is an appreciation of the work done by one of the staff, Miss Bickell, who recently retired, having served the Institution for twenty-five years. She had passed the normal retiring age but finally had to leave for family reasons, and it was much against her own wishes that she felt compelled to go. Your Council gave her a small recognition of her valuable and whole-hearted work, and she has appreciated that very much indeed.

I do not think there are any comments I can add to the Annual Report. I think it is perfectly plain. The Institution is benefiting very much indeed by the co-operation of members who covenant to pay their subscriptions. You will notice that it has been decided that a second and any subsequent annual covenant may be executed at the old rate of £1 5s. od. instead of £1 10s. od.

FINANCE.—Now we come to finance. I do not know whether any members here have any questions to ask about finance? (*No questions were asked.*)

JOURNAL.—The next general heading is the JOURNAL. Has anyone a question he wishes to ask about the JOURNAL? (*No questions were asked.*)

LIBRARY.—Then we come to the Library. I may say that we have just appointed a new Librarian, Wing Commander Beauman, who took over a day or two ago.

MUSEUM.—Then there is the Museum. Are there any questions regarding the Museum? (*No questions were asked.*)

If there are no remarks on the Annual Report, I move :

" That the Report and Accounts, as circulated, be taken as read and adopted."

BRIGADIER J. A. LONGMORE : I second that.

*The Resolution was then put to the Meeting and carried unanimously.*

#### ELECTION OF AUDITORS

THE CHAIRMAN : I will now ask Major-General Vyvyan to move the second Resolution on the Agenda.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. E. VYVYAN : I beg to move :

" That Messrs. Barton, Mayhew & Company be re-elected Auditors for the ensuing year."

CAPTAIN J. H. LAING : I second that.

*The Resolution was then put to the Meeting and carried unanimously.*

#### VACANCIES ON THE COUNCIL

THE CHAIRMAN : The undermentioned Officers have been nominated as Candidates for the vacancies on the Council :—

##### ROYAL MARINES (one Vacancy)

Major-General H. T. Tollemache, C.B., C.B.E., R.M.

##### ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE (one Vacancy)

Captain C. B. Sanders, V.R.D., R.N.V.R.

##### REGULAR ARMY (two Vacancies)

General Sir Ouvry L. Roberts, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O.

Major-General G. P. Walsh, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

##### TERRITORIAL ARMY (two Vacancies)

Brigadier Sir George S. Harvie-Watt, Bt., T.D., A.D.C., Q.C., D.L., M.P.

Brigadier J. A. Longmore, C.B.E., T.D., D.L.

##### ROYAL AIR FORCE (two Vacancies)

Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Newall, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., C.B.E., A.M.

Air Chief Marshal Sir James M. Robb, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.

*These officers were unanimously elected to the Council.*

#### THE TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1951

THE CHAIRMAN : I will ask the Secretary to report the result of the Trench Gascoigne Prize Essay Competition, 1951.

THE SECRETARY : The result of the Trench Gascoigne Prize Essay Competition for 1951 is as follows. There were only five entries for this competition—four from the Army and one from the Royal Air Force. On the recommendation of the Referees, the Council have awarded the prize of thirty guineas to Colonel P. A. Tobin of the Royal Engineers. At the time when he entered the competition he was a Major. He has since been appointed to the local rank of Colonel.

THE CHAIRMAN, in presenting the prize, said : I congratulate you not only on this prize but also on your promotion. I am very glad indeed.

There is one point I would like to mention in connection with this prize essay competition. It would be only right that I should thank the members of the Institution who acted as Referees. It is one of the most strenuous jobs we hand out to our members, and it falls very often on the Directors or Commandants of the Staff Colleges. In this case, Captain Currie, R.N., Major-General Lathbury, and Air Vice-Marshall Gillmore were concerned, and I feel that we should record our thanks to them for having taken on the job. It is not one of the easiest tasks.

#### VOTE OF THANKS TO THE RETIRING CHAIRMAN

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES M. ROBB : May I ask the meeting to join with me in a vote of thanks to the retiring Chairman ? We in the Council in particular see what responsibilities are carried by the Chairman in his year of office. We realize, too, what a great amount of correspondence he has to initiate. I therefore move :

“ That the thanks of the Meeting be accorded to the retiring Chairman.”

COMMODORE R. HARRISON : I have very much pleasure in seconding that proposal.

*The vote of thanks was carried by acclamation.*

THE CHAIRMAN : Thank you very much. It is not really so strenuous a year. If I may say so, it is not only a pleasure but it is also very interesting to be Chairman, and I have had the honour of holding office for two years. I thank you all very much, and I am delighted to hand over to my successor, General Sir Ouvry Roberts, who is going to take over from now on.

*The Meeting then terminated.*









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
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
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